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Abstract   
 
Using ethnographic observations and interview based research I document the 
production of research mathematics in four European research institutes, 
interviewing 45 mathematicians from three areas of pure mathematics: topology, 
algebraic geometry and differential geometry. I use Bourdieu's notions of habitus, 
field and practice to explore how mathematicians come to perceive and interact 
with abstract mathematical spaces and constructions. Perception of mathematical 
reality, I explain, depends upon enculturation within a mathematical discipline. This 
process of socialisation involves positioning an individual within a field of 
production. Within a field mathematicians acquire certain structured sets of 
dispositions which constitute habitus, and these habitus then provide both 
perspectives and perceptual lenses through which to construe mathematical 
objects and spaces. 
I describe how mathematical perception is built up through interactions 
within three domains of experience: physical spaces, conceptual spaces and 
discourse spaces. These domains share analogous structuring schemas1, which are 
related through Lakoff and Johnson's notions of metaphorical mappings and image 
schemas. Such schemas are mobilised during problem solving and proof 
construction, in order to guide mathematicians' intuitions; and are utilised during 
communicative acts, in order to create common ground and common reference 
                                                          
1 A schema is a term taken from the cognitive sciences. It describes a mental structure or framework 
for organising, relating and categorising phenomena. Schemata shape the ways in which we perceive 
reality, influencing what we attend to as well as how we attend to certain things (thus shaping our 
dispositions towards phenomena).   
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frames. However, different structuring principles are utilised according to the 
contexts in which the act of knowledge production or communication take place. 
The degree of formality, privacy or competitiveness of environments affects the 
presentation of mathematicians' selves and ideas. Goffman's concept of interaction 
frame, front-stage and backstage are therefore used to explain how certain 
positions in the field shape dispositions, and lead to the realisation of different 
structuring schemas or scripts. 
I use Sewell's qualifications of Bourdieu's theories to explore the multiplicity 
of schemas present within mathematicians' habitus, and detail how they are given 
expression through craftwork and bricolage. I argue that mathematicians' 
perception of mathematical phenomena are dependent upon their positions and 
relations. I develop the notion of social space, providing definitions of such spaces 
and how they are generated, how positions are determined, and how individuals 
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Chapter 1: Introductions  
 
1.0 Overview  
 
In this introductory chapter I provide an overview of the thesis, and justify my 
choice of field sites, areas of study, and theorists used. In section 1.2 I provide the 
reader with a literature review, which covers a discussion of key works associated 
with some of the main themes addressed within the thesis’ body. In section 1.3 I 
review the main methods used during the course of my fieldwork. In section 1.4 I 
detail my use of Bourdieu, Goffman and Lakoff and Johnson, providing definitions 
of the terms and theories I will use later on in the thesis. Finally, in 1.5 I provide 

















Section 1.1: Motivations 
 
1.11 Introduction: Bridging Worlds 
This thesis concerns the production of mathematical knowledge by research 
mathematicians, within the contexts of mathematics institutes. This study does not 
focus on specific local engagements with mathematical problems or controversies, 
but rather its aim is to document the broader, everyday practices undertaken by a 
range of different individuals in the course of producing mathematics. I am not 
specifically concerned with the production of proof, but rather explore a range of 
activities involved in research mathematicians' work lives, activities such as 
collaborating, teaching, supervising, sketching, reflecting, reading, socialising, even 
escaping from their work. My study does not narrow down to one specific 
mathematical sub-discipline, but rather I study individuals within algebraic 
geometry, topology and differential geometry. The reason for this generality was 
not only a result of access and availability of researchers, but because, within 
research institutes, a variety of mathematicians, from a range of disciplines, share 
spaces, resources and ideas. Many researchers collaborate across sub-disciplines, 
and adopt tools and techniques from other fields. The boundaries between 
disciplines is often porous, and thus delineating a group who are pure algebraic 
geometers or pure topologists can be difficult.   
Maintaining this level of generality therefore is a way of not reifying the 
divisions between mathematical disciplines, and reflects better the fuzzy 
boundaries between social groupings in mathematics. Using a multi-sited 
ethnographic approach provides a breadth, rather than a depth, to this study. 
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Focusing on the everyday work-practices, and on the social lives of mathematicians, 
likewise provides a feel for what work and life is like in these disciplines. I argue 
that this approach can complement the in-depth work conducted in the sociology 
of mathematics by, for example, MacKenzie (1999), Livingston (1998) and Bloor 
(1978). Such breadth-work provides a glimpse of the wider contexts for 
mathematical knowledge production, providing an overview of the working 
environments and practices of knowledge workers. Such mundane worlds can be 
taken for granted, but this thesis argues that it is from the mundane that the 
complex, abstract mathematical worlds are built. I will use the background habits, 
the mundane daily practices, as the starting point for discussing the processes by 
which knowledge is experienced, validated and constructed.  
1.12 What areas of mathematics am I studying? 
The mathematical field is divided into a number of sub-fields, which correspond to 
populations of individuals working on certain problems, objects or concepts of a 
mathematical nature. The sub-fields of mathematics are often grouped together 
into two broad areas of "applied" and "pure" mathematics. Applied mathematicians 
apply their research to practical problems in other disciplines, such as engineering, 
natural sciences, computer science, etc. Pure mathematicians on the other hand 
deal with abstract objects and concepts, which may or may not be related to real 
world problems. The areas this thesis deals with: algebraic geometry, topology and 
differential geometry, fall into this category of "pure" mathematics, although many 
ideas from these fields have been applied to problems outside of the field. Let me 
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now give some brief overviews of the three disciplines I am engaging with in this 
thesis.  
The first discipline, algebraic geometry, uses techniques from abstract 
algebra to solve geometric problems. Algebraic geometers study solutions to 
systems of polynomial equations, through use of geometric representations of such 
equations, in objects called "algebraic varieties". These varieties are divided into 
classes of objects which share certain features, for example they may take the form 
of plane curves, lines, parabolas, ellipses, etc. The work of the algebraic geometer is 
not only to classify such objects, but also to explore them, documenting their 
features, how they are generated, and what relationships exist between objects of 
different classes.  
Our second community, of topologists, study the changing properties of 
objects as they are continuously distorted or deformed. Topologists convert objects 
under investigation into collections of sets, which allow such objects to be treated 
as "topological spaces". Through translating objects into topological spaces, the 
properties, relationships, and generating principles of the objects can be explored. 
Different fields of topology explore how topological spaces are grouped together or 
connected (algebraic topology), how spaces are embedded in other spaces 
(geometric topology), or how spaces are affected by differentiable functions 
(differential topology).  
Finally, the third discipline of differential geometry, deals with the 
application of calculus and algebra to studying geometric problems. Differential 
geometers analyse curves and surfaces, exploring their properties and 
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relationships. Through such analysis they classify such objects, and provide 
explanations for their properties, and the ways in which they are constructed.  
1.13 Why study mathematical communities? 
Mathematicians will often borrow tools and techniques from other mathematical 
disciplines, as well as collaborate across disciplinary boundaries, making such 
boundaries somewhat porous. However, as Restivo (1994) explains, the boundaries 
between disciplines have emerged over time, through processes of 
professionalization and specialisation. Such processes serve to differentiate aspects 
of mathematics. Through such differentiation different communities are bounded 
and constituted as separate disciplines: 
Specialization, professionalization, and bureaucratization are aspects of the 
organizational and institutional history of modern mathematics. These 
processes occurred in earlier mathematics traditions but their scope, scale, 
and continuity in modern times are unparalleled. Their effect is to generate 
closure in mathematics worlds. As closure increases, the boundaries 
separating mathematics worlds from each other and from other social 
words thicken and become increasingly impenetrable. Specialized 
languages, symbols, and notations are some of the things that thicken the 
boundaries around mathematics worlds (Restivo, 1994:214) 
 
The mathematical worlds that Restivo presents are inherently social worlds, which 
are the product of histories, politics and social change. Schoenfeld (1992) also 
acknowledges mathematics as a social practice, which is learned through becoming 
socialised within the mathematical field:  
Mathematics is an inherently social activity in which a community of trained 
practitioners (mathematical scientists) engages in the science of patterns - 
systematic attempts based on observation, study, and experimentation to 
determine the nature or principles of regularities in systems defined 
axiomatically or theoretically or models of systems abstracted from real 
world objects. The tools of mathematics are abstraction, symbolic 
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representation, and symbolic manipulation. However, being trained in the 
use of these tools no more means that one thinks mathematically than 
knowing how to use shop tools makes one a craftsman. Learning to think 
mathematically means (a) developing a mathematical point of view - valuing 
the processes of mathematization and abstraction and having the 
predilection to apply them, and (b) developing competence with the tools of 
the trade, and using those tools in the service of the goal of understanding 
structure - mathematical sense-making (Schoenfeld, 1992:335) 
 
This process of socialisation, according to Schoenfeld, concerns assimilating the 
individual within the field of knowledge production, through providing them with a 
viewpoint on the field, as well as the tools necessary to contribute to the field's 
reproduction. Restivo argues that these "viewpoints" and "tools of the trade" have 
become ever more specialised within mathematics and its sub-disciplines, as well as 
ever more abstracted from the day-to-day realities we experience. Restivo argues 
that the disciplines of mathematics form their own separate worlds, whose 
reference objects are not "picturable" in terms of objects from the phenomenal 
world. Rather, referents in mathematics are internal to the mathematical language 
within which they are constituted. Restivo (1994) writes: 
As generational continuity is extended and closure proceeds in a 
mathematical community, mathematicians work more and more in and less 
and less out of their mathematics worlds. As a result, their experiences 
become progressively more difficult to ground and discuss in terms of 
generally familiar everyday world experiences. The worlds they leave behind 
are pictured worlds, landscapes of identifiable things. Mathematics worlds 
are worlds of specialized symbols and notations. This is the social and 
material foundation of so-called `pictureless' mathematics. But 
mathematical experiences in highly specialized mathematics worlds are not 
literally picture-less. The resources being manipulated and imagined in 
mathematics worlds are so highly refined that they are not picturable in 
terms of everyday reality; the referents for mathematical objects are 
increasingly mathematical objects and not objects from the everyday world. 
Since closure is never perfect, some degree of everyday picturing does occur 
even in the most abstract mathematical work; and, in any case, everyday 
pictures are almost inevitably produced as mathematicians move back and 
forth between mathematics and other social worlds. At the same time, new 
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picturing experiences and processes lead to the development of new 
pictures, mathematics world pictures. (Restivo, 1994:216) 
 
Mathematics becomes abstracted from the "picturable" world, meaning that 
linguistic systems are generated, whose referents lie in abstract conceptual spaces, 
rather than in physical space. To perceive and "picture" mathematical objects, an 
individual must learn mathematical languages, and acquire a vocabulary of 
mathematical objects by which to classify the mathematical world. The perception 
of mathematical reality is then mediated by the categories that are constructed 
within a mathematical language, and this language is, in turn, shaped through 
consensus between members of the community of practice. The abstract pictures 
which mathematicians use to visualise and perceive mathematical reality are the 
products of the social group and, therefore, in order to understand mathematical 
perception, we must explore the social mechanisms by which categories in 
language are produced. Restivo writes that we must understand mathematics as a 
form of social reproduction. This involves documenting the production processes 
involved in mathematical knowledge work, and the mechanisms involved in the 
production of the mathematical field itself. For such a reason we must ask: 
[W]hat do scientists produce, and how do they produce it; what re-sources 
do they use and use up; what material by-products and wastes do they 
produce; what good is what they produce, in what social contexts is it 
valued, and who values it; what costs, risks, and benefits does scientific 
work lead to for individuals, communities, classes, societies, and the 
ecological foundations of social life ... What is the relationship be-tween 
scientists and various publics, clients, audiences, patrons; how do scientists 
relate to each other, their families and friends, their colleagues in other 
walks of life; what is their relationship as workers to the owners of the 
means of scientific production; what are their self-images, and how do they 
fit into the communities they live in; what are their goals, visions, and 
motives? (Restivo, 1988:218) 
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From the questions above, we see that there are many opportunities to study 
mathematics from a sociological perspective. Knowledge production in 
mathematics is a social process, and through exploring not only how and where 
knowledge is produced, but also why knowledge is produced, we can begin to 
understand the extent to which knowledge is socially shaped. Restivo's questions 
provide much of the motivation for the following thesis, and in part explain the 
more general approach I have taken during the course of my questioning. One of 
my aims, in this thesis, is to orient the reader within the field of mathematics, 
through situating mathematical production within its wider social frameworks.  
 
1.14 Why were these field sites selected? 
In order to frame mathematical production I must ground production practices 
within specific contexts. Mathematics, after all, is produced by individuals within 
certain physical and social environments, at certain times, according to certain 
rules, using certain tools and techniques. In this thesis I chose to study 
mathematicians working at mathematics research institutes. Such institutes were 
designed specifically to facilitate the production of mathematics, and recruit 
populations of mathematicians for this purpose. These mathematicians, recruited 
according to the areas of mathematics they worked in, and from a variety of 
different institutions and backgrounds, provided representative samples of the 
wider population of elite research mathematicians. This sample of mathematicians 
however were already pre-selected, in the sense that the institutes themselves 
recruited individuals according to their own, institution-specific, selection criteria.  
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Studying mathematical production in institutes allowed me to explore 
spaces which have been specifically designed to facilitate mathematical knowledge 
production. Such spaces were thus "mathematical spaces" in the sense that they 
were pre-tooled for use by mathematicians, and afforded certain resources for 
effective production of mathematics. Within the confines of the institute, 
mathematicians were more likely to communicate with one another, form 
collaborations, and thus be open to talking about their research. Since 
mathematicians were already expected to speak about their ideas and collaborate, I 
reasoned that the institute would be a good place to observe how knowledge is 
performed and made public2 and visible.  
The institutes themselves were chosen on the basis of a number of criteria: 
access to the institutes and the mathematicians working there, existing contacts 
within the institutes, availability of funding for travel and accommodation, 
reputation of the institutes, as well as the areas of mathematics such institutes 
specialised in. Before choosing my field sites I built up a network of mathematicians 
through personal correspondences, attending conferences and talks in the relevant 
fields, and through collaborating with individuals working within mathematics and 
computer science. I then obtained a number of scholarships from the institutions 
                                                          
2 The question of what constitutes “public” must be addressed at this point. Public is a relational 
concept and depends on the perceived position an individual occupies with respect to other 
individuals within a given environment in which an individual presents themselves. The public realm 
is a space in which individuals present their “social” face to the world. Public spaces are places 
where socially meaningful symbols and values are communicated between socialised individuals. In 
mathematics these spaces may comprise of physical spaces of institutes as well as virtual spaces on 
forums, personal websites or publications. The public is any space where the individual becomes 
visible to the evaluations of others, and where they must present a “face” or position by which they 
wish their social selves to be viewed.      
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themselves, along with permission from the institutes' directors, which allowed me 
to undertake 1-2 month long fieldwork at each of the sites.  
My aim was to narrow down my investigations to studying mathematics 
within elite, well-known institutions. The reason for this was to study knowledge 
production in its most "visible" and "public" form. Such institutions select 
mathematicians who are often well-published, well-cited, well-known, well-
educated and highly competitive. Such a population, I believed, would likely be 
leaders within their respective fields, and thus would have the ability to influence 
the directions in which their fields developed. Studying how these change-agents 
produced knowledge, how they performed and presented their knowledge, and 
how they assimilated such knowledge into the mathematical field, would therefore 
allow me to better understand the production processes within the mathematical 
field itself. However, in the future, to extend this study I believe it is necessary to 
explore knowledge production within "middle and lower tier" institutions, and get a 
sense of the role that individuals with lower capital accumulations play in shaping 
the field of production.  
1.15 Why use Bourdieu? 
The next set of decisions I need to justify concern the use of Bourdieu's ideas on 
practice, habitus and field, which act as the core theoretical grounding for this 
thesis. Within the sociology of scientific knowledge and sociology of science and 
technology community Bourdieu's ideas have had little influence, indeed they are 
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somewhat unpopular, and therefore neglected3. In this thesis, however, Bourdieu's 
theories take centre stage. There are several reasons for this.  
My first reason for using Bourdieu is because his theories provide a 
coherent framework by which to structure my fieldwork observations and interview 
materials. Explaining the complexity involved in research mathematics involves 
studying phenomena on a range of spatial and temporal scales, which takes place 
between different groups of researchers, within different social contexts; these 
researchers use complex languages and complex representations to communicate 
and produce knowledge. Much of their work takes place in inaccessible spaces of 
the mind, and are therefore opaque to observations. Confronted with such 
complexity within multiple dimensions of reality, within physical space, conceptual 
space, linguistic space and discourse space, requires theories which take such 
complexity into account. Bourdieu's notion of field, habitus and practice do just 
this, encompassing these different realms of experience, and demonstrating the 
interconnectivity between the structuring principles in each. Using Bourdieu thus 
allows me to relate phenomena within these different dimensions.  
Bourdieu provides a wide body of work from which to draw insight and 
inspiration, covering ethnographic work conducted among the Berber of Algeria, 
textual studies of 19th century French literature, studies of academic life, studies in 
linguistics, as well as work on the production of knowledge in science and art. This 
wide range of interests is united by a common framework for analysis, which 
                                                          
3 Bourdieu’s unpopularity within STS stems from a series of harsh critiques levelled at leading figures 
within the field, including Harry Collins, David Bloor, Karen Knorr-Cetina and Bruno Latour (see 
Sismondo, 2011:86). Bourdieu unfairly describes the work of these authors as “post-modern 
rantings” which undermine public confidence in science.  
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demonstrates the similarities between the organisation and functioning of social 
systems, at different levels of experience. Bourdieu looks not only at local contexts, 
at the structuring principles of the Berber house, for example, but also explores 
wider social systems - in the generation of academic fields, for instance. At different 
scales of social organisation there are common structuring principles, and the role 
of the sociologist becomes that of relating the local fields to the global fields which 
encompass them, and of understanding how meaning, power, and resources may 
be transformed or reproduced at different scales, locations, or periods of time. 
Within mathematics I was confronted with the problem of relating the local work of 
solving problems, to the wider field in which those problems are constituted. 
Through Bourdieu's ideas I was able to understand how perception of mathematical 
problems is shaped by the wider field of discourse, by structuring individual's 
dispositions towards mathematical phenomena.  
As a result of the interpretive flexibility of Bourdieu's definitions (especially 
of habitus), and of the analogical nature of Bourdieu's concept of structure, I was 
able to weave in other theorists such as Goffman and Lakoff and Johnson, who I 
believe complement Bourdieu's thought. Goffman's work on theatres of 
performance fits in well with Bourdieu's notion of practice, and Lakoff and 
Johnson's work on metaphor works well with Bourdieu's analogical, multi-
dimensional conception of habitus. Although such modularity may make this thesis 
appear eclectic and amorphous in its structure, I believe that such additions are 
necessary to fully understand how mathematical perception is shaped, and how 
knowledge is produced in mathematics.  
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My final justification for using Bourdieu concerns the notion of social 
topology. Bourdieu refers to this notion variously as a "social physics", or a "social 
calculus", but social topology works rhetorically within this thesis, as I work with 
topologists themselves. The simplicity of Bourdieu's ideas around social topologies 
is what attracted me to this mode of analysis, which simply involves describing 
properties of position, relation, differentiation, integration and orientation within 
social systems. I found that this simple method could be developed into a tool for 
describing the mathematical fields I studied, and a way to conceptualise how 
different dimensions of experience could be integrated within a common 
interpretive frame. I will however leave further explanation of my interpretation of 
Bourdieu's idea of topology until the end of the thesis, during the discussion, but I 
ask that the reader keep such ideas in mind when progressing through the main 
body of the thesis.  
1.16 What aspects of Bourdieu’s analytical framework will be adopted? 
 Standard uses of Bourdieu’s analytical framework will focus on the role that 
social position (class conditions), education and early socialisation play in shaping 
an individual’s position and disposition. The purpose of this is to situate or 
“objectivate” the individual within certain classes within a field, as well as 
determine their social position and capital accumulations. To follow the 
Bourdieusian framework precisely a researcher must therefore study in great detail 
the socio-economic backgrounds of the participants, exploring their parent’s 
occupations, their nationality, ethnicity, religious affiliation, up-bringing and early 
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childhood education. After this has been determined so the participants’ research 
history, education and career trajectory, and history of thought can be explored.  
 In this thesis the socio-economic and educational backgrounds of 
participants were explored, however my thesis diverges from tradition by not 
privileging this data in the later presentation. Although it can be said that socio-
economic background does play a role in shaping later career trajectories, through 
influencing the schools attended, the membership to elite social networks, etc., it 
appeared that subsequent socialisation within mathematical and academic fields 
had more of an influence on the subsequent development of mathematicians’ 
ideas.  
 In this thesis I use the method of objectivation as a means of understanding 
mathematicians’ positionings within institutional spaces. I use ethnographic 
observations to study work-habits and social interaction, studying how they change 
as a function of the formality and visibility of space. I then use objectivation during 
interviews, asking interviewees to locate themselves and their ideas within the 
field, through prompting them to outline their educational histories, the major 
influences on their thought, and the relationships they may have with 
collaborators, peers and supervisors. Understanding how the individual is 
positioned and how they position themselves within the field, through exploring 
goals, motivations and strategies, then allows me to study the “field effects” 
experienced by mathematicians.  
 As a result of the complexities involved in implementing Bourdieu’s ideas on 
social matrices, I have chosen to neglect some of the finer details of “objectivation”. 
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To construct a social matrix would have required exploring a number of parameters 
(for example family life, leisure pursuits, media consumed etc.), listing each 
parameter within the rows and columns of a matrix, and then measuring the effects 
of each parameter on every other parameter (taking partial derivatives). 
Understanding how each dimension of the social matrix functions in relation to 
every other dimension is possible, but is difficult to realise in the confines of a 
thesis. Instead I have chosen to study the multi-dimensional properties of habitus, 
through objectivating the individual and their ideas within physical, conceptual and 
discourse spaces, and showing the similar structuring principles present within each 
space.  
 Finally I must state that my thesis diverges significantly from the 
Bourdieusian framework by its lack of focus on inequality. Social stratification 
within the mathematical field is significant, especially when it comes to interactions 
between PhD’s and tenured professors, the allocation of prizes and positions, the 
presentation of knowledge during chalk-talks, and acceptance, validation and 
citation of published works. I briefly describe the tensions between friendship and 
competition, the pressures of productivity and the influence of certain individuals in 
the field, however limitations of space prevent inequality being discussed in any 
great detail.         
1.17 What are some of the criticisms levelled at Bourdieu? 
Bourdieu’s analytical framework should not be employed naively to studying the 
production of the mathematical field. Indeed, as Sismondo (2011) and Camic (2011) 
argue, there are some underlying problems within Bourdieu’s thought, which 
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present challenges to developing Bourdieu’s sociology of science. According to 
Sismondo, Bourdieu constructs an overly rationalised view of science, which 
neglects the messiness of knowledge production and decision-making in practice 
(Sismondo, 2011:89). Bourdieu is seen to neglect the materiality of scientific 
knowledge production, focusing on the more theoretical, “thinking” sciences, such 
as theoretical physics and mathematics, rather than the practical, “wet” biological 
sciences (Sismondo, 2011:92). This bias privileges the explicit, formalisable aspects 
of knowledge over those of the tacit and sensual. However, although it can be said 
that Bourdieu viewed Actor Network Theory in a negative light, it cannot be said 
that Bourdieu neglects the role that the material world, and the role that the tacit 
dimensions of experience, play in shaping the production and perception of 
knowledge. In this thesis I shall demonstrate these material aspects of knowledge-
production, and show how they are incorporated within Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus. Materiality, I explain, far from being neglected by Bourdieu, was in fact a 
central part of his notion of habitus and field.  
The next apparent problem associated with Bourdieu’s work lies in the 
varying notions of fields and their boundaries. According to Camic (2011), Bourdieu 
presents two antagonistic notions of field: on the one hand as discrete entities with 
their own internal logic, and on the other as interconnected, intersecting spaces, 
whose boundaries are permeable (Camic, 2011:281-3). Such varying definitions for 
the field, according to Camic, are symptoms of Bourdieu’s “cleft” sociology, which 
emerges from the antagonisms between his theoretical and empirical works. This 
duality in interpretation leads some researchers, such as Sismondo (2011), to 
conclude that Bourdieu reifies the boundaries around fields, and abstracts such 
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fields from their wider socio-cultural contexts and histories of formation (Sismondo, 
2011:92). However, such an interpretation, as Camic argues, neglects the multi-
scale nature of Bourdieu’s analytical framework, which seeks to understand how 
fields embed and interact within systems of fields (Camic, 2011:290).  
These interactions and intersections between fields, can be difficult to 
articulate and define explicitly. This difficulty arises from the complexities and 
interdependencies involved in networked fields’ interactions. The field effects of 
one field upon another therefore are hard to measure and characterise in a single 
sociological study. For such a reason a Bourdieu-inspired analysis requires multiple 
investigations, at different scales of magnification, beginning at the level of local 
field, or local collection of fields, and building out to encompass a global field of 
relations. This initial focus on the local field can result in the reification of the 
boundaries of a field, making fields appear as independent entities. But this 
reification of a field is a necessary evil, imposed by the limits of sociological analysis. 
Ideally all relevant forces would be studied simultaneously, in order to characterise 
a social system. However the complexities involved in such analysis would create a 
single body of work too vast to be practical.  
For this reason it is better to adopt a modular approach to sociological 
analysis, which takes the local field, or collection of local fields, as independent 
units of analysis, and then builds together different units, in separate sociological 
studies, into more complex systems of relations. Within this thesis I take a 
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collection of sub-fields4 in mathematics as my unit of analysis, and focus on defining 
how individuals position themselves at different spatial levels within these fields. 
The end result is not to fully characterise individuals’ positioning within the 
mathematical field, but rather to begin a process of locating the individual within a 
social system. From this starting point it will then be possible to change my 
objective frames of reference, zooming in or out to interactions on different scales 
of magnification. These different framings, I explain in the conclusion, can then be 
added together to present a more coherent understanding of an individual’s 
position within a social system, and the effect of such position on their dispositions 
and knowledge-production practices.  
1.18 How has the Bourdieusian framework been used in the history of 
mathematics? 
A Bourdieusian style framework of analysis has been adopted by a number of 
researchers within the history of mathematics, notably Goldstein et al. (2007a, 
2007b) on the intellectual histories of Gauss and Einstein, Brian (1994) on the socio-
cultural histories of statistics in 18th-19th century France, Ehrhardt (2010, 2012, 
2016) on adaptation of Galois’ work in 19th century France, and Gingras (2001) on 
the mathematization of physics during the 18th century.  
                                                          
4 A sub-field I take to be a sub-set of a field. The field of Algebraic geometry, for example, is a sub-
field of the Mathematical field, it is therefore contained within the wider field of mathematics, 
which, in turn, is contained within the wider field of “Academia”. Fields therefore can be nested 
within other fields, and thus can be defined as “sub-fields” according to their relative positions with 
respect to other fields or sets of fields. Being a sub-field of a field, so the sub-field bears certain 
qualities possessed by the field, but also has unique qualities with respect to other areas of the field, 
for example possessing specialised capital in the form of languages, tools, techniques, histories, etc. 
not shared with other parts of the wider field. These sub-fields are separate spaces for competition, 




Goldstein and Schappacher’s (2007a) articles on the publication and 
dissemination of Gauss’ Disquisitiones Arithmeticae (1801) utilise an implicit 
Bourdieusian style of analysis, which positions Gauss’ work within its historical, 
intellectual and social contexts. Goldstein et al. study how the work was related to 
existing bodies of knowledge, how it was accepted and assimilated within the 
intellectual community, as well as how the work generated a new field of enquiry 
within mathematics. According to Goldstein and Schappacher, to objectivate the 
position of Gauss’ ideas requires:  
…[M]ore than just a “thicker description” of such milestones; it requires that 
light be shed on other patterns of development, other readers, other 
mathematical uses of the book – it requires a change in our questionnaire. 
We need to answer specific questions, such as: What happened to the book 
outside Germany? What were the particularities, if any, of its reception in 
Germany? Which parts of it were read and reworked? And when? Which 
developments, in which domains, did it stimulate – or hamper? What role 
did it play in later attempts to found mathematics on arithmetic? (Goldstein 
and Schappacher 2007: 4-5) 
 
Goldstein and Schappacher trace out the connections between Disquisitiones 
Arithmeticae (DA) and other works of the time, through following citations 
referenced in Gauss’ book. Through building up a network of citations so they were 
able to trace the social relations between ideas incorporated into DA, as well as the 
social relations between individuals who were working on similar problems at the 
time. As they write below, this map of objective relations (in the form of citations), 
was mirrored by the personal correspondences taking place between authors, and 




More specifically, we have called arithmetic algebraic analysis the domain of 
research directly connected with the D.A. that knit together reciprocity laws, 
series with arithmetical interpretations, elliptic functions and algebraic 
equations. We argue that it constituted a (research) field, in the sense that 
“all the people who are engaged in [this] field have in common a certain 
number of fundamental interests, viz., in everything that is linked to the 
very existence of the field,” and that one can uncover “the presence in the 
work of traces of objective relations … to other works, past or present, [of 
the field].”As we have noticed, its main actors were indeed linked by a 
dense communication network, both personal and mathematical. Their 
published papers would meet with prompt reactions; quite a number of 
these papers were in fact excerpts of letters addressed to another 
mathematician working in the domain 
 
This process of tracing out objective relations between works was precisely what 
Bourdieu intended to accomplish through his objectivation process. Such a process 
of objectivation requires analysis at different levels of magnification, from the local 
level of individual interpretations and negotiations, to the global level of the field of 
discourse. Ehrhardt (2016) in her discussion of the posthumous reimagining of 
Évariste Galois’ work balances this study of local representations with an analysis of 
the socio-intellectual contexts within which Galois’ ideas were popularised. Below, 
for example, Ehrhardt objectivates the mathematician Arthur Cayley within the 
wider historical context of 19th century Cambridge, in order to understand his 
interpretation of Galois’ theories: 
Therefore, Cayley’s interpretation implied a complete conceptual change, as 
well as new representations associated with Galois’s memoir. If we take a 
closer look at Cayley’s intellectual and social environment, Cambridge 
University in the Victorian age, we can gain a better understanding of this 
phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, Cambridge was much more than 
place of education: it was home to a specific mathematical tradition that 
structured a whole scientific community, both socially and culturally 
(Warwick 2003, 49–285). In the 1850s it was certainly the place in Europe 
where algebra was the least synonymous with the theory of equations. 
From the 1810s onward, mathematics in Cambridge was profoundly 
renewed by a group of mathematicians often called the English Algebraic 
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School… In other words, this choice of notation was linked to a specific 
mathematical practice that was typical of the scholarly culture Cayley 
belonged to. Moreover, the mathematicians of the English Algebraic School 
had an epistemological way of thinking about the “essence” of algebra that 
they put into practice in mathematical works that developed new objects 
and new methods. Cayley’s generation may have been less concerned with 
seeking the foundations of algebra, but the fact that Cayley saw the concept 
of the group as a kind of generic concept that would enable mathematicians 
to unify many particular situations reveals that he also tried to uncover the 
“true reasons” of these situations that were concealed by their specificity. 
(Ehrhardt, 2016:332). 
 
Ehrhardt (2010) builds up an historical frame in which to position the individual, 
and through which we can understand how Galois’ ideas were being construed. 
Through studying mathematicians’ syllabuses and text-books from the period she 
also develops a sense of the conceptual habitus that Galois’ work would have been 
related to, and through which it was interpreted by readers of the period: 
Analyzing the standard mathematical textbooks helps us to paint this picture 
with a finer brush by showing the practical skills attached to the theory of 
equations. These books not only inform us about the kind of knowledge that 
was to be passed on, but also elucidate the contours of each sub-discipline, 
the way knowledge was introduced and used in examples and applications. 
They embody cognitive and methodological preferences, which will be 
adopted by the later generations in the course of their training, and which 
will be considered as the right way to ask questions and to solve problems 
(Schubring 1987). Thus opening Lacroix’s textbooks allows us to see Galois’s 
paper through the eyes of its readers. (Ehrhardt: 2010:95) 
 
Ehrhardt explicitly makes use of Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and attempts to 
locate Galois within the mathematical field at the time, through comparing his 
position to other authors of similar position, she writes: 
To understand how algebraic research relied, in a practical way, on the 
nineteenth century French mathematical habitus, and then what Galois’s 
readers expected to find in his paper, we will compare this paper to 
another. But as every mathematical research is unique by definition, we will 
first explain what this means. First, we need a paper that could have been 
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seen by the academicians as one that resembles Galois’s with respect to the 
author’s position in the community and to its subject. (Ehrhardt, 2010:102) 
 
Through comparisons with other authors in similar socio-economic positions she 
locates Galois within a dominated strata of the field. Below she discusses how this 
position influenced how his ideas were received by the establishment: 
Thus, the scientific field offered Galois a “space of possibilities” much larger 
than what was labeled by the Academy of Sciences. Nevertheless, Galois’s 
student position was at the bottom of the scale of positions within this field 
– in Bourdieu’s words, Galois was in a “dominated” position. Still, Galois 
thought that he deserved more than a teacher’s job in province and for this, 
the highest scientific rewards, he needed the Academy of Sciences whose 
members were in a “dominating” position within the scientific field through 
an institution whose role in evaluating research meant that it still embodied 
the scientific temperament (Ehrhardt, 2010:107) 
 
Erhard uses this Bourdieusian style of analysis to better understand how 
disposition, and validation of knowledge vary as a function of social position. Like 
Goldstein (2007) and Brian (1994) Erhard demonstrates the power of objectivating 
positions within a field, and of situating the individual within specific socio-historical 
frameworks. In the following thesis I will carry on this process of objectivation, 
however, rather than focusing on an historical context, I will attempt to objectivate 
mathematicians within the present-day field of mathematical production.      
1.19 What does this study contribute to sociology? 
My hope is that this study can add to the growing body of ethnographic work 
undertaken with mathematicians by Heintz (1999), Greiffenhagen (2011) and 
Barany (2012). My thesis attempts to answer some of the questions posed by 
Restivo (1982), through documenting the processes of production in mathematics, 
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and exploring mathematics as a form of craftwork. Like Livingston (2007) I attempt 
to explore the local contexts of production, but I attempt to situate such production 
within the wider mathematical field. I use Bourdieu (1978, 2004) to understand the 
dialectics between local and global, agency and structure, the individual and 
society, and the body of this thesis follows Bourdieu's process of analysing social 
systems. Through use of Bourdieu I demonstrate how mathematical perception is 
constructed, and how it functions on three spatial levels, encompassing physical, 
conceptual and discourse spaces. In developing Bourdieu's notion of a social 
topology I present the potential to construct mathematical models for representing 
social systems, which can be developed as a tool for comparing and understanding 
the production of different social fields.  
1.19.1 What is my main thesis? 
The mathematical field is a social field which consists of socialised individuals 
bearing properties of position, relation, differentiation, integration, and orientation. 
These spatial relations are structured according to the possession of social capital, 
which is unequally distributed through the field. An individual's position within the 
field generates habitus - systems of durable, transposable dispositions - and such 
habitus structure individual's perception of mathematical phenomena and of the 
mathematical field itself. I demonstrate how mathematical perception is built 
through orienting the individual within the mathematical field. I describe how, by 
understanding how individuals position themselves within the field of production, 
through practice and performance, we can understand how they become oriented 
or disposed towards mathematical phenomena. I argue that these operations of 
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position, orientation, differentiation, integration and relation are present within 
three different spatial dimensions: conceptual, physical and discourse spaces. I 
demonstrate that, because these spaces bear similar properties, they are 
analogically related through metaphor5. Finally I propose that these analogical 
relationships are themselves the result of shared generative schemas, which allow 











                                                          
5 Although analogy implies approximation, there is also another sense in which metaphor can be 
interpreted, which is as homology or isomorphy (equality). In mathematics there are direct 
homologues to certain concepts within different disciplines. One object can thus have many 
manifestations depending on the language used to describe it, the frames of reference used to view 
it, or the objects or examples used to relate it to.   
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Section 1.2: Literature Review 
1.21 Introduction  
In this literature review I shall contextualise this thesis within the existing literature 
on the sociology of mathematics. I will divide this review into four main sections, 
each discussing a major theme present within the body of my thesis. The first 
theme concerns the nature of objectivity and the social shaping of knowledge in 
mathematics. The second theme explores the presentation and performance of 
knowledge in mathematics. The third theme concerns the mutability of categories 
through dialogue and debate, as well as the stabilisation and socialisation of 
meaning. The fourth theme involves understanding mathematical practices 
themselves, exploring work involving the local contexts of knowledge production.  
Theme 1: Nature of Objectivity  
 
1.22: How is objectivity in mathematics socially shaped? 
Bloor (1984) argues that what is considered objective and factual in any scientific 
discipline, mathematics included, is a product of its social context. Objectivity is 
produced through "institutionalisation" of concepts.  According to Bloor: 
[O]bjectivity is social. What I mean by saying that objectivity is social is that 
the impersonal and stable character that attaches to some of our beliefs, 
and the sense of reality that attaches to their reference, derives from these 
beliefs being social institutions (Bloor, 1984:229) 
 
The requirements of being objective are that beliefs are non-subjective, stable, and 
shared, as Bloor states: 
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[A] belief that is objective is one that does not belong to any individual. It 
does not fluctuate like a subjective state or a personal preference. It is not 
mine or yours, but can be shared. It has an external, thing-like aspect to it 
(Bloor, 1984:229) 
Objectivity gives object-like stability to the things we believe in, makes rules and 
standards compelling, and gives the appearance of being external to the individual. 
These criteria for objectivity, according to Bloor, are met by social institutions. He 
writes: 
My claim is that these specifications are met by social institutions. The 
taken-for-granted practices sanctioned by a group have just this quality of 
being external to the individual. They have a stability far greater than the 
individual's changing desires. They are the common ground where 
individuals meet. They are shared. So institutions satisfy the general 
conditions for objectivity. The second step is to seize the opportunity 
presented by this interesting fact, and to identify the objective with the 
social. The second step does not, of course, follow from the first step. It is an 
act of theory formation: a conjecture, not a deduction (Bloor, 1984:229-30) 
 
Bloor argues that because social institutions satisfy the criteria of creating 
objectivity, that objectivity itself is the product of "social institutions". Such social 
institutions can take many forms: religious organisations, nation-states, languages, 
or academic disciplines. In relation to this thesis "social institution" encompasses 
the community of mathematical practitioners within mathematical institutes and 
mathematical disciplines. Within these institutions mathematicians are constituted 
as mathematicians, through sharing common languages, common beliefs, 
conceptual tools, rules and standards, and methods for constructing and evaluating 
knowledge. As a result of objectivity being located within such social institutions, 
the members of institutions are also able to define what constitutes as objective 
and valid. The consequence of the social construction of objectivity is that 
objectivity is then influenced by the social contexts within which it is generated.  
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The objectivity of certain beliefs, and the constitution of beliefs as "factual", 
therefore depends upon the systems of beliefs within which such knowledge is 
constituted, and the community of believers who share these beliefs. Restivo 
(1994) uses Durkheim's concept of "thought collective" to characterise these 
systems of beliefs and believers. An individual's thoughts are seen as being shaped 
by their social contexts, by Bloor's social institutions. The institution therefore 
defines the entire field of possibilities for action and thought, which makes an 
individual's thoughts a product of the collective consciousness. This is explained by 
Restivo (1994) in the following:   
Durkheim (1961:485) argues that individualized thoughts can only be 
understood and explained by attaching them to the social conditions they 
depend on. Thus, ideas become communicable concepts only when, and to 
the extent that, they can be and are shared... The apparently purest 
concepts, logical concepts, take on the appearance of objective and 
impersonal concepts only to the extent that, and by virtue of, the fact that 
they are communicable and communicated, that is, only insofar as they are 
collective representations. All concepts, then, are collective representations 
and collective elaborations because they are conceived, developed, 
sustained, and changed through social work in social contexts. In fact, all 
contexts of human thought and action are social. The next intellectual step 
is to recognize that 'work', 'context', 'thought', and 'action' are inseparable; 
concepts, then, are not merely social products, they are constitutively social. 
This line of thinking leads to the radical conclusion that it is social worlds or 
communities that think, not individuals. Communities as such do not literally 
think in some superorganic sense. Rather, individuals are vehicles for 
expressing the thoughts of communities or 'thought collectives'. Or, to put it 
another way, minds are social structures. (Restivo, 1994: 209) 
 
Objectivity then is external to the individual but internal to the system of 
representations and beliefs within which it is defined. The community therefore 
determines what constitutes knowledge through processes of evaluation and 
negotiation, and such knowledge is then incorporated within the community's store 
of beliefs about the world. The validity of beliefs is dependent upon the social 
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frames of reference from which the belief is interpreted. Different social contexts 
will produce different reference frames and different sets of beliefs. Restivo 
characterises these different social frames as "worlds", which he describes below: 
This first step awakens us to 'mathematics worlds', networks of human 
beings communicating in arenas of conflict and cooperation, domination 
and subordination. Here we begin to experience mathematics as social 
practice, and to identify its connections to, and interdependence with, other 
social practices. (Restivo, 1994: 211) 
 
Within these "worlds" a "world-view" is generated. Such worldviews produce 
perspectives from which to perceive certain phenomena and constitute them as 
objects. Such objects, because they are constructed by a world view, are subject to 
changes within that world-view. Restivo explains below that mathematical objects 
also change as a product of their social histories: 
Mathematical forms or objects increasingly come to be seen as sensibilities, 
collective formations, and worldviews. The foundations of mathematics are 
not located in logic or systems of axioms but rather in social life. 
Mathematical forms or objects embody mathematics worlds. They contain 
the social history of their construction. They are produced in and by 
mathematics worlds. It is, in the end, mathematics worlds, not individual 
mathematicians, that manufacture mathematics (Restivo, 1994:212) 
 
Restivo goes on to argue that objects within mathematics, because they are socially 
constructed, can be studied in a similar way to material artefacts. Social histories of 
their use can be "unpacked" from objects and their biographies charted out. 
Through mapping out a mathematical concept’s genealogy it is then possible to 
understand its relationship to the social world, as well as to the wider system of 
representations within which it is entangled:   
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Explaining the 'content' of mathematics is not a matter of constructing a 
simple causal link between a mathematical object such as a theorem and a 
social structure. It is rather a matter of unpacking the social histories and 
social worlds embodied in objects such as theorems. Mathematical objects 
are and must be treated literally as objects, things that are produced by, 
manufactured by social beings. There is no reason that an object such as a 
theorem should be treated any differently than a sculpture, a teapot, or a 
skyscraper. Only alienated and alienating social worlds could give rise to the 
idea that mathematical objects are independent, free-standing creations, 
and that the essence of mathematics is realized in technical talk. Notations 
and symbols are tools, materials, and in general resources that are socially 
constructed around social interests and oriented to social goals. They take 
their meaning from the history of their construction and usage, the ways 
they are used in the present, the consequences of their usage inside and 
outside of mathematics, and the network of ideas that they are part of. The 
sociological imperative, especially when informed by the sociological 
imagination, is a tool for de-alienation and for uncovering the images and 
values of workers and social worlds in mathematics. (Restivo, 1994: 219) 
 
Restivo grounds mathematical objectivity within the social contexts of 
"mathematical worlds". Such worlds are similar to Bloor's idea of social institution 
in so far as both concepts blur the boundaries between subjectivity and objectivity, 
and relativize the concept of validity and factuality. Both authors argue that 
objectivity is a product of perception, with this perception being shaped through 
adopting and being enculturated within certain socio-cultural reference frames. 
Such frames of reference, called variously "worlds" or "institutions", involve 
understanding the social milieus of individuals within these communities, as well as 
understanding the biographies of these communities.  
Restivo's concept of mathematical worlds as thought-collectives does, 
however, present some problems. A certain degree of agency is taken away from 
individuals, who are considered as avatars for the wider collective consciousness. 
Individuals are described as vehicles for expressing the thoughts of communities, 
who become akin to Garfinkel's (1967) cultural dopes: simply replicating cultural 
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scripts given by their world-views. The question must also be asked as to what the 
boundaries are between mathematical worlds, or between such worlds and other 
social worlds - the worlds of language, art, religion, family, state, politics and the 
everyday. Drawing a boundary around such mathematical worlds thus seems 
problematic, and artificial, which means that the "collective" nature of such 
collective representations is difficult to establish.  
Nevertheless Bloor's notion of "social institution" and Restivo's 
"mathematical worlds" do provide the starting point from which to question what 
effect social life has on the production of knowledge. Such concepts allow us to 
understand that objectivity is to some degree a product of perception, that 
perception itself is socially shaped, and that the nature of perception, and therefore 
of objectivity, can evolve over time. In both Bloor and Restivo's work, knowledge is 
considered as being valid relative to the systems within which it is produced. Yet, 
despite this relativism, neither are denying the existence of a reality outside of 
human artifice. Rather the argument is one of perception of reality, and of 
phenomena, and the resultant classifications which are considered as being socially 
shaped. In my own thesis I do not concern myself with the nature of "truth" or 
existence, but rather I am only dealing with perception. I deal with the practices 
and performances of validation and classification, rather than attempting to show 
that x or y concept is true, or an arbitrary social construction. Within this thesis I do 
not make use of Bloor's social institution or Restivo's mathematical worlds. Rather I 
choose to adopt Bourdieu's (1978) notions of field, habitus and practice, and use 
Sewell's (1992) refinements of social structure and agency.  
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Theme 2: Visibility of ideas 
 
1.23 How are ideas presented within mathematics? 
From the social shaping of objectivity let us turn towards how such ideas are made 
visible and presented to mathematical audiences. When I speak of the visibility of 
ideas I am referring to the ways in which ideas are transformed in the process of 
being communicated and made public. Often-times there is a difference between 
what we hold as private belief and what we communicate and make public. 
Through the process of making belief public we must transform such belief in such a 
way as to be accepted and understood by another individual. This process involves 
reformulating concepts, making tacit understandings explicit, using certain 
prescriptive modes of presentation, or even using rhetorical techniques to make 
arguments more persuasive.  
Making an idea visible is thus a process of making the idea socially 
acceptable and surveyable to the community of practitioners. We witness this 
process of rendering mathematics visible during seminar presentations, during 
collaborations between mathematicians, during lectures, or through publication of 
mathematical proofs. Hersh (1991) argues that, during these processes of 
presenting and performing mathematics, the mathematical constructions or 
arguments may be transformed. Hersh differentiates the mathematics that is 
constructed in private from that which is performed in public, using Goffman's 
(1956) dramaturgical metaphors of the frontstage and backstage to understand 
how ideas change as a function of their social contexts. Ideas in the backstage are 
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informal, unfinished, fuzzy and multi-threaded, whilst ideas presented in the public 
frontstage are formalised, bounded and coherent.  
Greiffenhagen (2011) and Barany (2012) provide some insight into the 
differences between backstage and frontstage presentations of mathematics, and 
make use of blackboard inscriptions to trace out the "materialisation" of 
mathematical concepts. Merz and Knorr-Cetina (1997) similarly, in the context of 
studying theoretical physicists at work at CERN in Geneva, study the process of 
communicating and constructing mathematical objects. Much like mathematicians, 
theoretical physicists conduct their research around boards, through pen and 
paper, orally, or via email. As a result, Merz and Knorr-Cetina adapt their 
methodology to studying communicative practices, and interactions with 
representations and texts. As they write below, the traditional ethnographic 
methods used for studying laboratory life need to be adapted to study "thinking 
sciences": 
[T]he laboratory approach had to be adapted to the obdurateness of the 
field: the study is based rather less on the observation of physicists' 
activities than on one analyst's capability to exploit her physics training and 
interact with participants as a member of their culture. It is also anchored in 
a close 'reading' of physicists' personal-professional communications (their 
e-mail correspondence;), their calculation protocols, and their explanations 
to us which invariably involved paper and pencil. The close 'reading' was 
adopted to gain access to the ethnomethods implicated in doing theoretical 
physics work. Our approach yielded layers of methodical policies, "ansatze", 
tricks and other devices, which are piled into doing a theoretical 
computation. The policies, ansatze, tricks and devices were mutually 
embedded in one another within a sequential interactional system involving 





In both theoretical physics and mathematics researchers are involved in 
manipulating and reconfiguring what Merz and Knorr-Cetina call "disembodied 
objects", which may comprise of equations, models, constructions or diagrams 
(Merz & Knorr-Cetina, 1997:75). Such manipulations are part of the informal 
crafting processes which take place behind the scenes, in the backstage of 
knowledge-work. Within this backstage researchers are often dealing with quasi-
objects, which lack clear definitions, or which possess multiple interpretations. Such 
ill-formed concepts are concealed from public display, remaining on scratch paper, 
or written and erased from white-boards, rather than published in journals.  
The objectivity of such hypothetical-objects is, therefore, not completely 
determined, as they have not yet been presented for evaluation by the wider 
community of practitioners. Rather such objects are transacted within smaller 
private networks of friends, close collaborators or co-workers, where they are 
experimented and tinkered with. A concept within mathematics or theoretical 
physics will therefore undergo certain transformations as it moves from circulation 
within informal, private social networks to formal, public displays, during 
presentations and publications. When it enters the public sphere it is still subject to 
change, to reformulation and re-presentation, as it moves to different stages of 
performance. Such stages may vary in their degrees of formality, audiences, 
openness, visibility and prestige, and so the concept itself may change as a function 
of such spaces.  
In the context of the sociology of logic, Rosental (2003, 2008) weaves 
together these themes of display, performance, demonstration and debate in his 
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work on the presentation of a theorem in the field of fuzzy-logic. Rosental describes 
his work as analysing: 
[T]he concrete modalities of the production and certification of a particular 
logical theorem in the field of artificial intelligence in the 1990s. I 
investigate, in particular, how this theorem was collectively accredited in 
practice-what "recognition" it and its author received…I successively 
consider the different stages in the emergence of the theorem, from its 
earliest drafts, to its first publication, and then to the author's writing of 
several new versions in response to the critiques it triggered.(Rosental, 
2003:623-4) 
 
Using ethnographic, textual, and interview-based research Rosental follows the 
presentations, debates and re-presentations of a proof by Charles Elkan, which 
explored the paradoxes of fuzzy logic (Rosental, 2003:626). Rosental presents the 
controversies which emerged around Elkan's proof, documenting the different 
types of performances taking place on online forums, within journals, at 
conferences, and through personal exchanges with Elkan. Over the course of the 
controversy a few dominant viewpoints emerge, and it is around such views that 
the debate eventually stabilises. Through the course of the study Rosental asks the 
following questions: 
What does the expression of a point of view in the public and private 
spheres mean and require for the actors? Who has the resources to express 
him or herself, and in which cases? What individual and collective 
representations emerge from such interventions in the debate and how? 
Who reads what, how, and why? How are symbolic languages appropriated, 
and do they generate univocal readings of proofs? As a result, do the actors 
necessarily reach a consensus at a certain point through a simple victory of 
one side over the other? Or are misunderstandings possible, and can these 
misunderstandings contribute to the building of specific forms of 




In this thesis I will be asking similar questions concerning the distinction between 
public and private performances, the production of shared resources and 
representations, as well as the process of translating and reformulating ideas. For 
such a reason I will discuss in greater detail the relevant findings from Rosental's 
work, and demonstrate the relationship such work has to my own study of 
mathematicians.  
The first relevant aspect of Rosental's work to my own concerns positioning 
of debates and individuals within certain theatres of performance. Different 
theatres come with different rules and expectations, different levels of formality 
and visibility. Private email exchanges for example were often informal, friendly, 
and not subject to outside scrutiny or pressure to respond or perform. The forum 
upon which the controversy had been debated also remained informal, open, with 
low barriers to entry. However, as the debate moved to more formal settings in 
journals and at conferences, so the presentation of knowledge, the character of 
communication and the composition of the interlocutors changed, as Rosental 
writes: 
Thus, several months after the conference, the center of debate shifted 
from the electronic forum to journals that specialized in artificial 
intelligence. This shift of exhibited interaction to other arenas was 
accompanied by a radical transformation in the time-scale of debates and a 
substantial rise in the barriers to be surmounted to "stay in the game." 
Making a point of view public now required authors to produce polished 
texts and to subject them to editorial constraints. It also required full 
investment in a milieu in which interindividual relations and reputations 
were essential in the processes of selecting (and often commissioning) 




As performances entered the frontstage, and as visibility of ideas increased, so the 
presentation of the arguments were adapted to suit these formalised domains. 
Rosental states that presentations became more "polished" and increased effort 
was required in presentation. Within these formalised domains personal and 
institutional reputations and statuses were on display, as much as the ideas 
themselves. This passage returns us again to the concept of objectivity, in the sense 
that such ideas are not neutral, or self-evident, but rather they are positioned 
within social systems. Ideas are associated with the individuals who created them, 
as well as the institutions such individuals themselves are affiliated with. Ideas, 
thus, rather than being objective, are subject to the judgements of the individuals 
present within the systems in which it is produced. Ideas therefore change as a 
function of their social contexts.  
As ideas move between different social contexts so different resources and 
schemas are utilised. In this process of context switching so certain individuals are 
excluded from participating, as a result of their positioning within the field. 
Rosental (2008) discusses this idea of shared schemas and resources in his 
discussion of modes of reading: 
In fact, the gaps between the different modes of reading a given 
demonstration can be apprehended as a problem of replication, the 
difficulty of duplicating the specific mode of reading that the author 
anticipates. The difficulty stems in particular from the fact that both writer 
and reader need to have acquired in advance the same large set of specific 
tacit skills…Similarly the replication of a given type of reading of a de-
monstration by a reader necessitates that the reader and writer share 
numerous and sometimes very unusual skills. In each case, obtaining a 
replication is more the exception than the rule, given the improbability that 
such conditions will be met. (Rosental, 2008:105-6).  
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Rosental explains that to successfully read a demonstration or proof an individual 
must share certain sets of tacit skills (what I classify as schemas). Such tacit skills are 
built up through individuals sharing similar knowledge bases, similar educational 
backgrounds, and similar experiences in presenting and demonstrating their 
knowledge. These tacit skills generate a perspective and a perceptual frame 
through which an individual can construe and interpret phenomena. Through 
possessing similar reference frames, reference objects and resources, so individuals 
are able to co-ordinate their perspectives; such coordination, Rosental writes, takes 
place around shared texts: 
[This] approach allows us to grasp the way de-monstrative action, which 
involves the collective of readers and authors participating in the news-
group, is coordinated by the presence of textual devices; this action is 
distributed among the inscriptions, the tacit practices of causing to appear, 
and the acts of visual verification of symbolic manipulations.  (Rosental, 
2008:100)  
 
Within these texts, arguments and ideas are both shown (monstrated) and 
explained (demonstrated). These different modes of presenting are different 
strategies by which points of view are communicated, and through which 
individuals are persuaded to adopt a given perspective. As Rosental states below, 
these different modes of presenting are used variously by different actors who 
possess a multiplicity of different resources and schemas for interpreting a given 
phenomenon: 
Demonstrative practices will be interrogated in relation to the potentially 
multiple exercises in which the actors are involved, but also in relation to 
the varied resources and registers used by researchers to support their own 
points of view - whether these elements are presented in the texts of 
proofs, brought into various types of oral and written interventions, or 
shaped during interactions. On this occasion, it will be crucial to ask to what 
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extent a dichotomy generally operated between showing (montrer) and 
demonstrating (demontrer) is pertinent, and to what extent the formalist 
activity studied can be identified with an activity of putting into form, or 
formalisation. (Rosental, 2008: 54) 
 
The multiplicity of perspectives from which to construe phenomena leads to the 
problem of how to create consensus and produce certified knowledge. Through the 
online forum the number of different interpretations of Elkan's proof multiplied, as 
individuals began producing new demonstrations: 
In the messages addressed to comp.ai.fuzzy, we note that the participants 
make abundant efforts to produce new demonstrations - or 
counterdemonstrations - of the theorem in order to convince their 
interlocutors of the correctness - or the absence of correctness - of Elkan's 
proof. Indeed, we observe a veritable inflation in the texts through whose 
mediations the writers seek to make themselves spokespersons for Elkan's 
article. The writers present their own messages as reformulations of the 
original proof, a proof to which they attribute recourse to specific resources 
(assorted logical principles and notions, implicit axiomatics, demonstrative 
mechanisms); they offer the forum’s readers substitutes for the articles 
Elkan published in the proceedings of the 1993 conference on artificial 
intelligence. (Rosental, 2008:96) 
 
Individuals, in demonstrating their reformulations of Elkan's proof, were drawing on 
different schemas and resources through which to en-frame Elkan's ideas. Such 
reformulations created parallel arguments which could act as substitutes for Elkan's 
original formulations. Such substitutions similarly took place with arguments 
running counter to Elkan's proof. What such parallel arguments created was a 
system of associations which linked multiple viewpoints together, and therefore 
provided a more holistic frame through which to view the original arguments. 
Objectivity was thus being constructed through making multiple frames of 
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reference agree on common reference points. It is through creating such common 
reference points that classification and judgements are stabilised.  
1.24 How does the presentation of ideas affect their perceived objectivity?  
Individuals create associations between ideas through a process of staging their 
presentations so as to appear self-evident. Previously accepted beliefs are linked 
together with novel propositions so as to legitimise the novel propositions through 
association: 
The staging of this "appearance" is constituted by the linking of inscriptions, 
and it is guided by the search for agreement among the forum's readers as 
to the legitimacy of the equivalences advanced. In other words, the writer is 
seeking to win acceptance for the step he is taking in associating one 
inscription with the other, in order ultimately to emphasise the original 
author's recourse to the logical principle identified. (Rosental, 2008:101). 
 
As Rosental argues, the staging of appearance does not seek to justify 
(demonstrate) claims but simply shows relationships, making it appear self-evident 
that relationships exist between propositions. Showing or "monstration" is thereby 
made to appear as explanation or demonstration: 
The de-monstration is thus presented as a linkage presupposed by the 
writer to be self-sufficient, one that does not require complementary 
developments. Each stage seems to be perceived as transparent: all its 
elements are purportedly there to be seen, and thus it would convey its own 
self-evidence. Since at each stage the writer is content precisely to present a 
display, we can say that this de-monstration is deployed in a series of 
showings, or "monstrations". This term offers an evocative characterisation 
of a quite specific practice that can be related to a formalist project of 
making everything visible, a practice that consists in linking up textual 
fragments that the writer believes he can simply exhibit without further 




Self-evidence and objectivity of arguments thus can change as a function of their 
mode of presentation. Exhibiting without explaining creates the appearance of self-
evidence, however the self-evidential nature of such statements are challenged 
through demands for justification: 
He exhibits an equivalence without explaining why he attributes this status 
to the pair of statements in question. The structure of the passage illustrates 
quite well the extent to which the de-monstration is composed of a series of 
monstrations, that is, moments in which, implicitly, the author considers it 
sufficient to show, without providing justifications for what he shows as 
such. Challenging a step in a de-monstration, as we have seen on 
comp.ai.fuzzy, consists precisely in demanding justifications, or in producing 
a textual fragment intended to refute what is presented as "self evident". 
(Rosental, 2008:213) 
 
Modes of presenting ideas, as well as the visibility of ideas, therefore effects the 
degree to which they are considered as self-evident or objective. The stabilisation 
of interpretations around a given proof is dependent upon managing the proof's 
presentation and interpretation by different groups of actors. As the quote below 
states, stabilisation of interpretation was achieved through coordinating different 
viewpoints, and reformulating the proof to counter criticisms levelled against it: 
Moreover, the formation of representations of Elkan's theorem was not a 
sum of strictly individual approaches. It was very much a question of 
collective actions involving a substantial amount of coordination and was set 
in the struggles between coalitions of actors, the configuration of which 
evolved partly in line with viewpoints expressed during the debate. This 
coordination of view- points and the management of their visibility by 
means of various mechanisms was one of the elements clearly showing that 
the practice of logic did not simply amount to the production of reasoning, 




The end result of such negotiations was for Elkan to adapt his proof to better suit its 
social climate. The proof thus was tinkered with and reassembled so as to present 
more nuanced arguments, as Rosental writes:  
Elkan thus had the opportunity to elaborate and test several different 
reformulations on diverse interlocutors. He adapted his talks to suit his 
interlocutors and the forums at which he presented, adjusting his 
presentations in a differentiated, evolving, and sometimes personalized 
way.  (Rosental, 2003:637) 
 
Through presenting, debating and reformulating within different presentational 
contexts so different versions of the proof are generated: 
The different versions of Elkan's text form a record of negotiations. As 
objections arose, the proof problematized more and more the de-
monstrative steps and logical notions. It became more resistant because less 
direct, more nuanced and better accompanied. The theorem, the proof, and 
the logical objects incorporated were transformed simultaneously. From 
one version to the next, certain elements of the proof were abandoned, 
others were brought to light and exploited in new de-monstrative 
sequences. By following the steps in the de-monstrative production, we 
observe that the work of proving put into play skilful bricolages. 
 (Rosental, 2008:236-7) 
 
Even after such skilful bricolages, which transform the presentation of the proof, 
the negotiations and controversies surrounding the proof persisted. However, 
through re-presenting the proof through secondary presentations and articles, the 
primary text of the proof could be re-construed and re-evaluated, as Rosental 
writes: 
Because his article, a singular material device launched in the world, 
eventually proved somewhat ineffective in countering criticism, Elkan added 
to it by producing new texts and new speeches. He thus provided new 
instructions for his theorem's interpretation and general comprehension, 
thereby forging new tools for changing readers' relationship to his original 
text. Such adjustments also helped to stabilize debate because they limited 
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disagreements by making them appear, retrospectively, and at least partly, 
as misunderstandings (which differed, of course, depending on the 
interlocutors and the publics).(Rosental, 2003:637) 
 
What Rosental's work demonstrates is that even formal presentations within logic 
are subject to social processes of evaluation. The presentations of ideas change as a 
function of the social contexts within which such presentations take place. 
Objectivity is thus never a given, but rather it is constructed through processes of 
formulation, debate and reformulation. Knowledge, as DeMillo, Lipton and Perlis 
(1972) argue below, must be subjected to the judgement of the community before 
it can be certified and perceived as valid: 
The proof by itself is nothing; only when it has been subjected to the social 
processes of the mathematical community does it become 
believable…Mathematical proofs increase our confidence in the truth of 
mathematical statements only after they have been subjected to the social 
mechanisms of the mathematical community (DeMillo, Lipton and Perlis, 
1972:275). 
 
Such knowledge, even in mathematics, is therefore only certified or validated 
through becoming assimilated within existing systems of knowledge. Ideas must be 
socialised and related to what a community already understands and accepts as 
being valid. As DeMillo, Lipton and Perlis state below, the presentation of formal, 
deductive arguments is not enough to qualify its objectivity, rather objectivity is 
bestowed upon the proof through its subjectivity, that is to say through it becoming 
a subject of the existing field of discourse: 
After enough internalization, enough transformation, enough 
generalization, enough use, and enough connection, the mathematical 
community eventually decides that the central concepts in the original 
theorem, now perhaps greatly changed, have an ultimate stability. If the 
various proofs feel right and the results are examined from enough angles, 
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then the truth of the theorem is eventually considered to be established. 
The theorem is thought to be true in the classical sense--that is, in the sense 
that it could be demonstrated by formal, deductive logic, although for 
almost all theorems no such deduction ever took place or ever will (DeMillo, 
Lipton and Perlis, 1972:274) 
 
Theme 3: Mutability of Mathematics 
 
1.25 How is knowledge stabilised through debate? 
So far we have seen that objectivity and self-evidence are products of social 
institutions. We have observed that the presentations and perceived validity of 
beliefs change as a function of their position within social fields. Different social 
contexts thus transform the relationships that individuals have with a given belief, 
affecting the perspectives from which they may view it, and their perception of it as 
being objective or not. The ways in which knowledge is performed also shapes our 
perceptions of it, as presentations must conform to certain expectations, and serve 
to make visible certain aspects of a belief rather than others. There is therefore a 
certain degree of context-dependency, indeterminacy, multiplicity and flexibility in 
the beliefs that we constitute as knowledge, despite our experience of such 
knowledge as being stable and objective.  
In mathematics the process of validating and, therefore, of stabilising 
knowledge, is achieved mainly through proof. Such proof techniques and their 
reasons for use can vary between different mathematical cultures. MacKenzie 
(1999) for example compares different cultures of proving within the formal 
verification community to those of pure mathematics. Within formal verification 
proof can be comprised of mechanised proof carried out by a computer, or it can 
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involve formalised proof carried out by hand. Proofs may also need to fulfil certain 
criteria, for example providing "insight", being "rigorous", "beautiful", or 
"surveyable" (See Heintz 2003:930). MacKenzie (1999, 2001) explores how different 
definitions of proof came into conflict, as a result of Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang 
Haken's 1976 proof of the 4-Colour Theorem. This theory dealt with the minimum 
number of colours required to fully colour contiguous regions of a map, so that no 
two adjacent regions would share the same colour. The controversy associated with 
the proof concerned its use of a computer program to check that a given map 
possessed certain properties.  
For Tymoczko (1979), traditional proofs in mathematics must fulfil certain 
criteria of being convincing, surveyable and formalizable (Tymoczko, 1979: 59), he 
characterises these attributes as follows:   
(a) Proofs are convincing. This fact is key to understanding mathematics as a 
human activity. It is because proofs are convincing to an arbitrary 
mathematician that they can play their role as arbiter of judgment in the 
mathematical community.  
(b) Proofs are surveyable. Proofs are the guarantees of mathematical 
knowledge and so they must be comprehended by mathematicians. A proof 
is a construction that can be looked over, reviewed, verified by a rational 
agent. We often say that a proof must be perspicuous, or capable of being 
checked by hand. It is an exhibition, a derivation of the conclusion, and it 
needs nothing outside of itself to be convincing. The mathematician surveys 
the proof in its entirety and thereby comes to know the conclusion. 
(c) Proofs are formalizable. A proof, as defined in logic, is a finite sequence 
of formulas of a formal theory satisfying certain conditions. It is a deduction 
of the conclusion from the axioms of the theory by means of the axioms and 
rules of logic. Most mathematicians and philosophers believe that any 
acceptable proof can be formalized. We can always find an appropriate 
formal language and theory in which the informal proof can be embedded 
and "filled out" into a rigorous formal proof. Formal proofs carry with them 
a certain objectivity. That a proof is formalizable, that the formal proofs 
have the structural properties that they do, explains in part why proofs are 
convincing to mathematicians. (Tymoczko, 1979: 59-60). 
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According to Tymoczko, it is the property of surveyability that is of utmost 
importance to a proof in mathematics, with mathematicians organising their proofs 
to facilitate it being surveyed by others: 
Surveyability is an important subjective feature of mathematical proofs 
which relates the proofs to the mathematicians, the subjects of 
mathematical investigations. It is in the context of surveyability that the idea 
of 'lemma' fits. Mathematicians organize a proof into lemmas to make it 
more perspicuous. The proof relates the mathematical known to the 
mathematical knower, and the surveyability of the proof enables it to be 
comprehended by the pure power of the intellect-surveyed by the mind's 
eye, as it were. (Tymoczko, 1979:60)  
 
Through organising the proof clearly into lemmas the mathematician structures the 
proof so that another reader can follow what is being presented. Formal proofs 
which may be difficult to survey can be mediated by related surveyable proofs 
which have already been verified: 
Hence it begins to appear that, in practice, at least, mathematicians come to 
know formal proofs only through the mediation of surveyable proofs. Either 
the formal proofs are simple enough to be surveyed themselves and verified 
to be proofs, or their existence is established by means of informal 
surveyable arguments. (Tymoczko, 1979:62) 
  
However in the case of the 4-Colour Theorem, there was no surveyable proof to act 
as a mediator between the formalisations and the steps conducted by the 
computer program. For such a reason, Tymoczko argues that the 4 Colour Theorem 
is a departure from the traditional proving process in mathematics: 
In summary, the proof of the 4CT, although much like a traditional proof, 
differs in certain key respects. It is convincing, and there is a formal proof. 
But no known proof of the 4CT is surveyable, and there is no known proof 
that a formal proof exists. The crucial difference between the 4-Color proof 
and traditional proofs is that the 4-color proof requires the appeal to 
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computers to fill the gap in an otherwise traditional proof. The work of the 
computer is itself not surveyable (Tymoczko, 1979: 73). 
 
As Tymoczko argues below, if the Appel and Haken proof of the 4-Colour Theorem 
were accepted (which it was), then the community's notion of what a proof was 
would have to change to accommodate the use of computers: 
Has the 4CT a surveyable proof? Here the answer is no. No mathematician 
has surveyed the proof in its entirety; no mathematician has surveyed the 
proof of the critical reducibility lemma. It has not been checked by 
mathematicians, step by step, as all other proofs have been checked. 
Indeed, it cannot be checked that way. Now Appel, Haken, and Koch did 
produce something that was surveyable in the sense that it could be looked 
over. Their work, as we have said, is very much like a surveyable proof with 
a lacuna where a key lemma is justified by nontraditional means-by 
computer. Incidentally, we must be wary of verbal entanglements here. Of 
course, if we call the appeal to computers a "new method of proof" in the 
strictest sense, then, trivially, the 4CT will have a surveyable proof. But the 
notion of proof itself will have shifted to accommodate the new method. 
(Tymoczko, 1979:70) 
 
Surveyability of proof still remains core to many mathematicians' notion of proof as 
" [A] construction that can be looked over, reviewed, verified, by a rational agent.." 
(Tymoczko, 1979: 54). Such a definition returns us to DeMillo, Litpon and Perillis 
(1977) and their argument that the social processes of reviewing and debating 
proofs makes them valid knowledge. These processes aim to convince audiences 
and generate a consensus, as Kleiner (1991) argues: 
The truth of a theorem, then, has a certain probability, usually < 1, attached 
to it. The probability increases as more mathematicians read, discuss, and 
use the theorem. In the final analysis, the acceptance of a theorem (i.e., the 
acceptance of the validity of its proof) is a social process and is based on the 
confidence of the mathematical community in the social systems that it has 




This process of socialising and stabilising mathematical knowledge does not only 
take place at the point of certification of proofs by the community. Rather these 
processes of negotiation and debate take place during the construction of the 
proofs themselves. As Lakatos (1976) explains, mathematical knowledge is not 
immutable and infallible, but rather theorems are subject to a constant 
examination and reformulation, through a process of conjecture, proof, counter-
example and refinement. The boundaries around mathematical categories are 
therefore subject to change, as the proof is used as a tool for testing the precision 
of definitions, as well as constructing those definitions.  
 
The proof thus makes mathematical objects visible and surveyable, in the sense 
that it provides a framework by which objects can be clearly defined and related to 
other objects. As Bloor explains, mathematicians do not start off with definitions 
and then derive theorems and proofs, rather the definitions are constructed within 
the framework of a given proof: 
Everyone remembers the mathematical textbook which begins with long 
and complicated definitions, announces a surprising theorem, and then 
develops an austerely compelling proof. Definition; theorem; proof; QED. 
No, says Lakatos; this is all upside down. What really come at the beginning 
are not definitions, but problems and conjectured solutions to them. 
Theorems are conjectures. Like all conjectures they need testing, and 
proofs, odd though this may sound, are attempts to test them. (Bloor, 
1978:246) 
 
Proofs are built up through testing conjectures through presenting theorems, 
providing examples and counter-examples, and then reformulating the theorem so 
as to encompass or exclude certain elements which contradict it: 
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Proofs start with a 'thought-experiment', or exploit some quasiempirical 
procedure to break down the problematic conjecture, embedding it into 
what may be a quite distinct body of knowledge. Each step in this 
decomposition of the theorem becomes a possible source of error. It will fail 
if exceptions are found to it. Exceptions to the steps of the proof Lakatos 
calls 'local' counterexamples; exceptions to the original conjecture are 
'global' counterexamples. (Bloor, 1978:246) 
 
Through negotiating with these local and global counter examples to the proof, 
through barring certain "monsters" from it, so clearer boundaries are created 
between the categories of objects that the proof is seeking to relate to. When 
certain phenomena fall outside of these boundaries, then either the boundaries 
themselves are redrawn or a new set of classifications and boundaries are 
constructed. But the important point to take away from Lakatos, according to Bloor, 
is that these boundaries can only be tested through encountering certain test 
objects, and through individuals negotiating the bounds of definitions through use 
of such test objects: 
We have seen that a proof begins with the invention of a technique or 
procedure, like stretching or triangulating. This can be carried out on  a 
limited number of familiar figures, but everything surrounding this narrow 
area of accomplishment is, at first, simply darkness. The accomplishment is 
mute about its own scope and about the broader range of contingencies to 
which it may come to be related. It says nothing about whether such things 
as nested cubes or twin tetrahedra do, or even can, exist; or whether they 
have any relevance to the study of polyhedra.  
This approach to proofs may be called 'finitist'. The point is that a 
proof procedure does not have a set of preordained implications outside the 
immediate context of use. How it comes to be accorded these implications 
as that context of use is extended is precisely what Lakatos is investigating. 
He is not saying that the implications pre-exist but we do not know what 
they are: the implications await our creation. In particular, the question of 
whether there are counterexamples to a proof procedure is not settled in 




The boundaries around categories are thus only determined through their 
encounter with specific examples. The boundaries around categories are then 
redefined in relation to such examples, and redrawn accordingly: 
We draw the boundary lines. Classification is our achievement and our 
problem. Nothing is to be gained by seeing different boundary lines as more 
or less corresponding to the 'real' ones. But this is not all. For Lakatos the 
world is so densely populated by objects of all shapes and sizes, and there 
are so many imaginable procedures that can be based on them, that there is 
an indefinitely large number of different boundaries that we might 
reasonably draw. (Bloor, 1978:248) 
 
Our experience of categories as objective, therefore, are products of our 
socialisation within systems of classifications, which construct conceptual 
boundaries around phenomena. As Bloor explains, the objective nature of our 
categories are products of our habituation to certain classifications, which construct 
our objects of perception:  
 
The belief in a fixed basic vocabulary of perfectly understood terms is an 
illusion created by our verbal habits. We become habituated to a certain 
usage in a particular context; it becomes 'obvious', transparent, and direct. 
We think that we will know exactly how to use the word in all future cases, 
as if there were a unique and natural way of extending it outside its old 
range. This is wrong, because new proof procedures can decompose any 
idea, however simple. They bring to it a new context, suggest new 
connotations and hence endow it with a new, inner complexity. What the 
Cauchy proof procedure did for our idea of polyhedra could be done for any 
concept including point and line. Our concepts can always be 'stretched'. 
(Bloor, 178:249) 
 
As Bloor explains, our categories become naturalised and gain a self-evident 
quality. However the future use of our categories are somewhat underdetermined 
in practice. As a result, the boundaries around categories are constantly being 
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redrawn. New objects assimilated into a category subtly distort the original 
framework by which the class was originally constructed, and thus all objects 
become transformed by the redefinition. Bloor argues that this process of 
redrawing and reformulating is integral to the production of knowledge in 
mathematics: 
This fails to meet Lakatos' point. He is saying that concept-stretching and 
the redrawing of classificatory boundaries is an integral part of 
mathematical reasoning. Trying out wider and different applications of 
concepts, and making the consequent adjustments to theorems and 
definitions is something that is going on all the time. Changing the meaning 
of concepts in this way is not a subterfuge to be shrugged off, as if the 
counterexamples it created were unimportant.' This is because our 
intellectual judgements are guided by the properties of our overall system 
of thought, not by its isolated elements. In the interests of overall coherence 
any particular achievement may be subverted and any theorem may have to 
be modified: You cannot separate refutations and proofs on the one hand 
and changes in the conceptual, taxonomical, linguistic framework on the 
other. (Bloor, 1978:250) 
 
There is therefore an inherent instability within all classification, whether they be in 
the context of natural language or mathematics. Rather, categories are constantly 
in the process of redefinition, as classifications come into contact with a reality of 
almost infinite variation. Such instability in definitions, however, is nullified through 
consensus between the members of a community of practice. Through agreeing on 
definitions, and certifying proofs, so the community creates shared frames of 
reference, which are internally coherent, through which phenomena can be 
construed. As Bloor concludes, there is no final truth regarding proofs, rather there 
exists only the system of interlocking claims and counter claims in which knowledge 
is connected and stabilised: 
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Lakatos is saying that the stability and scope of every theorem is precarious: 
critical argument and adjustment is in principle endless; there is no final 
truth to reveal, only a ramified and interlocking network of claims and 
counterclaims to be balanced and stabilized….If the stream of potential 
counterexamples is endless, then the processes whereby we accord, or fail 
to accord, recognition of them must also be endlessly at work. Without their 
remorseless operation and that of the forces which govern them, there 
would be neither order nor coherence in mathematical knowledge. Its 
classifications, its counterexamples and its theorems would have no agreed 
relations to one another. The great significance of Lakatos' work is that it 
makes the forces which govern the response to anomaly constitutive of 
mathematical knowledge: they are a necessary part of that knowledge. 
(Bloor, 1978:251) 
 
Theme 4: Mathematics in practice  
 
1.26 How is mathematical reality constructed through local negotiations? 
The process of proving, refuting and reformulating concepts is an ongoing process 
through which knowledge in mathematics is constructed and validated. Such 
processes take place through an individual's situated engagements with problems 
within a given field. The concept-user encounters problems in the course of their 
daily practices, and must define the boundaries around the concept for themselves, 
according to their understanding of the concept and the wider system of relations 
within which that concept is defined: 
Each and every instance of concept application takes place under the impact 
of local contingencies, and among these local contingencies will be 
sociological variables. I have already listed some of them: traditions, 
precedents, authorities, goals and interests. The fit of our concept to reality 
is, therefore, not just a matter for reality; it is always a matter (collectively) 
for the concept users as well. (Bloor, 1996:853) 
 Each local engagement constitutes an "instance" within which the concept is given 
a specific set of referents. Such referents form reference points around which a 
reference frame for the concept is generated. Through this reference frame the 
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wider category, of which the concept is a member, is generated. The instance thus 
serves as an anchor around which the boundaries of a category are related, and 
from which later instances are related to.  
Such local negotiations of categorical boundaries are theorised within Barnes, Bloor 
and Henry's category of "finitism", the core principle Barnes defines as follows:  
[Finitism's] core assertion is that proper usage is developed step by step, in 
processes involving successions of on the spot judgements. Every instance 
of use, or of proper use, of a concept must in the last analysis be accounted 
for separately, by reference to specific, local, contingent determinants. 
Finitism denies that inherent properties or meanings attach to concepts and 
determine their future correct applications. (Barnes, 1982:30) 
  
Finitism thus argues that meaning is developed through use within certain 
situations. There is no absolute rule which individuals follow, rather future uses of a 
term are underdetermined, and will be subject to change, being re-created on a 
case-by-case basis; as Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996) write: ‘…there is nothing in 
the meaning of a term, or its previous use, or the way it has previously been defined, 
which will serve to fix its future proper use" (1996:78). Indeed Barnes, Bloor and 
Henry (1996) claim that finitism has 5 main implications: 
1. The future applications of terms are open-ended; 
2. No act of classification is ever indefeasibly correct;  
3. All acts of classification are revisable;  
4. Successive applications of a term are not independent; and  
5. The applications of different kinds of terms are not independent of each 




The boundaries of categories are thus somewhat fluid, as the prototypical reference 
points for each individual actor can vary. Each individual therefore will possess a 
specific point of view, according to the collection of referents which constitute their 
reference frame for any given concept. Such reference points, however, can be 
calibrated through dialogue and debate, through which common referents are 
determined. For each individual the categories are not totally underdetermined. 
Rather, past experience, use, and co-ordination with other socialised individuals, 
gives a certain degree of structure to their perception, as Bloor writes:   
When an individual confronts a putative new instance of a term, he 
confronts an array of similarities and differences, between the new and the 
past instances, and among the past instances. Formally, his assertion that an 
instance falls under a term is only his contingent judgement to the effect 
that similarity outweighs difference. Past usage offers precedents for this 
usage, but is not sufficient to fix it because there is no natural or universal 
scale for the weighing of similarity against difference (Bloor, 1982: 28–9) 
 
Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996: 103) explain that training provides resources for 
orienting one's perspective, in the form of exemplars and solved problems. Such 
past experiences are used as heuristic models through which analogies can be 
generated between past precedent and novel phenomena. They argue that 
education and experience:  
[R]enders the unknown in terms of the known, and hence allows 
calculations about the unknown to be made by analogy with calculations 
about the known. Once the connection between the known and the 
unknown is made, inductive inference can flow from the former to the latter 
directly, without passing through any ‘general theory’, and expectations can 
be developed about the unknown. Thus, knowledge can develop from case 




Such heuristic frameworks are built up through experience with mathematical 
objects and constructions, developed through encountering them within their day 
to day work lives. Such experience can take the form of explicit knowledge 
formulated in text books, or in lecture or seminar presentations, as well as implicit 
or tacit knowledge, which may comprise of motor skills and schemas built up 
through solving problems, crafting proofs, and through personal engagements with 
other researchers and their ideas (Collins, 1974: 1981). Such tacit knowledge, 
MacKenzie (1995) writes, is situated knowledge, developed within local contexts:  
Because tacit knowledge is transmitted person to person, there are greater 
barriers to the spread of competence than the traditional view might lead us 
to expect. If science rests upon specific, hard-to-acquire, tacit skills, then 
there is a sense in which scientific knowledge is always local knowledge. It is, 
for example, often small "core sets," rather than wider scientific 
communities, that resolve scientific controversies (MacKenzie, 1995:46) 
 
Within such local contexts individuals develop rhythms and routines by which they 
constitute the day-to-day worlds of work, and through which they develop intimate 
understandings of the problems and the proofs they work with. Merz and Knorr-
Cetina (1997) explore the situated-ness of knowledge production in theoretical 
physics, through the local communities of practice that develop between friends, 
colleagues and supervisor and student:  
Suffice it to say that these relationships can be analyzed along the lines of 
their rhythm, their sequencing, their logic and dynamics. Theoretical 
physicists seemingly learn how to collaborate in early contacts with their 
thesis supervisor and with fellow students, as they learn how to handle 
objects. Like these teacher-student relationships, the 'thought alliances' 
physicists form later also contain an element of consultation. However, 
thought alliances are also sustained by and embedded in 'friend-ships' which 




Through situated engagements with individual problems so individuals develop an 
intimacy with the objects they study. By getting "stuck" on a problem so physicists 
and mathematicians are forced to confront definitions and conceptual boundaries 
around categories and knowledge. They manipulate objects in order to gain new 
perspectives from which to view them, deconstructing and expanding classifications 
in the process. Merz and Knorr-Cetina describe this process:  
Working toward a solution does not mean simply doing a calculation, but 
finding ways out of being "stuck". Physicists "get stuck" many times while 
doing a computation. But not only do the physicists get stuck: so does the 
computation. Physicists and computations are stuck together against the 
resistance of an equation. In the beginning of a computation, the object 
asserts itself forcefully, and ways must be found for physicists to "gain 
control". Gaining control rather literally means reconfiguring the object, 
through the process of deconstruction. The equation is changed by 
becoming "reduced", "converted", "divided up", "cut", "split" or 
"decomposed". "Reducing" or "converting" is done by "cutting" or "splitting" 
the computation into smaller components, which have to be "combined" or 
"recombined" later to arrive at final results. The concrete form of such 
deconstructions will become visible in subsequent sections. While physicists 
try to "reduce" an overbearing equation to manageable size in order to 
prevent it from getting "totally out of hand", they also expand the equation 
into new elements which can be rearranged, substitute other equations for 
it and supplement it by studying exemplary cases in other contexts. 
Physicists' "cutting" and "dividing" vocabulary conceals the expansionary 
character of the actual deconstruction (Merz and Knorr-Cetina, 1997:82-3) 
 
The boundaries around categories are deliberately dissolved in order to discover 
new view-points from which to perceive a given problem. Researchers attempt to 
relate a given concept to other objects within their vocabulary, they use models to 
structure objects, and use conceptual schemas to translate and transmute 
categories. Below Merz and Knorr-Cetina document this process: 
Model objects, on the other hand, are related to the main object by analogy. 
As a consequence, they can be exploited in more flexible ways along the 
lines of their analogous relationship - as models for the object, for the 
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problem specification, for difficult technical steps, or for possible results. 
One can take advantage of a suitable analogy by adapting known results to 
the new context. In addition, one can use the model as a playground for 
new attempts to deduce old results - for trying out new calculations in a safe 
and controlled environment. For example, one might try to find a new proof 
for a solved problem to test a proposal for how to solve the main problem. 
This work with the model as a 'laboratory' for trying out new calculations is 
very important and distinguishes physicists' use of models from pure 
reasoning by analogy or from doing 'exemplars' (Merz and Knorr-Cetina, 
1997:102) 
 
We see again the mutability of objects in theoretical physics and mathematics. At 
such local scales the boundaries around concepts remain flexible, as multiple 
heuristic frameworks are applied, in order to construe objects in certain ways, so as 
to fit certain expected patterns. Here metaphor and polysemy are exploited as tools 
for generating new perspectives on problems. In order to solve a problem 
individuals must be able to "see", or perceive, its solutions through creating 
interpretive lenses, or schemas, by which to view the problem. Individuals must 
interpret the phenomena as some category, or through use of some category, in 
order for that phenomena to be cognitively grasped. Such a construal of 
phenomena are not however inherent to the phenomena itself, rather they are 
induced within phenomena through the situated engagement of the individual and 
the object at hand. Livingston (1999) explains that the process of reasoning often 
involves use of mathematical intuition, which become written out of the arguments 
detailed in the published proof:  
Mathematical reasoning, both in its concrete detail and in its transcendence 
of that concreteness as an organization of those details, is analogous to 
these features of gestalt perception. The details of a written mathematical 
argument are seen in terms of the reasoning that argument describes, yet 




The process of understanding a proof is thus concerned with reconstructing this 
intuition and reconstituting the frame of mind of the author. Livingston argues that 
understanding is a process of rediscovering or perceiving the "perceptual gestalts" 
which give the elements of the proof structure and coherence:  
In analogy with perceptual gestalts, mathematical proofs are discovered, 
and rediscovered on subsequent occasions, as organised totalities of 
reasoning and practice: the material detail of an argument articulates a 
coherent "whole" of reasoning that is not present in any of the argument's 
individual details. (Livingston, 1999:869) 
 
In the process of constructing the proof, the prover must construct the proof in 
such a way as to allow other members of the community to follow their lines of 
reasoning. The prover must provide sufficient detail to allow the reader to re-
construct the perceptual gestalt utilised by the author. The author must build up 
material detail for the reader, enough so that it evokes an authentic context similar 
to that inhabited by the author (see Becker 2000). Livingston explains that such 
context building takes the form of a craft process: 
As such partial arguments are produced, they are subject to any number of 
operations: they are inspected, integrated, discarded, revised, compared, 
combined and reworked, thereby embedding within the material detail of 
the written argument a dense texture of reasoning. In such layered 
arguments, provers look for the coherence of reasoning - the gestalt - of 
which the projected proof consists, at the same time that they are stabilizing 
within their work the communally recognised practices of proving. When 
provers arrange, rearrange and rework the material details of a prospective 
and developing proof, they are, in fact, orienting to and composing the 
cultural substance of their work. (Livingston, 1999:880)  
 
In the process of crafting, however, the author artificially reconstructs the history of 
the proof to make its conclusions appear self-evident. Through following the proof, 
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the reader is confronted with a linearized narrative, purged of its dead-ends and 
multiple plot-lines:  
A proof is used to justify claims about how that proof was discovered. 
Second, when mathematicians engage in discovery work, they continually 
look forward, prospectively, to the proof that lies on the horizon of their 
efforts. They are trying to prove something, and what they are doing now is 
viewed in terms of what that work will come to later. In this way, as provers 
work on a proof, they continually ‘rewrite’ what they are doing and what 
they have done. Retrospectively, the false paths, mistakes and failures to 
see what now seems ‘obvious’ all appear to be idiosyncratic failings of an 
individual prover. Looking back, such circumstances are viewed as 
unaccountable errors of judgment and ability; they appear to be ‘without 
reason’ and, therein, despite their prevalence wherever and whenever 
mathematicians are at work, are seen as impediments to, and obfuscations 
of, actual mathematical practice (Livingston, 2006:60-1) 
 
The re-writing of proof, according to Livingston (2006), distorts what the lived-work 
of proving actually looks like in practice. According to Livingston, the prover is 
confronted by a field of possibilities which constantly shifts as an individual engages 
with the specificities of the problem at hand: 
Rather than being a static background of familiar techniques (for example, 
the introduction of an auxiliary line) and known facts (such as the Side-
Angle- Side Congruence Theorem), that context is a dynamically changing 
horizon of a prover’s current work. It is also a changing texture of detail and 
of the perceived relevance of that detail as part of the prospective horizon 
of that activity (Livingston, 2006:46) 
 
According to Livingston, each activity is constituted by a horizon of possibilities, 
which is altered prospectively by the search for solutions, and retrospectively by 
the previous lines of enquiry already conducted. Within this field there are multiple 
potential directions that the proof-work can take. The prover must adopt and adapt 
strategies through which to best reach their goal.  They must also present their path 
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through the field of possibilities in such a way as to allow readers to follow, as well 
as for such a path to appear as a natural course: 
This other, thematically developing approach to proving the theorem was 
interwoven at times with the first, the prospective argument being 
reengaged and cultivated as different ‘pieces of a puzzle’ came more clearly 
into view, and then being cast aside when they did not seem to offer a proof 
that they had again seemed to promise. The idea that I was continually 
working on one approach and that, even though the direction of my work 
changed, that work was a straightforward progression to an eventual proof, 
is incorrect. More generally, provers are located in a field of possible 
directions, in a field of possibly relevant proof-specific, proof-relevant 
details, in a field of potential relevancies of that detail and of possible 
organizations of those details as possible courses of proving. Clarifying and 
developing one of those possible organizations of details and, therein, the 
field of conditional, situated relevancies of detail, provide the immediate, 
conditional horizon of a prospective course of proving. (Livingston, 2006:59) 
 
The lived work of proving and problem solving in mathematics is thus a process of 
negotiating with the possibilities of the field. It is a form of craft work which is 
situated within local contexts and local engagements with problems. These 
contexts are constantly changing, as certain approaches fail, or as new relationships 
are brought to awareness. The path that the proof eventually ends up taking, and 
the end structure of a proof, is thus the product of negotiation and selection from a 
field of possibilities. However, through crafting the proof and reassembling it with 
the form of a narrative, so the multiple threads of arguments and multiple 
meanings of concepts are filtered out. What is left is an argument presented as 
natural and self-evident, and it is through such modes of presentation that we lose 





1.28 Conclusion  
This literature review has presented a small fraction of the work that has taken 
place within the sociology of mathematics and logic. The works presented were 
intended to highlight some of themes that will appear within the main body of this 
thesis. Such themes included objectivity, presentation of knowledge, mutability and 
stability of knowledge, as well as the performances and practices involved in 
constructing knowledge. I have shown that the social world6 does have an influence 
on the shaping of knowledge in mathematics; I demonstrated that the boundaries 
around knowledge can change as a function of the contexts of their use; I also 
illustrated the different craft processes which are involved in producing 
mathematics. 
In the theory section that is to follow (section 1.4) I want to bring these 
themes together into a more coherent theory of production of mathematical 
knowledge. I will use Bourdieu's theories on structure, field, habitus and practice 




                                                          
6 Here, by “social world”, I mean the wider, day to day world of person to person interactions and 
social relations. “Social” is here meant to mean that which is held in common, whose value is 
bestowed through negotiation and communication between individuals in groups or communities. 
The “social world” is a subjective world, comprised of individual subjects, who are imbued with 
agency to effect change, as well as interpretive potential by which to associate meaning to events or 
phenomena. The “social world” is thus defined in opposition to the “natural world”, which stands 
prior to and outside of human sociality. However as Berger (1967) and Searle (1996) would argue, 
the natural world is always already a social world in the sense that it is already interpreted, 
penetrated and structured by language. 
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Section 1.3: Methodology  
1.31 Overview  
The following thesis is based upon 6 months of ethnographic fieldwork at four 
research institutes across Europe. I have anonymised the institutes in order to 
conceal the identities of the individuals involved within the study, within this thesis 
I shall refer to the institutes by pseudonyms. These institutes are referred to as: UK-
A – a well-respected institute associated with a prestigious university in the UK; UK-
B – comprised of a group of mathematicians located within the mathematics 
department of a well-respected UK university; Germany-A – a prestigious institution 
located within a German city; Paris-A – an institute in Paris associated with a 
prestigious French university. 
1.32 Research methods 
This project is based upon both observations and interviews conducted with 
mathematicians at the institutes outlined above. 45 interviews were undertaken 
during the course of fieldwork, each lasting between one to two hours in length. 
Interviewees were mathematicians from algebraic geometry, topology, and 
differential geometry. Interviews took place with researchers at different stages of 
their career, and included PhD students, Post-doctoral researchers, lecturers, 
research fellows, associate and assistant professors, full professors, directors of 
institutes, and retired professors. This wide range of interview subjects spanned the 
age range of 22-72, but the sample of female mathematicians was small, 
comprising 25% (11 individuals) of the sample (although female mathematicians are 
generally under-represented within many mathematics departments globally).   
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The selection of interviewees depended upon the willingness and availability 
of researchers to participate in the study. Directors, senior professors, and 
individuals already taking part in the study helped recruit participants for the 
project. Professor C in Paris-A was integral in recruiting individuals in Paris, offering 
her contacts at the mathematics institute. At the UK-A institute, Director J 
introduced the project to the mathematicians present, and helped recruit 
participants. Likewise, at the UK-B Institute, a senior professor made introductions, 
and encouraged others to participate in this study. At the Germany-A institute no 
formal introductions were given, and a network was instead built up independently. 
In all field sites a network of participants was developed through myself becoming 
assimilated into the mathematician's professional social networks.  
Ethnographic observations were also conducted at all institutes. This 
process involved occupying common spaces, or private office spaces, and recording 
social interactions and work routines. Certain collaborative groups and individuals 
were shadowed during their daily routines, and the observations of such shadowing 
were recorded through a photo journal and through extensive fieldwork notes. 
Such shadowing involves moving with the working groups through the different 
spaces of the institute, from common areas to seminar rooms, from libraries to 
private offices, and observing how the activities and communicative practices are 
transformed through movement between different spaces. I also observed intra 
and inter-group interactions in order to understand how different communicative 
modalities are implemented across diverse social situations. Throughout this 
process of shadowing I collected notes, diagrams, sketches and examples, in order 
70 
 
to understand the evolution of mathematical concepts, and the means by which 
they are constructed.  
1.33 Interview Protocol  
Interviews lasted between one to two hours in length and spanned a range of 
themes including: personal biographies, education within mathematics, daily work 
practices, life-histories of ideas, representation and perception of mathematics, as 
well as individuals’ motivations and career goals. Interviews began with situating 
the individual within a wider social frame, through understanding their socio-
economic background. Introductory questions explored their parents’ backgrounds 
and occupations, their early experiences in mathematics, and their education within 
mathematics. Questioning then aimed to situate them within the mathematical 
field, exploring their career trajectories, and the influences on their research. 
Interviews moved on to discussing the particularity of an individual’s research, 
exploring PhD problems, current problems, and the evolution of their thought. Such 
questions aimed to understand how individuals position their knowledge within the 
mathematical field, and how concepts change as a function of such positioning.  
 Institutional contexts were then explored, to discover what effect space has 
on day to day routines. Questions regarding work routines, habits, and production 
practices were explored, with interviewees being asked to walk the interviewer 
through work-routines, narrate notebooks or black-board inscriptions, and to 
describe in detail any current research. During this stage of the interview the 
researcher was questioned about how research was presented and communicated 
to others, as well as the process of solving problems as part of collaborations. The 
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intention of such questioning was to understand how collaborative work practices 
differed from solo-work, as well as how knowledge changed in the process of 
presentation and communication. Towards the end of the interview I wished to 
explore mathematicians’ perceptions of the wider field. As a result questions 
regarding aesthetics, validation of proofs, competition and metaphor were 
discussed. 
1.34 Research tools 
Altogether 45 interviews were conducted, producing 65 hours of audio material. 
These were recorded using a Sony ICD-PX240 Voice Recorder and a back-up voice 
recorder mobile app. These recordings were then transcribed by myself, with 
sections being classified in Nvivo according to relevant themes. 
During the course of fieldwork I kept a regular account of my experiences in 
4 pocket-sized fieldwork notebooks. I also kept a separate, digital fieldwork 
reflection journal, which is recorded in Microsoft OneNote. Throughout the process 
I used a small, pocket 16 mega-pixel Nikon COOLPIX S9900 camera, and my Lumina 
535's 3.5 mega-pixel camera, to record a regular photo-journal of my fieldwork 
experiences. Using these cameras I recorded scratch paper notes, blackboard 
writing and other ephemera of daily life. Using the note-taking app Evernote I kept 
a backup of my interviews, photos and notebooks, which were automatically 





1.35 Training and background 
Over the course of the PhD I have increased my understanding of mathematics, 
mainly through private study of mathematical text books, and through participating 
in online mathematics and physics courses. Online material has mainly been 
provided through MOOCs on Coursera, MIT open courses, and EdX. During the first 
year of my PhD I introduced myself to mathematics using textbooks produced by 
Dover publications. During my second and third years of PhD I then moved to 
reading the Springer Undergraduate Mathematics series of textbooks. Through 
such texts I gained a grounding in the following topics in mathematics: 
Linear Algebra, Set theory, Calculus, Multi-variable calculus, Analysis of 
complex numbers, Functional analysis, Advanced algebra, Advanced 
calculus, Topology, Algebraic geometry, Number theory, Group theory, and 
Galois theory.  
This grounding in mathematics, however, does not furnish me with sufficient 
knowledge to participate in the creation of research mathematics. Nor is this 
background sufficient to understand a modern proof within my target fields. This 
background only provides me with a basic understanding of certain constructions, 
processes and objects used within the disciplines I work with.  
1.36 Research sites 
The four sites were chosen mainly because of their excellent reputation within the 
mathematical community, as well as the ease by which they could be accessed. The 
target community of differential geometers, algebraic geometers and topologists 
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were also present within these institutes at the time of the studies, making them 
ideal locations in which to undertake fieldwork.   
A total of 6 months was spent at all 4 research institutes. Time was divided 
as follows: UK-B Institute: 8 weeks; UK-A Institute: 5 weeks; Germany-A Institute: 4 
weeks; Paris-A institute: 8 weeks.  
Research took place between March-May 2014 at the UK-A institute, 
October 2014 at Germany-A Institute, September-November 2015 at UK-B Institute 
and January-March 2016 at the Paris-A Institute.  
1.37 Existing ethnographic work in mathematics 
For the purpose of this particular study I have selected the Mathematical research 
institute as my research site because of the relative ease of access to 
mathematicians, and because of the greater likelihood of witnessing 
communication of concepts between mathematicians. Such research institutes 
attract mathematicians for the purpose of collaborating and this by definition 
requires communication and the communal production and sharing of knowledge. 
Two key researchers: Bettina Heintz and Christian Grieffenhagen have already 
begun undertaking work within research institutes. My thesis supports and builds 
upon their findings, demonstrating the importance Heintz places on trust and 
friendship in validating proof. I go on to explain the importance Grieffenhagen 
attaches to inscription practices on black-boards, as well as the use of the body in 
communicating and materialising mathematics.   
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The stimulus for this kind of ethnographic investigation into scientific 
knowledge-production stems in part from Latour and Woolgar's 1979 Laboratory 
life. The aim of their project was to understand the internal workings of scientific 
knowledge construction, as they explain: 
Although our knowledge of the external effects and reception of science has 
increased, our understanding of the complex activities which constitute the 
internal workings of scientific activity remains undeveloped (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979:281)  
 
Their study aimed to understand the day-to-day realities of life within a lab at the 
Salk Institute in California. By utilising ethnographic fieldwork techniques, they 
sought to make the familiar strange and study the scientific community as if they 
were a "tribe", as they explain:   
Partly as a result of our dissatisfaction, and in an effort both to penetrate 
the mystique of science and to provide a reflexive understanding of the 
detailed activities of working scientists, we decided to construct an account 
based on the experiences of close daily contact with laboratory scientists 
over a period of 2 years (Latour and Woolgar, 1979:312) 
 
Their employment of ethnographic techniques is now common practice within 
sociology of scientific knowledge, but such widespread adoption is perhaps a 
testament to the power of the technique in gaining insight into the situated 
practices by which "scientific facts" are generated. Merz and Knorr Cetina (1997) 
are an example of how "Laboratory Life" has been extended out into other fields of 
scientific enquiry. In Merz and Knorr-Cetina's case they explore the production of 
cutting-edge research in theoretical physics at CERN in Geneva. The application of 
Latour and Woolgar's techniques to the "thinking" science (as opposed to "wet" or 
hands-on science of biology) is perhaps closer to home with regards to my own 
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study, as the problems of how you observe knowledge-production become more 
obvious when most of the production process is located within the minds of 
individual physicists, indeed Merz and Knorr-Cetina found themselves asking:  
When theoretical physicists do a calculation, when they compute the BRST 
cohomology of the W-algebra, when they grade by the ghost number or 
face the Tb γγ term or when they discuss the advantage of doing H(M⊗M*) 
over H(F⊗F), students of science usually look the other way. Are these sorts 
of operations still within the scope of our interest? More important perhaps, 
are they even within our reach? Can we study them ethnographically or 
observationally? What, if one could study them, might one find out?" 
(1997:73)  
   
As with mathematics, they found that most of the work was not subject to 
observation, consisting of desk-work involving just a pen and paper. For this reason 
Merz and Knorr-Cetina adapted their technique:  
It also has to be admitted that the laboratory approach had to be adapted to 
the obdurateness of the field: the study is based rather less on the 
observation of physicists' activities than on one analyst's capability to 
exploit her physics training and interact with participants as a member of 
their culture. It is also anchored in a close 'reading' of physicists' personal-
professional communications (their e-mail correspondence […]), their 
calculation protocols, and their explanations to us, which invariably involved 
paper and pencil. The close 'reading' was adopted to gain access to the 
ethno-methods implicated in doing theoretical physics work. (Ibid 1997:74) 
 
Such ethnographic fieldwork involved analysing email communication, collecting 
artefacts in the form of notes and examples of diagrams. They studied small work-
groups, attended group meetings and shadow teams throughout their work-day. 
Greiffenhagen (2008) followed a similar practice, as he explored the contexts within 
which mathematics is communicated. He observed mathematicians at lectures, at 
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seminars, and during graduate students’ interactions with their advisors. In his work 
on student-teacher communication, Grieffenhagen explains his research as follows: 
[L]ooking at mathematical lectures only gives us access to existing 
mathematical knowledge (and only the demonstration of this knowledge for 
a particular set of recipients, namely graduate students). The weekly 
supervision meetings between a supervisor and his doctoral students were 
therefore chosen as a second site. In these supervision meetings doctoral 
students present the current state of their research to the supervisor and 
they collaboratively try to find solutions for problems for which there are as 
yet no solutions. In these discussions, mathematicians explain to each other 
their reasons for why a particular way of proceeding might be successful (or 
not) and thereby have to explicitly formulate some of the strategies, tricks, 
and competences that they employ when working out novel mathematics 
(Grieffenhagen 2008:12) 
 
During Grieffenhagen’s (2008) fieldwork at a UK research institute, and from 
seminar lectures and professor-student dialogues within office spaces, he 
highlighted the importance that written communication on blackboards played in 
the construction and presentation of proof. Indeed Grieffenhagen’s analysis of 
video-footage from mathematicians interacting at blackboards showed the ways in 
which mathematical concepts were constructed and unfolded through time. In my 
own study, communication around, and presentation upon, blackboards was a 
primary focus as a site for mathematical knowledge-production.    
Such blackboards, and indeed research institutes in general, are sites where 
mathematical knowledge-production is made visible, as they are spaces where 
mathematical communication is necessary. Sites such as the UK-A Institute and 
Germany-A institute were thus selected for this study because the intentions of 
social actors within these institutional contexts are to communicate concepts, to 
explain and justify, and thus make mathematical concepts visible and subject to 
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scrutiny. It is such "visibility" and "survey-ability" of mathematical practice that 
makes the research institute and the study of mathematical collaborations subject 
to sociological investigation. Such investigations have been conducted successfully 
in the past, by Heintz (2003, 1998).  
Heintz conducted her sociological investigations at a research Institute in 
Germany. Her (1998) work consisted of a 4 month ethnographic study in 1996, 
during which time she conducted 20 ethnographic interviews and observed the 
mathematicians interacting during seminars, coffee breaks and work in offices and 
library spaces. The core findings from her research, relevant to this thesis 
concerned the social aspects involved in validating proof. Heintz described how 
new technologies and conceptual tools were often adopted by other 
mathematicians on the basis of trust.   
Heintz observed that complete understanding of the conceptual machinery 
of a proof was not necessary for a tool to be used or accepted. Rather the 
character, status and standing of a mathematician within the community of practice 
was enough for a proof or technology to be trusted and validated. Heintz also 
outlined the role that aesthetics played in determining the truth of an argument, 
arguing that problem solving was a product of Erleuchtung, or enlightenment, 
which took the form of aesthetic feelings, intuition, and insight (Heintz, 2003:149-
150).  
Heintz’ work highlights the role that ethnographic observations and 
interview based research can play in understanding the social nature of 
mathematical production. Such methods allow us to contextualise the production 
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of mathematical knowledge within the day to day worlds of mathematicians. In the 
following thesis I shall expand on Heintz’s and Greiffenhagen’s work and provide a 



















Section 1.4: Theoretical Background 
1.41 Introduction  
Bourdieu's theories on the field, habitus and practice are critical components of this 
thesis. I use these ideas to construct a theoretical lens through which to view the 
mathematical communities I am studying. Through such a theoretical framework I 
define certain components to the mathematical production system: group, field, 
capital, habitus, and practice. I use Bourdieu's ideas to show how these 
components are formed, how they interact, and how they change over time. 
Although I use terms such as system, production, components, my intention is not 
to construct an overly mechanised vision of production in mathematics, or to reify 
the boundaries around groups, categories or social structures. I simply use the 
terms as a means for conceptualising and describing the social phenomena 
encountered.  
Bourdieu's ideas will not be used without question, rather I will later qualify 
Bourdieu's definitions of habitus and field, through use of Sewell's (1992) revisions. 
Bourdieu's ideas, although they have stood the test of time, have not been without 
their critics. Bourdieu's earlier work, for example was criticised as being overly 
structuralist in his analysis. His work on the Berber house Bourdieu himself 
describes as "perhaps the last work I wrote as a blissful structuralist" (Bourdieu, 
1990:9). Such a structuralist approach neglected the ambiguities and contradictions 
involved in interpreting symbols in concrete social situations (McAllister, 2004: 
118). As Davison (1988) argues, it is the situated actions between individuals and 
material culture which produce symbolic meaning. The symbolic oppositions built 
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into the organisation of space in the Berber house therefore may be manifested in 
different ways, according to the contextualised performances of different social 
actors within such spaces (Davison, 1988:100). A more nuanced understanding of 
Bourdieu would therefore consider how agency is exerted through performances in 
space, through use of tactics and strategies for manipulating symbols in order to 
influence relationships, structure and perceptions, as McAllister (2004) writes: 
[T]hese principles can be manipulated, adapted, selected from, ignored, 
reversed, etc., by the actors, to recreate and reinforce relationships or to 
signal changes in them, in terms of the interests and strategies of those 
involved. (McAllister, 2004:119) 
 
The later works of Bourdieu take into account the mutability of structure, and study 
strategies and tactics for manipulating them. Bourdieu uses the term "Practice" or 
the "logic of practice" to describe the mechanisms by which different scripts or 
schemes are adapted to the practical needs of individuals. Structures are seen not 
only to constrain, but also to enable, and equally to be manipulated according to 
needs of the individual. This modification to his theories invests more agency and 
awareness in the individual, and presents a more nuanced vision of structure, as a 
set of organising principles which are reproduced by social actors through social 
interactions, but also which are altered by the individual through such interactions.    
Another criticism of Bourdieu's theories, especially of the habitus, 
concerned their lack of definition. Multiple interpretations can be drawn from the 
definitions provided by Bourdieu and, as a result, his work is liable to be 
misinterpreted or misrepresented. In the following review of Bourdieu's theories I 
will present as clear definitions as I can, using excepts from Bourdieu's writings to 
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substantiate the interpretations that I am presenting. With such preliminaries dealt 
with, I will now proceed to provide definitions of the key ideas I will be adapting 
from Bourdieu's theoretical corpus.  
1.42. Defining objectivity  
Let us begin by discussing Bourdieu's notion of objectivity. Much like Bloor (1984), 
Bourdieu locates objectivity within the social field. Objectivity within the sciences, 
according to Bourdieu (2004), is produced within the specific contexts of a 
discipline, through agreements between members of that discipline:  
Objectivity is an intersubjective product of the scientific field: grounded in 
the presuppositions shared within this field, it is the result of the 
intersubjective agreement within the field. Each field (discipline) is the site 
of a specific legality (a nomos), a product of history, which is embodied in 
the objective regularities of the functioning of the field and, more precisely, 
in the mechanisms governing the circulation of information, in the logic of 
the allocation of rewards etc. and in the scientific habitus produced by the 
field, which are the condition of the functioning of the field. (Bourdieu, 
2004:83) 
 
For Bourdieu there is no distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, rather 
objectivity is subject to intersubjective negotiations within the social field. The field 
constitutes certain phenomena as objective, legitimising certain phenomena as 
"facts".  Facts are therefore constructed entities produced through consensus 
between individuals socialised within a given field. The fact is not a given, rather 
Bourdieu explains: 
The fact is won, constructed, observed, in and through the dialectical 
communication among subjects, that is to say through the process of 
verification, collective production of truth, in and through negotiation, 
transaction, and also homologation, ratification by the explicitly expressed 
consensus - homologein - (and not only in the dialectic between hypothesis 
and experiment). A fact truly becomes a scientific fact only if it is recognised. 
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The construction is socially determined in a twofold way: on the one hand, 
by the position of the laboratory or scientist within the field; on the other 
hand, by the categories of perception associated with the position of the 
receiver (with the effect of imposition, authority, being that much greater 
the lower this position is in relative terms). (Bourdieu, 2004:73) 
 
A fact can only be classified as such if it is recognised by members of a field. The 
fact, Bourdieu writes is created through recognition, through the act of discerning 
and discriminating. The means by which such facts are agreed upon, by 
communities of practice, are through creating rules for verifying knowledge. For an 
individual to participate in the creation of knowledge they must be cognisant of the 
rules and have skill at manipulating them. Bourdieu characterises this mastery of 
rules as possessing a "feel for the game", as he describes below:  
Epistemological rules are the conventions established for settling 
controversies: they govern the confrontation of the scientist with the 
external world, that is, between theory and experiment, but also with other 
scientists, enabling him to anticipate criticism and refute it. A good scientist 
is someone who has a sense of the scientific game, who can anticipate 
criticism and adapt in advance to the criteria defining acceptable arguments, 
thus advancing the process of recognition and legitimation; who stops 
experimenting when he thinks that the experimentation conforms to the 
socially defined norms of his science and when he feels sufficiently assured 
to confront his peers. Scientific knowledge is the set of propositions that 
have survived objections. (Bourdieu, 2004:83) 
 
1.43 Defining social position 
Epistemological rules thus define the forms that acceptable knowledge in the field 
can take. Such rules also shape individual's perception of knowledge, by creating 
positions or stances from which individuals can relate to knowledge and relate 
knowledge together:  
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Epistemological rules are nothing other than the social rules and regularities 
inscribed in structures and/ or in habitus, particularly as regards the way of 
conducting a discussion (the rules of argumentation) and settling a conflict. 
Researchers put an end to their experimentation when they think that their 
experiment is consistent with the norms of their science, and can confront 
the expected criticism. (Bourdieu, 2004:71) 
 
These standpoints are defined by an individual's own position within the field, 
which is determined relative to other members of the field. The sum of possible 
positions in a field defines the social space of the field, with different stand-points, 
or positions, linked through operations of relation and differentiation, as Bourdieu 
explains: 
But a point of view is also a point in a space (Standpunkt), a point of space 
where one stands in order to take a view, a point of view in the first sense, 
on that space: to conceive the point of view in this way is to conceive it 
differentially, relationally, in terms of the possible alternative positions to 
which it is opposed in different respects (income, qualifications, etc.). 
(Bourdieu, 2004: 31) 
 
Positions, or standpoints, within social space, generate different viewpoints from 
which to view the space of social relations, as well as the objective facts of the field. 
Each view creates different perspectives of the field, and thus affects their 
perception of the field. The result of this position-dependency is that the 
epistemological rules, as well as the schemas of perception inherited from habitus, 
will have different expression as a function of the individual’s position in the field. 
As Bourdieu explains, there is no absolute point of view of the field, rather all views 





A point of view is first of all a view taken from a particular point 
(Gesichtspunkt), a particular position in space and, in the sense in which I 
shall mean it here, in the social space: to objectivate the subject of 
objectivation, the (objectivating) point of view, is to break with the illusion 
of the absolute point of view, which is characteristic of every point of view; 
it is therefore also a perspective view (Schau): all perceptions, visions, 
beliefs, expectations, hopes, etc., are socially structured and socially 
conditioned and they object a law which defines the principle of their 
variation, the law of the correspondence between positions and position-
takings. Individual A's perception is to individual B's perception as A's 
position is to B's position, with the habitus making the connection between 
the space of positions and the space of points of view (Bourdieu, 2004: 95) 
 
1.44 Defining social spaces  
Each scientific discipline generates its own social spaces, which are composed of 
local, hierarchically ordered spaces of institutes, departments, collaborative groups, 
etc. The spaces generated by disciplines are themselves ordered hierarchically in 
relation to the total set of spaces which constitute "Science" in its generality. 
Mathematical disciplines such as algebraic geometry are thus related to other 
disciplines, such as topology, within the set of disciplines which constitutes the field 
of "mathematics". As Bourdieu explains below, individual work-sites, such as 
laboratories, form local spaces or microcosms, which are related to other 
laboratories to constitute a discipline. Within each individual laboratory there will 
be a given positioning of individual scientists, these local positions are further 
structured according to the laboratory's position amidst the wider collection of 
laboratories: 
But it is immediately clear that a laboratory is a social microcosm, itself 
situated in a space containing other laboratories, these together 
constituting a discipline (itself situated in a hierarchized space, that of the 
disciplines), and that is derives a major part of its properties from the 
position it occupies within that space. If one ignores this series of structural 
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interlockings, this (relational) position and the associated effects of position, 
one is likely, as in the case of the village monograph, to look in the 
laboratory for explanatory principles which in fact lie outside it, in the 
structure of the space within which it is located. Only through an overall 
theory of the scientific space, which understands it as a space structured 
according to both generic and specific logics, is it possible truly to 
understand a given point in this space, where a particular laboratory or an 
individual researcher. (Bourdieu, 2004, 32-3) 
 
The position of the individual within social space is thus determined simultaneously 
at the local level of the laboratory or department, and at the global level of the 
discipline. The relationships between the local and the global spaces constitutes the 
field of objective relationships. An individual's place within this field then shapes 
their dispositions towards phenomena, as well as their performances of their selves 
and their ideas, as Bourdieu explains: 
The notion of the field marks a first break with the interactionist approach, 
inasmuch as it takes note of the existence of this structure of objective 
relationships among laboratories and among researchers which governs or 
orients practices. It makes a second break, inasmuch as the relational or 
structural approach that it introduces is associated with a dispositionalist 
philosophy, which breaks with the finalism, allied to a naïve intentionalism, 
which sets agents - in this case researchers - as rational calculators seeking 
not so much the truth as the social profits accruing to those who appear to 
have discovered it. (Bourdieu, 2004:33)  
 
1.45 Defining scientific capital 
Position and therefore disposition (habitus) within the field is part determined by 
the possession of capital. Capital is always already social capital, because it has 
been constituted and consecrated within social systems. Capital can take the form 
of economic capital (money, possessions, labour power, earning power), moral 
capital (religious standing), symbolic capital (status, position, recognition), 
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knowledge capital, political capital (ability to influence decision making), etc. In the 
case of the sciences and mathematics Bourdieu creates the notion of "scientific 
capital". According to Bourdieu scientific capital is derived from the category of 
symbolic capital, and relates to the recognition individuals receive as a result of 
producing accepted knowledge within a scientific discipline:  
Symbolic capital is a set of distinctive properties which exist in and through 
the perception of agents endowed with the adequate categories of 
perception, categories which are acquired in particular through experience 
of the structure of the distribution of this capital within the social space or a 
particular social microcosm such as the scientific field. Scientific capital is a 
set of properties which are the product of acts of knowledge and 
recognition performed by agents engaged in the scientific field and 
therefore endowed with the specific categories of perception that enable 
them to make the pertinent distinctions, in accordance with the principle of 
pertinence that is constitutive of the nomos of the field. This diacritical 
perception is only accessible to those who possess sufficient incorporated 
cultural capital. (Bourdieu, 2004:55) 
 
To produce accepted knowledge an individual has to have incorporated the 
schemas of perception necessary to discern and discriminate novel phenomena 
within the field. Through making a recognised contribution to the stock of 
knowledge, so a scientist adds to their stock of scientific capital and distinguishes 
themselves relative to their peers:  
To exist scientifically is to have a "plus" in terms of the categories of 
perception prevailing within the field, that is to say, for one's peers (to have 
contributed something), to have distinguished oneself (positively) by a 
distinctive contribution. In scientific exchange, the scientist makes a 
"contribution" for which he is recognised by acts of public recognition such 
as citation among the sources of the knowledge used. Thus scientific capital 
is the product of recognition by competitors (and an act of recognition 
brings capital to the extent that the person who makes it is himself 




Scientific capital, like any form of capital, is only legitimised through recognition. 
Only individuals socialised within the field possess sufficient understanding of the 
domain of knowledge to be able to recognise contributions to knowledge. For such 
a reason recognition of scientific capital is valid only within the limits of the field in 
which that capital is constituted:  
Scientific capital functions as a symbolic capital of recognition that is 
primarily, sometimes exclusively, valid within the limits of the field 
(although it can be converted into other kinds of capital, economic capital in 
particular). (Bourdieu, 2004:55) 
 
Only within the bounds of the field can the value of a contribution be judged and 
given weight. The more distinctive a contribution is the more recognition a concept 
gains, and therefore a contribution and its producer gain in visibility as a result:  
A scientist's symbolic weight tends to vary with the distinctive value of his 
contributions and the originality that his competitor-peers recognise in his 
distinctive contribution. The notion of visibility, used in the American 
university tradition, accurately evokes the differential value of this capital 
which, concentrated in a known and recognised name, distinguishes its 
bearer from the undifferentiated background into which the mass of 
anonymous researchers merges and blurs. (Bourdieu, 2004:56) 
  
To increase one's scientific capital an individual must therefore increase the value 
of their contributions and their visibility within the field. Individuals thus act in such 
a way as to increase their standing in the social field, through maximising the 
acquisition and effectiveness of their capital. To accomplish this task individuals 
adopt social strategies, or positions, which maximise the profit they receive from 
their capital investments: 
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These position-takings are the product of the relationship between a 
position in the field and the dispositions (the habitus) of its occupant. Every 
scientific choice - the area of research, the methods used, the place of 
publication, the choice, well described by Hagstrom (1965:100), of rapid 
publication of partially verified findings or later publication of fully checked 
findings - is also a social strategy of investment oriented towards 
maximisation of the specific, inseparably social and scientific profit offered 
by the field and determined by the relationship between position and 
dispositions that I have just set out. (Bourdieu, 2004:59).   
 
1.46 Defining the field 
The field I have discussed so far is a field of objective relations between individuals, 
determined by the distribution of social capital. This field defines an individual's 
position relative to others, and their position shapes their dispositions and stances 
towards structures determined by the field. As Bourdieu writes, an individual's 
position and consequent stance will therefore constitute the field of possibilities for 
potential action within the social world: 
In reality, the dispositions durably inculcated by the possibilities and 
impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions 
inscribed in the objective conditions (which science apprehends through 
statistical regularities such as the probabilities objectively attached to a 
group or class) generate dispositions objectively compatible with these 
conditions and in a sense pre-adapted to their demands. (Bourdieu, 
2004:54) 
 
The total space of positions is a field which generates the field of possibilities for 
social action. Such possibilities, however, can only be perceived through situated 
stances (dispositions) which are structured by the habitus. Through use of a habitus 
(a system of schemas structuring dispositions) the individual generates a vision of 
the field of possible actions: 
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The space of positions, when perceived by a habitus adapted to it, functions 
as a space of possibles, the range of possible ways of doing science, among 
which one has to choose; each of the agents engaged in the field has a 
practical perception of the various realizations of science, which functions as 
a problematic. This perception, this vision, varies according to the agent's 
dispositions, and is more or less complete, more or less extensive; it may 
rule out some sectors disdaining them as uninteresting or unimportant. The 
relationship between the space of possibles and dispositions can function as 
a system of censorship, excluding some directions and means of research de 
facto without even stating any restrictions. This narrowing effect is 
strongest for those agents who have least symbolic capital and specific 
cultural capital. (Bourdieu, 2004:59-60) 
  
The possibilities for action in the field are limited by individuals' position in the field, 
which is determined by their possession of capital. The possibility of an individual 
acting freely and exerting agency are limited by their possession of capital. Through 
unequal distribution of capital within fields, so inequality is generated, which 
creates positions of relative domination and subordination within any given social 
field:  
Even in the absence of direct interaction, intervention or manipulation, the 
structure of the field, defined by the unequal distribution of capital, that is 
of the specific weapons or assets, bears on all the agents within it, 
restructuring more or less the space of possibles that is open to them, 
depending on how well placed they are within the field, that is within this 
distribution. A dominant agent is one who occupies a place within the 
structure such that the structure works in his favour. (Bourdieu, 2004:34) 
 
Individuals will therefore possess varying degrees of agency by which to change 
their position within the field, or produce desired actions within the field. This 
ability to effect change is characterised as the "force" exerted by the individual 
within the field. Such force is proportional to the volume or mass of accumulated 
capital they possess: 
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The force attached to an agent depends on his various "assets", differential 
factors of success which may give him an advantage in the competition, that 
is to say, more precisely, the volume and structure of the capital in its 
various forms that he possesses…The structure of the distribution of capital 
determines the structure of the field, in other words the relations of force 
among the scientific agents: possession of a large quantity of capital gives a 
power over the field, and therefore over agents (relatively) less endowed 
with capital (and over the price of entry to the field) and governs the 
distribution of the chances of profit. (Bourdieu, 2004:33-4) 
 
Possessing capital affects an individual's power over the field, with large 
accumulations of capital possessing more force by which to influence decision 
making, tastes, and allocation of resources. An individual is thus motivated to 
maximise their acquisition of capital, in order to exert more force and hence more 
influence in the field of production. The field thus is not only a field of objective 
relations between individuals, but is also a field of struggles within which 
individuals compete for the resources necessary to exert their agency:  
[T]he field as a field of struggles, a socially constructed field of action in 
which agents endowed with different resources confront one another to 
conserve or transform the existing power relations. Agents undertake 
actions there, the ends, means and efficacy of which depend on their 
position within the field of forces, their position within the structure of the 
distribution of capital. (Bourdieu, 2004:34-5) 
 
Researchers adopt strategies by which to increase their volume of capital, but they 
are at the same time constrained in their strategic intentions by their positions 
within the field itself, as Bourdieu explains: 
Rather than being deployed in the context of a universe without gravity or 
inertia, where they would be able to develop without restriction, 
researchers' strategies are oriented by the objective constraints and 
possibilities implied in their respective position and by the representation 
(itself linked to their position) they are able to form of their position and 
those of their rivals, on the basis of their information and their cognitive 
structures. (Bourdieu, 2004:34-5) 
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Such positionings are themselves defined by the structure of the field and the 
distribution of capital within a given field. Fields, as Bourdieu describes, are 
characterised by structures of domination and sub-ordination, which vary according 
to the concentration of capital: 
The room for manoeuvre available to their strategies will depend on the 
structure of the field, characterised for example by a more or less high 
degree of concentration of capital (ranging from near monopoly…to a 
virtually equal distribution among all competitors); but it will always be 
organised around the principle opposition between the dominant and the 
dominated, the challengers. The former are able, often effortlessly, to 
impose the representation of science most favourable to their interests, 
that is to say, the "correct" legitimate way to play and the rules of the game 
and therefore the participation in the game. Their interests are bound up 
with the established state of the field and they are the natural defenders of 
the "normal science" of the day. They enjoy decisive advantages in the 
competition, one reason being that they constitute an obligatory reference 
point for their competitors, who, whatever they do, are…required actively 
or passively to take up a position in relation to them. (Bourdieu, 2004:35) 
 
1.46 Defining the boundaries of the field 
To be part of a field is to be part of a game in which individuals compete against 
one another for scarce resources of capital. To be part of the game an individual 
must accept certain rules, as well as the limits within which the game can be 
played. The limits of the game however are not clear cut, as the boundaries around 
the field merge with other social fields. The field of mathematics for example may 
be contained within wider fields of sociality: within universities, nation states, the 
scientific community, etc. Or they may exist parallel to other social fields: politics, 
family life, religion, etc. The boundaries around the field are thus ill defined, as the 
structure of the field itself is subject to change as a result of external pressures and 
internal tensions. Fields will have different degrees of autonomy according to how 
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the pressures and tensions are balanced, as well as how the boundaries around the 
fields are maintained:   
In fact, the field is subject to (external) pressures and contain tensions, in 
the sense of forces that act so as to drive apart, separate, the constituent 
parts of a body. To say that the field is relatively autonomous with respect 
to the encompassing social universe is to say that the system of forces that 
are constitutive of the structure of the field (tension) is relatively 
independent of the forces exerted on the field (pressure). It has, as it were 
the "freedom" it needs to develop its own necessity, its own logic, its own 
nomos. (Bourdieu, 2004:47) 
 
The varying degrees of autonomy of the field, that is to say the boundaries of the 
field, are thus constructed through controlling the production and possession of 
capital, through creating entry conditions to the field itself: 
The process of autonomization is linked to the rise in the implicit or explicit 
price of entry. This price of entry is competence, scientific capital, 
incorporated and turned into a "sense of the game", but it is also the 
propensity to take part in the game, the libido scientifica, the illusio, the 
belief not only in the stakes but also in the game itself, the idea that the 
game is…worth playing. (Bourdieu, 2004:50) 
 
In the case of fields within mathematics such entry conditions take the form of 
restricting access and production of knowledge through professionalization of the 
discipline: 
Mathematization first produces an effect of exclusion from the field of 
discussion. With Newton (I would add Leibniz), the mathematization of 
physics tended increasingly, from the mid-eighteenth century, to set up a 
very strong social separation between professionals and amateurs, insiders 
and outsiders. Mastery of mathematics became the price of entry and 
reduced not only the number of potential readers but also of potential 
producers. The Boundaries of the space were slowly redefined in such a way 
that the potential readers were more and more limited to the potential 
contributors, having the appropriate training. In other words, 
93 
 
mathematization contributed to the formation of an autonomous scientific 
field" (Gingras 2001:24). (Bourdieu, 2004:48) 
 
1.47 Defining habitus7  
Any given field is thus relatively autonomous to other fields, depending on the 
field's boundary conditions and how they are maintained. However, even within 
fields, there is an internal order generated by the distribution of capital. Individuals 
                                                          
7 Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is taken primarily from two sources: the work of the art historian 
Erwin Panofsky (1976 [1951]) and the anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1973 [1934]). Mauss himself 
adapts the concept from Aristotle’s “hexis” (acquired state of being). Mauss, however, uses the term 
habitus to describe the “techniques of the body”, which are shaped through socialisation (through 
education and apprenticeship), he traces out the concept of habitus in the following : 
 
I have had this notion of the social nature of the 'habitus' for many years. Please note that I 
use the Latin word-it should be understood in France-habitus. The word translates infinitely 
better than 'habitude' (habit or custom), the 'hexis', the 'acquired ability' and 'faculty' of 
Aristotle (who was a psychologist). It does not designate those metaphysical habitudes, that 
mysterious 'memory', the subjects of volumes or short and famous theses. These 'habits' do 
not just vary with individuals and their imitations, they vary especially between societies, 
educations, proprieties and fashions, prestiges. In them we should see the techniques and 
work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the ordinary way, merely 
the soul and its repetitive faculties. (1973:73). 
 
Mauss’ concept of habitus combines notions of body schemas: the techniques necessary for shaping 
bodily action – with evaluative schemas: the means by which skills are perceived, valued and judged 
by other socialised individuals. The body thus, in Mauss’ thought, is a socialised body, which is both 
structured on a physiological level, as well as at a moral or aesthetic level.  
 
For Panofsky the notion of habitus concerned the “habits of the mind”, and how mental structures 
could become translated into physical architecture through adopting a certain modus operandi (way 
of operating). Panofsky studied the emergence of Gothic architecture in and around Paris during the 
12th and 13th centuries, exploring architecture of this period as a cultural product inspired by the 
philosophies of the medieval scholastics (Panofsky, 1976:4-5). Masons of the period developed their 
craft through adopting the “mental habits” of the scholastics of the period (1976:20-21). By adopting 
certain motifs and principles of clarity, symmetry, totality, and hierarchy so a unified visual logic was 
generated which reflected the logic of the scholastics (p.68).  These generative principles for 
structuring cultural productions were thus part of a wider habitus shared by educated elites of the 
time, and reflected, as Hanks (2005) writes, the “spirit of the age” (Hanks, 2005:72).  
 
Through translating Panofsky’s work in 1976 Bourdieu adopted and adapted Panofsky’s notions of 
habitus as a means of explaining how certain socio-cultural-material systems were generated, and 
how physical, mental, and discursive structures could emerge which shared certain ordering 







with similar capital accumulations will be located in similar objective positions 
within the field, and hence neighbourhoods are created, which Bourdieu 
constitutes as classes. Members of such classes, because they share similar 
objective positions within the field, will tend to share similar norms, beliefs and 
dispositions. Such class dispositions Bourdieu defines as "habitus", which are 
characterised within the following two quotes, taken from two separate, but similar 
characterisations by Bourdieu: 
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the 
material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce 
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles for 
the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can 
be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the 
product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a 
conductor (Bourdieu, 1977: 72) 
 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of 
existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that 
is, as principles which generate and organise practice and representations 
that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary 
in order to attain them. Objectively "regulated" and "regular" without being 
in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a 
conductor. (Bourdieu, 1990:53) 
 
Habitus, we find, are "durable" in the sense that they persist within social groups 
over time, they are thus resistant to change. Habitus are transposable in the sense 
that certain schemes are flexible and can be used within multiple contexts. They are 
also structured structures - this reflects the schematic or program-like nature of 
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habitus, which act to give order to experience, much like the notion of a gestalt.  
Such schemes work at multiple levels of experience, from shaping the body's 
movements and practical actions, to shaping representations in linguistic and 
conceptual spaces, to shaping social interactions between individuals. This is made 
more explicit by Bourdieu in the following quotes: 
[A] subjective but not individual system of internalised structures, schemes 
of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same 
group or class. (Bourdieu, 1977:86). 
Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system 
of perception and appreciation of practices… (Bourdieu, 1989: 19- 20). 
 
Within these quotes we see the perceptual, conceptual and behavioural aspects of 
habitus. Bourdieu thus does not want us to limit habitus' operations to the social 
world, but he argues that such schemes organise every facet of our existence. We 
think, and act, and socialise through internalising certain social programs, which 
then run in the background of our consciousness. The habitus, as Bourdieu explains, 
constitutes the practical world of action, through creating "motivating structures" 
which present possibilities for action in the world: 
The practical world that is constituted in the relationship with the habitus, 
acting as a system of cognitive and motivating structures, is a world of 
already realised ends - procedures to follow, paths to take - and of objects 
endowed with a "permanent teleological character", in Husserl's phrase, 
tools or institutions. This is because the regularities inherent in an arbitrary 
condition tend to appear as necessary, even natural since they are the basis 
of the schemes of perception and appreciation through which they are 
apprehended. (Bourdieu, 1990:53-4) 
 
The schemes of a habitus thus creates perspectival frames through which 
phenomena are construed, given order and categorised. The individual is presented 
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with possibilities for action, which are organised as strategies, not through the 
strategic intentions of the individual, but rather through path-dependent 
operations programmed by the habitus: 
The habitus contains the solution to the paradoxes of objective meaning 
without subjective intention. It is the source of these strings of "moves" 
which are objectively organised as strategies without being the product of a 
genuine strategic intention - which would presuppose at least that they be 
apprehended as one among other possible strategies. If each stage in the 
sequence of ordered and oriented actions that constitute objective 
strategies can appear to be determined by anticipation of the future, and in 
particular, of its own consequences (which is what justifies the use of the 
concept of strategy), it is because the practices that are generated by the 
habitus and are governed by the past conditions of production of their 
generative principle are adapted in advance to the objective conditions 
whenever the conditions in which the habitus functions have remained 
identical, or similar, to the conditions in which it was constituted. (Bourdieu, 
1990:54) 
 
Certain actions thus become sedimented within the individual's habits, they 
become naturalised as "intuition" (what Bourdieu calls the "feel for the game"). The 
possibilities for action are experienced as a practical sense, which is manifested as 
choices for directing the individual:    
Practical sense is a quasi-bodily involvement in the world which 
presupposes no representation either of the body or of the world, still less 
of their relationship. It is an immanence in the world through which the 
world imposes its imminence, things to be done or said, which directly 
govern speech and action. It orients "choices" which, though not deliberate, 
are no less systematic, and which, without being ordered and organised in 
relation to an end, are none the less charged with a kind of retrospective 
finality. A particularly clear example of practical sense as a proleptic 
adjustment to the demands of a field is what is called, in the language of 
sport, a "feel for the game". This phrase gives a fairly accurate idea of the 
almost miraculous encounter between the habitus and a field, between 
incorporated history and an objectified history, which makes possible the 
near-perfect anticipation of the future inscribed in all the concrete 




1.48 Defining body hexis  
This "feel for the game", or intuition, is a product of being socialised within the field 
and specifically with certain sub-classes of the field. Position within classes 
determines the sets of schemas, or habitus, an individual is exposed to, and these 
schemas, in turn, shape an individual's practices, strategies and perception of the 
field. Habitus themselves are manifested in the dispositions of individuals. Such 
dispositions can take the form of physical dispositions: ways of speaking, using the 
body, using space, interacting with others; conceptual dispositions: the theories, 
concepts, classifications one adopts; aesthetic dispositions: tastes, personal 
preferences, aesthetic sensibilities etc. Disposition affects how an individual 
interacts with others, who they interact with, what they discuss, what they 
consume, what they believe and aspire to be; in short such dispositions involve 
every facet of an individual's life-world. The schemes of the habitus relate 
phenomena together, and may serve to construe one set of categories in terms of 
another, thereby creating analogues between domains of experience:    
The habitus, as "a matrix8 of perceptions, appreciations and actions," allows 
for "the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical 
transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems" 
(Bourdieu 1977:83). 
 
Schemas thus are transferred between domains of experience through analogical 
transfers and metaphorical mappings, through use of schemas or heuristics. The 
                                                          
8 This concept of Matrix is another way of representing the multi-dimensional nature of habitus, 
instead of the more geometrical representation depicted within this thesis. The habitus is seen to 
exist as an “n row by n column” matrix (in which n is an arbitrarily large number), in which different 




origins of these analogues lies in the phenomenal world, in the physical structures 
of inhabited space, which serve to ground all experience. Bourdieu, in his discussion 
of the Berber house, identifies inhabited space, the house in particular, as the 
"privileged site of the objectification of the generative schemes": 
Inhabited space - starting with the house - is the privileged site of the 
objectification of the generative schemes, and, through the divisions and 
hierarchies it establishes between things, between people and between 
practices, this materialized system of classification inculcates and constantly 
reinforces the principles of the classification which constitutes the 
arbitrariness of a culture. Thus, the opposition between the sacred of the 
right hand and the sacred of the left hand, between nif and h'aram, 
between man, invested with protective and fertilizing powers, and woman, 
who is both sacred and invested with maleficent powers, is materialised in 
the division between masculine space, with the assembly place, the market 
or the fields, and female space, the house and the garden, the sanctuaries of 
h'aram; and, secondarily, in the opposition which, within the house itself, 
assigns regions of space, objects and activities either to the male universe of 
the dry, fire, the high, the cooked, the day, or the female universe of the 
moist, water, the low, the raw, the night. (Bourdieu, 1990:76) 
 
Inhabited space comes to mirror the inner worlds of thought, and acts as a tool for 
externalising this internal world, in the form of physical structures. Through 
dialogue between the resources of the material world and the schemes of 
structure, so the habitus comes to be objectified, and social structure externalised, 
within the physical surroundings. The habitus then is mirrored or repeated within 
the physical, conceptual and social spaces, which it constitutes as analogically 
connected. Bourdieu describes the metaphorical nature of the habitus in the 
following: 
The world of objects,  is a kind of object, a kind of book in which each thing 
speaks metaphorically of all others and from which children learn to read 
the world, is read with the whole body, in and through the movements and 
displacements which define the space of objects as much as they are 
defined by it. The structures that help to construct the world of objects are 
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constructed in the practice of a world of objects constructed in accordance 
with the same structures. The "subject" born of the world of objects does 
not arise as a subjectivity facing an objectivity: the objective universe is 
made up of objects which are the product of objectifying operations 
structured according to the same structures that the habitus applies to 
them. The habitus is a metaphor of the world of objects, which is itself an 
endless circle of metaphors that mirror each other ad infinitum. (Bourdieu, 
1990:76-7) 
 
It is in dialogue with this externalised structure, the objective, physical 
manifestations of the habitus, that the habitus itself is replicated by individual 
inhabitants of the field. Through inhabiting socialised spaces so individuals develop 
the habits and dispositions which constitute a viewpoint on the world. Bourdieu 
writes that, through structuring positions, relations and displacements within 
space, so structure is read by the body and enacted within day to day practice: 
The house, an opus operatum, lends itself as such to a deciphering, but only 
to a deciphering which does not forget that the book from which the 
children learn their vision of the world is read with the body, in and through 
the movements and displacements which make the space within which they 
are enacted as much as they are made by it. (Bourdieu, 1977:90) 
 
Actions performed within structured spaces thus are invested with social meaning 
and serve to educate the body's dispositions to phenomena, and construct the 
categories by which and individual perceives reality: 
But in fact all the actions performed in a structured space and time are 
immediately qualified symbolically and function as structural exercises 
through which practical mastery of the fundamental schemes is constituted. 
Social disciplines take the form of temporal disciplines and the whole social 
order imposes itself at the deepest level of the bodily dispositions through a 
particular way of regulating the use of time, the temporal distribution of 
collective and individual activities and the appropriate rhythm with which to 




This art of educating the body and gaining practical mastery of the schemes of 
perception Bourdieu refers to as Body hexis: 
Body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of a pattern of 
postures that is both individual and systematic, because linked to a whole 
system of techniques involving the body and tools, and charged with a host 
of social meanings and values: in all societies, children are particularly 
attentive to the gestures and postures which, in their eyes, express 
everything that goes to make an accomplished adult. (Bourdieu, 1977: 87) 
 
1.49 Defining practice  
The body acts as a bridge between worlds: between physical, conceptual and social 
spaces. Through the body's actions, so common structuring frameworks are created 
between these multiple dimensions. The body thus grounds the individual within a 
context and, through being conditioned within social spaces, so it is oriented to the 
world in a certain way. Bodies which are domesticated within similar structured 
spaces will have their habits shaped in similar ways, sharing similar references and 
thus viewpoints on the world. Individuals within similar contexts thus come to co-
ordinate their reference frames, sharing common ground and common habitus: 
The habitus is precisely this immanent law, lex insita, inscribed in bodies by 
identical histories, which is the precondition not only for the co-ordination 
of practices but also for practices of co-ordination. The corrections and 
adjustments the agents themselves consciously carry out presuppose 
mastery of a common code; the undertakings of collective mobilisation 
cannot succeed without a minimum of concordance between the habitus of 
the mobilising agents and the dispositions of those who recognise 
themselves in their practice or words, and above all, without the inclination 
towards grouping that springs from the spontaneous orchestration of 
dispositions. (Bourdieu, 1990:59)  
 
As a result of sharing common ground, and hence common reference frames, so 
individuals will also share common practices, that is to say common dispositions 
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towards phenomena: they may, for example, come to adopt similar habits, forms of 
speech, or dress, or deportment. However, such practices are not merely replicated 
whole-sale by each individual, rather they are enacted and negotiated during 
situated engagements with the world. Practical action thus is context-dependent, 
and under-determined by the schemes which generate it. Within the immanence of 
the act there is therefore a degree of uncertainty in the outcome, as Bourdieu 
explains:  
The generative formula which enables one to reproduce the essential 
features of the practices treated as an opus operatum is not the generative 
principle of the practices, the modus operandi. If the opposite were the 
case, and if practices had as their principle the generative principle which 
has to be constructed in order to account for them, that is, a set of 
independent and coherent axioms, then the practices produced according 
to perfectly conscious generative rules would be stripped of everything that 
defines them distinctively as practice, that is, the uncertainty and 
"fuzziness" resulting from the fact that they have as their principle not a set 
of conscious, constant rules, but practical schemes, opaque to their 
possessors, varying according to the logic of the situation, the almost 
invariably partial viewpoint which it imposes, etc. Thus, the procedures of 
practical logic are rarely entirely coherent and rarely entirely incoherent. 
(Bourdieu, 1990:12) 
 
The individual replicates the structure of habitus in practical ways, according to 
their own judgement and the specificities of the context in which the action takes 
place. They apply the schemas of the habitus in practical ways, according to their 
needs and the resources they have at hand. As a result of this pragmatism, the logic 
by which a system functions will always have elements which are inconsistent and 
incoherent, and thus which are difficult to model explicitly: 
In other words, symbolic systems owe their practical coherence - that is, on 
the one hand, their unity and their regularities, and on the other, their 
"fuzziness" and their irregularities and even incoherences, which are both 
equally necessary, being inscribed in the logic of their genesis and 
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functioning - to the fact that they are the product of practices that can fulfil 
their practical functions only in so far as they implement, in the practical 
state, principles that are not only coherent - that is, capable of generating 
practices that are both intrinsically coherent and compatible with the 
objective conditions - but also practical, in the sense of convenient,  that is, 
easy to master and use, because they obey a "poor" and economical logic. 
(Bourdieu, 1990:86) 
 
This "practical logic" is economic in the sense that a few generative principles are 
used across multiple different domains of experience:  
This practical logic - practical in both senses - is able to organize all thoughts, 
perceptions and actions by means of a few generative principles, which are 
closely interrelated and constitute a practically integrated whole, only 
because its whole economy, based on the principle of the economy of logic, 
presupposes a sacrifice of rigour for the sake of simplicity and generality and 
because it finds in "polythesis" the conditions required for successful use of 
polysemy. (Bourdieu, 1990:86) 
 
The use of schemas across multiple domains of experience as heuristic devices 
mean that, in practice, individuals seek out equivalences between categories, and 
hence analogies between categories, in order to match novel phenomena to those 
categories they already understand. Practical equivalences are hence drawn 
between phenomena, in order to construct practical models by which to organise 
the world. As Bourdieu explains, the body serves as the original reference from 
which all practical equivalences are constructed. Bodily understanding of position, 
orientation, distinction, relation are the basis from which all other structuring and 
classifying operations are drawn: 
When the properties and movements of the body are socially qualified, the 
most fundamental social choices are naturalised and the body, with its 
properties and its movements, is constituted as an analogical operator 
establishing all kinds of practical equivalences among the different divisions 
of the social world - divisions between the sexes, between the age groups 
and between the social classes - or, more precisely, among the meanings 
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and values associated with the individuals occupying practically equivalent 
positions in the spaces defined by these divisions. (Bourdieu, 1990:44) 
 
1.410 Defining craft  
The context-dependency of habitus mean that the practical application of rules and 
schemas are localised and underdetermined in practice. As with our previous 
discussion on finitism, the local reference frames for action are specific to the 
individual and the context within which the action takes place. Knowledge 
production or action in the social world thus are not the product of conscious, 
explicit, applications of rules and schemas, but rather are tacit, crafting processes 
by which knowledge is organically built up through local engagements with 
concrete problems:   
To reintroduce the idea of the habitus is to set up as the principle of 
scientific practices, not a knowing consciousness acting in accordance with 
the explicit norms of logic and experimental method, but a "craft", a 
practical sense of the problems to be dealt with, the appropriate ways of 
dealing with them, etc. (Bourdieu, 2004:38) 
 
This notion of craftwork extends not only to the production of knowledge, but also 
to the process of domesticating the individual within the field of knowledge 
production. The individual is crafted by the habitus as much as they themselves 
craft out their own viewpoint from within the habitus. Through such craftwork the 
individual gains a practical mastery of the schemes and resources of the field. Such 
schemes are incorporated and embodied within the individual, through being 
educated within the field. This education then manifests itself through gaining an 
"educated eye", which allows the individual to discern and recognise certain 
distinctions and relationships between categories of experience. Within scientific 
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fields, Bourdieu explains, the educated eye is crafted through situated 
engagements with examples, through problem solving and experimenting, not 
simply through learning theory. The practical mastery of the field thus is more akin 
to hands on craft work, that is to say, science is more akin to art:   
There is always an implicit, tacit dimension, a conventional wisdom engaged 
in evaluating scientific works. This practical mastery is a kind of 
"connoisseurship" which can only be communicated through example, and 
not through precepts; it is not so different from the art of recognising a 
good picture, or identifying its period and author, without necessarily being 
able to articulate the criteria that one is applying. "Scientific research - in 
short - is an art" (Polanyi, 1957:57). (Bourdieu, 2004:38) 
 
1.411 Incorporating Sewell's reformulations of Bourdieu 
In Bourdieu's use of practice and craft there is an attempt to counter some of the 
critiques levelled against him, which argued that he reified social structure and 
neglected the agency exerted by individuals and material artefacts. In the above 
definitions of Bourdieu's theories I have tried to present a clear picture of 
Bourdieu's ideas, using, where possible, Bourdieu’s own words. However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, I will modify Bourdieu's ideas slightly, incorporating Sewell's 
critiques and reformulations on Bourdieu, Lakoff and Johnson's work on metaphor, 
and Goffman's work on performance. These additions will provide a stronger 
theoretical basis for explaining the mechanisms by which individuals’ positions in 
the mathematical field shape their dispositions within, and perceptions of, 
mathematical spaces. Such additions will also allow me to explain Bourdieu’s notion 
of social topology at the end of this thesis.   
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I will first turn towards Sewell, and his interpretation of Bourdieu. Sewell's 
reformulations of structure and habitus will allow me to discuss the multiplicity of 
structures, which better accounts for the role of polysemy and metaphor. Through 
discussing Sewell I can introduce Lakoff and Johnson's work on metaphor. 
Metaphor, we shall see, explains better the role that body hexis and physical space 
play in structuring conceptual and social spaces. Metaphor links into Bourdieu's 
notions of analogy and the multi-dimensional properties of the habitus. Finally 
Goffman grounds this study in practices and performances, and demonstrates the 
context-dependency of actions, as well as the multiplicity of structures.  
As Sewell explains, there is a problem with our notion of structure, in the 
fact that it is overly rigid and reified. Such use of structure privileges the structures 
themselves, and neglects the role that the individual plays in constituting structure: 
What tends to get lost in the language of structure is the efficacy of human 
action-or "agency," to use the currently favoured term. Structures tend to 
appear in social scientific discourse as impervious to human agency, to exist 
apart from, but nevertheless to determine the essential shape of, the 
strivings and motivated transactions that constitute the experienced surface 
of social life. A social science trapped in an unexamined metaphor of 
structure tends to reduce actors to cleverly programmed automatons. 
(Sewell, 1992:2) 
 
Bourdieu's notion of structure strongly privileges stability and reproduction of 
social structures, and does not provide strong arguments by which to account for 
social change, as Sewell explains: 
A second and closely related problem with the notion of structure is that it 
makes dealing with change awkward. The metaphor of structure implies 
stability. For this reason, structural language lends itself readily to 
explanations of how social life is shaped into consistent patterns, but not to 
explanations of how these patterns change over time. In structural 
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discourse, change is commonly located outside of structures, either in a 
telos of history, in notions of breakdown, or in influences exogenous to the 
system in question. Consequently, moving from questions of stability to 
questions of change tends to involve awkward epistemological shifts. 
(Sewell, 1992:2-3) 
 
To address some of these issues Sewell begins with using Giddens' notion of the 
duality of structure. Structures are thus "both the medium and the outcome of the 
practice which constitute social systems" (Giddens, 1981:27). Structures constitute 
social life and practice, but they are also reproduced through social action by 
knowledgeable agents. These structures comprise of rules and resources which are 
only realised or instantiated through human actions (Giddens, 1984:377). Social 
systems therefore are brought into existence through the patterned social practices 
of structure. Both the social system and the structure thus only have potential or 
"virtual" existence prior to their moment of instantiation (Giddens, 1984:17).  
Sewell, however, clarifies the term "virtual" to apply only to the "rules" 
(what Sewell refers to as schemas), and not to resources. Resources, rather, are 
"actual" but equal parts of structure; both virtual and actual parts are in constant 
dialogue with each other, and both are necessary to generate social systems 
(Sewell, 1992:11). Sewell characterises the dual nature of structure in the following: 
If structures are dual in this sense, then it must be true that schemas are the 
effects of resources, just as resources are the effects of schemas… A factory 
is not an inert pile of bricks, wood, and metal. It incorporates or actualizes 
schemas, and this means that the schemas can be inferred from the 
material form of the factory. The factory gate, the punching-in station, the 
design of the assembly line: all of these features of the factory teach and 
validate the rules of the capitalist labour contract…In short, if resources are 
instantiations or embodiments of schemas, they therefore inculcate and 
justify the schemas as well. Resources, we might say, are read like texts, to 
recover the cultural schemas they instantiate. (Sewell, 1992:13) 
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The durability of structure depends on the persistence of the relationship between 
resource and schemas sets. Schemes require resources in order to be reproduced 
over time; without such a resource base such schemes are forgotten: 
If resources are effects of schemas, it is also true that schemas are effects of 
resources. If schemas are to be sustained or reproduced over time - and 
without sustained reproduction they could hardly be counted as structural - 
they must be validated by the accumulation of resources that their 
enactment engenders. Schemas not empowered or regenerated by 
resources would eventually be abandoned and forgotten, just as resources 
without cultural schemas to direct their use would eventually dissipate and 
decay. Sets of schemas and resources may properly be said to constitute 
structures only when they mutually imply and sustain each other over time. 
(Sewell, 1992:13) 
 
Sewell relates the schema-resource sets to Bourdieu's notion of habitus:  
Bourdieu recognizes the mutual reproduction of schemas and resources that 
constitutes temporally durable structures - which he calls "habitus." His 
discussion of habitus powerfully elaborates the means by which mutually 
reinforcing rule-resource sets constitute human subjects with particular 
sorts of knowledge and dispositions. (Sewell, 1992:15)  
 
This notion of habitus, Sewell argues does not account well for social change. The 
habitus, Sewell argues, privileges the replication of structure, and thus of the 
reproduction of existing social institutions. Sewell, for such a reason, modifies 
Bourdieu's terminology, introducing a number of modifications: 
It is my conviction that a theory of change cannot be built into a theory of 
structure unless we adopt a far more multiple, contingent, and fractured 
conception of society - and of structure. What is needed is a conceptual 
vocabulary that makes it possible to show how the ordinary operations of 
structures can generate transformations. To this end, I propose five key 
axioms: the multiplicity of structures, the transposability of schemas, the 
unpredictability of resource accumulation, the polysemy of resources, and 




The first of Sewell's axioms is the "multiplicity of structures". This term takes into 
account the variety of contexts within which social life unfolds, such contexts 
generate different assemblages of schemes and resources (habitus). Structure in 
practice therefore is manifested in multiple ways, depending on the local contexts 
of actions, as Sewell explains: 
Societies are based on practices that derive from many distinct structures, 
which exist at different levels, operate in different modalities, and are 
themselves based on widely varying types and quantities of resources. 
While it is common for a certain range of these structures to be 
homologous… it is never true that all of them are homologous. Structures 
tend to vary significantly between different institutional spheres, so that 
kinship structures will have different logics and dynamics than those 
possessed by religious structures, productive structures, aesthetic 
structures, educational structures, and so on…The multiplicity of structures 
means that the knowledgeable social actors whose practices constitute a 
society are far more versatile than Bourdieu's account of a universally 
homologous habitus would imply: social actors are capable of applying a 
wide range of different and even incompatible schemas and have access to 
heterogeneous arrays of resources. (Sewell, 1992:16-17) 
 
The next axiom to discuss focuses on "transposability". This term, adapted from 
Bourdieu (1977), refers to the generalisability of schemes and their extension to 
different contexts and different sets of resources. Such schemes are transposed 
through analogically relating different categories together. Sewell argues that the 
recognition of analogies cannot be determined in advance, rather they are 
determined through situated engagements with problems: 
Whether a given problem is similarly shaped enough to be solved by 
analogical transfers of schemes cannot be decided in advance by social 
scientific analysts, but must be determined case by case by the actors, which 
means that there is no fixed limit to the possible transpositions… To say that 
schemas are transposable, in other words, is to say that they can be applied 
to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside the context in 
which they are initially learned. (Sewell, 1992:17) 
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As Sewell argues competence within a domain comes through correct application of 
rules to unfamiliar cases. Agency thus is the act of applying schemas creatively and 
effectively within novel contexts: 
Whether we are speaking of rules of grammar, mathematics, law, etiquette, 
or carpentry, the real test of knowing a rule is to be able to apply it 
successfully in unfamiliar cases. Knowledge of a rule or a schema by 
definition means the ability to transpose or extend it - that is, to apply it 
creatively. If this is so, then agency, which I would define as entailing the 
capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts, is inherent in 
the knowledge of cultural schemas that characterizes all minimally 
competent members of society. (Sewell, 1992:18) 
 
A consequence of the underdetermined nature of schema application is that the 
consequences of structure are never fully predictable. This brings Sewell's next 
axiom of unpredictability to bear: 
But the very fact that schemas are by definition capable of being transposed 
or extended means that the resource consequences of the enactment of 
cultural schemas is never entirely predictable…Moreover, if the enactment 
of schemas creates unpredictable quantities and qualities of resources, and 
if the reproduction of schemas depends on their continuing validation by 
resources, this implies that schemas will in fact be differentially validated 
when they are put into action and therefore will potentially be subject to 
modification. (Sewell, 1992:18) 
 
As a result of the context-dependency, unpredictability, and differential validity of 
schema application, there is a degree of interpretation involved in construing 
certain schema-resource sets within certain categories. Multiple interpretations can 
thus be derived from any schema-resource set, depending on the dispositions of 
the interpreting agent:  
The term polysemy (or multiplicity of meaning) is normally applied to 
symbols, language, or texts. Its application to resources sounds like a 
contradiction in terms. But, given the concept of resources I am advocating 
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here, it is not. Resources, I have insisted, embody cultural schemas. Like 
texts or ritual performances, however, their meaning is never entirely 
unambiguous…Any array of resources is capable of being interpreted in 
varying ways and, therefore, of empowering different actors and teaching 
different schemas. Again, this seems to me inherent in a definition of agency 
as the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts. Agency, 
to put it differently, is the actor's capacity to reinterpret and mobilize an 
array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other than those that initially 
constituted the array. (Sewell, 1992:19) 
 
Finally the axiom of intersection of structures refers to the ways in which resources 
can act as boundary objects and have different, intersecting schemas applied to 
them by different actors from different viewpoints. Schemas may also be 
transferred between different contexts, or be incorporated from the schemas of 
other social systems (for example in the appropriation of linguistic terms from 
another language, or in the adoption and adaptation of new technologies): 
The intersection of structures, in fact, takes place in both the schema and 
the resource dimensions. Not only can a given array of resources be claimed 
by different actors embedded in different structural complexes (or 
differentially claimed by the same actor embedded in different structural 
complexes), but schemas can be borrowed or appropriated from one 
structural complex and applied to another. (Sewell, 1992:19) 
 
Through use of Sewell's five axioms, Bourdieu's notions of structure can be adapted 
so as to better account for change and agency. Using Sewell's axioms we can 
explain how change is built into structure, and enacted by individuals in their 
negotiations between schemes and resources. Reproduction of social systems is 
never automatic, but rather there is a degree of indeterminacy, through the 




Structures, then, are sets of mutually sustaining schemas and resources that 
empower and constrain social action and that tend to be reproduced by that 
social action. But their reproduction is never automatic. Structures are at 
risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social encounters they shape-
because structures are multiple and intersecting, because schemas are 
transposable, and because resources are polysemic and accumulate 
unpredictably. Placing the relationship between resources and cultural 
schemas at the center of a concept of structure makes it possible to show 
how social change, no less than social stasis, can be generated by the 
enactment of structures in social life. (Sewell, 1992:19) 
 
1.412 Relating Bourdieu to metaphor  
Through Sewell's reformulations we notice the polysemic and indeterminate nature 
of structure. Structures are multiple and applied across multiple domains of 
experience, and it is the shared structuring principles used to order these diverse 
realms of experience, which generates analogies and resemblances between them. 
In this thesis I shall discuss the ordering of conceptual spaces in mathematics. In 
order to perceive mathematical objects within such conceptual spaces an individual 
must internalise certain schemas through which to structure their perception. 
These schemas are part of a habitus, which shape individuals' dispositions, or 
orientations, towards phenomena. I explore how these schemes of perceiving 
mathematical spaces are adapted from schemes organising physical spaces. I show 
that our body's understanding of position, relation, orientation, are adapted so as 
to structure abstract conceptual spaces and constitute such spaces as "landscapes". 
In order to understand this process I therefore insert Lakoff and Johnson's ideas on 
Metaphor into Bourdieu's concept of schema and habitus. I use ideas on metaphor 
to demonstrate how certain ways of organising perception become analogically 
transferred, so as to organise abstract mathematical spaces.    
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Metaphor, as Lakoff and Johnson describe it, is a linguistic device for 
structuring one domain of experience in terms of another. In mathematics, 
metaphor can be seen to play a role in relating one's bodily experiences and 
intuitions within physical spaces to analogous processes taking place in 
mathematical spaces. In this mapping process the intuitions that one has of the 
mechanics of the physical world are used as schemas for interpreting operations 
taking place within mathematical spaces. For example, movement, orientation, 
speed, acceleration and distance are all schemas for organising and measuring 
physical spaces, which can be applied to the organisation of abstract mathematical 
spaces. In utilising such schemas, and applying them metaphorically to 
mathematical spaces, so the semantic and somatic associations linked to the 
operations are also transferred. Abstract conceptual space is then understood as if 
it were an analogue of physical space, and the body relates to it and explores it as if 
it were physical space. 
Metaphor serves as a scaffolding device for making systematic comparisons 
between domains of knowledge. The ultimate point of reference for all such 
comparisons lies in the body's sensory-perceptual experience of the physical world. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that such bodily experiences are structured into 
perceptual, or "embodied" schemas, which form orderings of recurrent patterns of 
behaviours, stimuli or dispositions. They write: "[Embodied schemas] are a primary 
means by which we construct or constitute order and are not mere passive 
receptacles into which experience is poured." (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:29-30). Such 
schemas are built up from our experience of inhabiting and interacting with our 
environments, and go on to actively shape our perception.  
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The schema comprises cognitive frameworks for organising experience and 
filtering perception, for ease of processing information. As Lakoff and Nunez (1997) 
write:  
Johnson (1987) considers image schemata to be the fundamental means by 
which we build or constitute order in our experiences: … in addition to 
propositional comprehension, understanding is an evolving process or 
activity in which image schemata (as organizing structures) partially order 
and form our experience and are modified by their embodiment in concrete 
experiences. (Lakoff and Nunez, 1997: 30) 
 
Such Image schemata are seen to link different domains of knowledge together, 
allowing for mapping between different concepts and generating novel ideas as a 
result.  
These image schemata can facilitate mathematical reasoning because their 
internal structure can be extended figuratively to develop understanding of 
formal relations among concepts and propositions. This is achieved through 
metaphorical projections, that is, metaphors (cf. analogies) serve to map 
image schemata (which structure space) into abstract models (which 
structure concepts). Because image schemata are directly understood in 
terms of physical experience, the metaphors used in the mapping process 
are motivated by the structures of these experiences. (Lakoff and Nunez, 
1997:263) 
 
These schemata gain their power through linking physical experiences to abstract 
concepts - the metaphor thus relates the world of ideas to that of physical 
experience. It grounds knowledge within the body and the experience of the world. 
In using metaphor individuals thus are using their existing experiences and 
knowledge of physical reality to scaffold their knowledge of more abstract 




Our experience of physical objects and substances provides a further basis 
for understanding—one that goes beyond mere orientation. Understanding 
our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out 
parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances of 
a uniform kind. Once we can identify our experiences as entities or 
substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and 
quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them. (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 2003: 508) 
 
Organising reality through such experiential gestalts synthesises abstract concepts 
into larger bodies of knowledge, providing them with a coherent structure, through 
creating relational correspondences between different knowledge-systems (Lakoff 
and Johnson, 2003:152). Such mappings, Lakoff and Johnson argue, are not 
arbitrary, but are motivated by previous experiences. In the case of metaphor in 
mathematics Lakoff and Nunez (1997) present the following examples: 
The notion of an algorithm is, of course, based on the machine metaphor. 
An algorithm, as a metaphorical machine performs operations sequentially 
on input objects to yield output objects. Since the machine is metaphorical 
and not real, the operations and objects are conceptual in nature, and they 
always apply perfectly in exactly the same way, since imperfections of 
physical objects are not mapped onto conceptual objects by the metaphor 
(Lakoff and Nunez, 1997:1046) 
A number line is a conceptual blend formed from the 
superimposition of the source domain (Geometry) of the Arithmetic as 
Geometry metaphor onto the target domain (Arithmetic). The entities in this 
blend are number-points—numbers that are metaphorically points. The 
blend combines truths of geometry with truths of arithmetic, to yield new 
inferences about the target domain, arithmetic. Using the metaphorical 
concept of the number line, we can construct a much more complex 
metaphorical concept, the Cartesian Plane. (Lakoff and Nunez, 1997:1093)  
 
Mapping across domains is commonplace within mathematics, but the question is: 
does the creation of analogies or metaphors between different domains of 
knowledge in mathematics actually enhance understanding or allow for developing 
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new knowledge? English (1997) argues that it does, giving the example of the 
application of blocks in teaching mathematics in primary school:  
Both analogy and metaphor are important not only in the initial 
construction of these mental models but also in their subsequent 
development and refinement. For example, children’s explorations with 
tens- and ones- blocks assist them in constructing a basic model of the 
relationships within two-digit numbers. This mental model then becomes 
the source for children’s exploration of the relations in multi-digit whole 
numbers (via manipulation of the concrete representation), and 
subsequently, for their introduction to decimal fraction ideas. Of course, a 
complete understanding of numeration entails many other relations, 
effectively developed through analogical reasoning. (English, 1997:181) 
  
  
Metaphors are hence useful in structuring knowledge and shaping the discovery 
process. Once the ability to manipulate, communicate and reason using analogies is 
grasped, the individual has a powerful tool through which to build new frameworks 
through which to structure novel experience. In mathematics, the use of discourses 
on beauty, and the enculturation of aesthetic appreciation of mathematical 
concepts and proofs are other means by which these schemas are built up. As Pimm 
(2007) argues: 
Aesthetic considerations concern what to attend to (the problems, 
elements, objects), how to attend to them (the means, principles, 
techniques, methods) and why they are worth attending to (in pursuit of the 
beautiful, the good, the right, the useful, the ideal, the perfect or, simply, 
the true). (Pimm, 2007:160)  
 
The process of socialising mathematicians to appreciate certain phenomena as 
being "truthful" or "beautiful" is the means through which social values and 
evaluation principles are communicated within the mathematical community. 
Aesthetic discourse determines what should be attended to and how, and thus 
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provides the prototypical examples against which the validity of discoveries is 
measured. Aesthetic objects thus provide the measure for evaluating proofs and 
also provide the markers for orienting future action and application of certain rules 
or definitions. In establishing a discourse on aesthetic appreciation certain 
standards are generated and hence classifications are more likely to be oriented 
towards such pre-existing structures, as momentum has already been generated 
through their wide-spread adoption and use.  
1.413 Defining performance and frames of reference  
Goffman is not someone we usually associate with Bourdieu's ideas, however, there 
are some elements of Goffman's work which complement Bourdieu's own. I have 
already provided several additions to Bourdieu's notion of structure and habitus, 
demonstrating their multiplicity, ambiguity and transposability, through use of 
Sewell (1992). Introducing metaphor also explained the mechanisms by which 
transposition takes place. Through Goffman's work I wish to add another 
clarification of Bourdieu's concepts, by exploring how schemas are applied in 
practice, how such practices are context dependent, and how reference frames are 
generated within situated encounters between individuals.  
The first thing to note is that Goffman's socialised individual is much like 
Bloor's, in that they apply rules according to the specific, local contexts of 
interactions (which Goffman calls "encounters"). These rules are moral principles 
impressed on the individual from an externalised "social" field. The individual is 
constructed through such rules in relation to other social actors, who bear an 
understanding of the rules at play. Rules provide a means of evaluating and 
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recognising one's own and others' actions, and such rules allow them to determine 
the character (what Goffman calls "face") of themselves and others' "selves". 
Encounters between individuals are a means of mobilising these rules, thus 
establishing social frameworks by which social selves are manifested and made 
visible, as Goffman explains:  
Universal human nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the 
person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic 
propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from 
without. These rules, when followed, determine the evaluation he will make 
of himself and of his fellow-participants in the encounter, the distribution of 
his feelings, and the kinds of practices he will employ to maintain a specified 
and obligatory kind of ritual equilibrium. The general capacity to be bound 
by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the particular set of 
rules which transform him into a human being derives from requirements 
established in the ritual organisation of social encounters. (Goffman, 
1955:246) 
 
Goffman's "rules" bear certain similarities with the schemes of Bourdieu's habitus: 
rules are objective; they are shared tools by which to perceive social categories; 
they generate social selves; and they are performed and manifested through 
practice. The resemblances between these terms however are limited, but they 
provide the starting point from which to assimilate certain elements from Goffman 
into Bourdieu's work. I will therefore highlight other similarities between terms, in 
order to create a series of equivalences and begin the process of assimilation.  
The second equivalence relevant to this thesis is that between "status" and 
"social capital". Status, for Goffman, is determined by a person's acquisition of 
rights and privileges; the possession of certain statuses defines an individual's 
position and role within the social field. Such status is defined through 
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performances of status, and having such status recognised by other socialised 
individuals, as Goffman explains: 
The terms status, position, and role have been used interchangeably to refer 
to the set of rights and obligations which governs the behaviour of persons 
acting in a given social capacity. In general, the rights and obligations of a 
status are fixed through time by means of external sanctions enforced by 
law, public opinion, and threat of socio-economic loss, and by internalized 
sanctions of the kind that are built into a conception of self and give rise to 
guilt, remorse, and shame. A status may be ranked on a scale of prestige, 
according to the amount of social value that is placed upon it relative to 
other statuses in the same sector of social life. An individual may be rated 
on a scale of esteem, depending on how closely his performance 
approaches the ideal established for that particular status. (Goffman, 
1951:294) 
 
Individuals possessing similar status are located within similar social positions, and 
such positions generate dispositions from which to experience the world. 
Individuals present their social positions through use of status symbols which serve 
to "place", or classify, actors within the social field: 
Persons in the same social position tend to possess a similar pattern of 
behaviour. Any item of a person's behaviour is, therefore, a sign of his social 
position. A sign of position can be a status symbol only if it is used with 
some regularity as a means of " placing" socially the person who makes it. 
(Goffman, 1951:295) 
 
The status symbol thus acts as a "sign vehicle" for conveying socially relevant 
information between individuals: 
By definition, then, a status symbol carries categorical significance, that is, it 
serves to identify the social status of the person who makes it. But it may 
also carry expressive significance, that is, it may express the point of view, 
the style of life, and the cultural values of the person who makes it, or may 
satisfy needs created by the imbalance of activity in his particular social 




Using such status symbols to place other individuals sets up a frame for the 
interactions that are to follow. An individual forms a stance, or frame, through 
which to construe the interaction, which sets up certain expectations and 
dispositions to adopt, according to the relative statuses of the actors involved: 
Information about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling 
others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what they may 
expect of him. Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to act 
in order to call forth a desired response from him. (Goffman, 1951:135-6) 
 
Individuals use a number of social cues, or signs, to classify other persons. Ways of 
speaking, ways of dressing, their deportment, the social situation are all taken into 
consideration when "placing" the individual. Using such information the behaviour 
of the individual is inferred and thus an appropriate interactional frame is 
generated, to guide the resulting interaction: 
For those present, many sources of information become accessible and 
many carriers (or "sign vehicles") become available for conveying this 
information. If unacquainted with the individual, observers can glean clues 
from his conduct and appearance which allow them to apply their previous 
experience with individuals roughly similar to the one before them or, more 
importantly, to apply untested stereotypes to him. They can also assume 
from past experience that only individuals of a particular kind are likely to be 
found in a given social setting. They can rely on what the individual says 
about himself or on documentary evidence he provides as to who and what 
he is. If they know, or know of, the individual by virtue of experience prior to 
the interaction, they can rely on assumptions as to the persistence and 
generality of psychological traits as a means of predicting his present and 
future behaviour. (Goffman, 1951:136) 
The performance of status symbols, and their role in framing interactions, 
demonstrates another equivalence between Bourdieu's ideas and Goffman's, this 
relationship is based upon the idea of distinction. In Bourdieu's thought, distinction 
is integral to the concept of the field. Distinction is a product of the distribution of 
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capital, or statuses; through recognising distinctions between social categories, so 
groups are either differentiated or integrated within classes. Through this process 
of integration and differentiation so the social field is given structure. Goffman 
describes how this process of distinguishing and classifying others is carried out 
through symbolic interactions between individuals:  
Co-operative activity based on a differentiation and integration of statuses is 
a universal characteristic of social life. This kind of harmony requires that 
the occupant of each status act toward others in a manner which conveys 
the impression that his conception of himself and of them is the same as 
their conception of themselves and him. A working consensus of this sort 
therefore requires adequate communication about conceptions of status. 
The rights and obligations of a status are frequently ill-adapted to the 
requirements of ordinary communication. Specialized means of displaying 
ones position frequently develop. Such sign-vehicles have been called status 
symbols. They are the cues which select for a person the status that is to be 
imputed to him and the way in which others are to treat him. Status 
symbols visibly divide the social world into categories of persons, thereby 
helping to maintain solidarity within a category and hostility between 
different categories. Status symbols must be distinguished from collective 
symbols which serve to deny the difference between categories in order 
that members of all categories may be drawn together in affirmation of a 
single moral community. (Goffman, 1951:294-5) 
 
Such distinction is enforced through use of schemas or rules which order 
interactions. Such rules form, as Goffman describes, systems of practices and 
conventions which structure an individual's dispositions and perceptions - these 
systems are thus equivalent to Bourdieu's habitus. Such schemes shape the flows of 
conversations, providing frames of reference by which individuals can orient their 
behaviours and thus successfully participate in symbolic exchanges, as Goffman 
explains: 
In any society, whenever the physical possibility of spoken interaction arises, 
it seems that a system of practices, conventions, and procedural rules come 
into play which functions as a means of guiding and organising the flow of 
121 
 
messages. An understanding will prevail as to when and where it will be 
permissible to initiate talk, among whom, and by means of what topics of 
conversation. A set of significant gestures is employed to initiate a state of 
communication and as a means for the persons concerned to accredit each 
other as legitimate participants. When this process of reciprocal ratification 
occurs, the persons so ratified are in what might be called a state of talk - 
that is, they have declared themselves officially open to one another for 
purposes of spoken communication and guarantee together to maintain a 
flow of words. A set of significant gestures is also employed by which one or 
more new participants can officially join the talk, by which one or more 
accredited participants can officially withdraw, and by which the state of 
talk can be terminated. (Goffman, 1955:239) 
 
These interactions between individuals are divided into local frames or "episodes" 
of interaction, which form the situated instances from which social systems are 
constructed: 
These rules of talk pertain not to spoken interaction considered as an 
ongoing process, but to an occasion of talk or episode of interaction as a 
naturally bounded unit. This unit consists of the total activity that occurs 
during the time that a given set of participants have accredited one another 
for talk and maintain a single moving focus of attention. (Goffman, 
1955:240) 
 
Within these episodes the individual actively negotiates with the schemes of the 
habitus, practicing their "mastery" of such schemes. Individuals position themselves 
in relation to the interlocutors through having evaluated the social roles at play 
within the practical context. Within these contexts of practice, so the individual, 
according to Goffman, adopts a stance from which to relate to their interlocutor, 
such a stance Goffman characterises as a "line", he explains: 
Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in 
face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these 
contacts, he tends to act out what is sometimes called a line - that is, a 
pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the 
situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially 
himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find 
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that he has done so in effect. The other participants will assume that he has 
more or less wilfully taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their 
response to him he must take into consideration the impression they have 
possibly formed of him. (Goffman, 1955:222) 
 
Along with the line the individual also adopts a "face", or persona, which is the 
image of themselves they want their interlocutor to have of them: 
The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person 
effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during 
a particular contact. Face is an image of self, delineated in terms of 
approved social attributes - albeit an image that others may share. 
(Goffman, 1955:222) 
 
A person performs using such a face, as an actor performs when playing the role of 
a character within a play. The "face" presents a coherent image of the individual to 
others, and emerges as a set of dispositions during the course of an encounter. The 
habitus of internalised schemas therefore manifests itself during the course of 
encounters in the form of socially meaningful dispositions, whose intent is to 
communicate certain traits relevant to the individual's communicative intent: 
A person may be said to have, or be in, or maintain face when the line he 
effectively takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that 
is supported by judgements and evidence conveyed by other participants, 
and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal agencies in 
the situation. At such times the person's face clearly is something that is not 
lodged in or on his body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the 
flow of events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these 
events are read and interpreted for the appraisals expressed in them. 
(Goffman, 1955:223) 
 
To maintain this face, and keep it consistent with the persona an individual is trying 
to convey, so an individual must monitor the performances of themselves, and 
maintain what Goffman refers to as an "expressive order": 
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As an aspect of the social code of any social circle, one may expect to find an 
understanding as to how far a person should go to save his face. Once he 
takes on a self-image expressed through face he will be expected to live up 
to it. In different ways in different societies he will be required to show self-
respect, abjuring certain actions because they are above or beneath him, 
while forcing himself to perform other even though they cost him dearly. By 
entering a situation in which he is given a face to maintain, a person takes 
on the responsibility of standing guard over the flow of events as they pass 
before him. He must ensure that a particular expressive order is sustained - 
an order that regulates the flow of events, large or small, so that anything 
that appears to be expressed by them will be consistent with his face. 
(Goffman, 1955:224)  
 
These face-saving operations for maintaining the expressive order are constructed 
within frames (Goffman, 1974:7). These frames create boundaries around 
encounters, and help define for the individual the face or dispositions to adopt, as 
well as the expectations and rules that parties involved should have. Such frames 
however are not always clearly defined. Applying the wrong frame, or changing 
("re-keying") frame, can lead to embarrassment and loss of face. In such framing 
the social action is thus perceived within a certain light, as Sewell would argue, the 
schema-resource sets can shift as a function of the reference frame.  
Presentations of self therefore can change depending on the reference 
frame one adopts, that is to say, depending on how a given encounter is 
interpreted. The performances of certain faces is a product of an individual's 
judgement within the situated contexts of the encounter itself. During encounters 
individuals choose to adopt certain stances, make visible certain information rather 
than others, and dramatically highlight certain aspects of their persona or 
knowledge (Goffman, 1957:40). Such performances, however, are not completely 
underdetermined, rather a role is practiced beforehand. Through the process of 
rehearsing, routinizing, and “playing about” with the possibilities of the role, an 
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individual becomes comfortable with a way of acting, and so they adopt patterns of 
behaviour which constitute an "idiom", rather than prescribed sets of behaviours 
which follow rules (Goffman, 1957:80-82). Through this process of adopting the 
role, and acting out the role, Goffman argues that we "dramatically realise" the role 
in practice.  Such realisations take place within different "theatres" of performance. 
Such theatres vary in their degree of visibility, from public spaces to private spaces. 
Goffman refers to public spaces as being "front of stage"; within these spaces the 
individual performs the roles that they have practiced, presenting their social face 
to the world. The private, "backstage", spaces are where the individual rehearses 
their role in preparation for presenting it in a public theatre.  
1.414 Conclusion 
Notions of frontstage and backstage, the encounter, and interactional frame, are 
used in this thesis as a way of positioning individuals within social spaces, and of 
“framing” the encounters between individuals within the context of the field. In this 
thesis I use three different frames of reference: conceptual, physical and discourse 
frames. Each of these frames present different theatrical stages for mathematical 
encounters, and for the production of mathematical selves and ideas. I use these 
spatial frames as tools for situating the individual within social space, and for 
explaining how dispositions and perceptions are generated as a function of position 
within social space.  
In what follows I shall ground the reader within these different reference 
frames, guiding the reader through the situated practices undertaken by 
mathematicians, across these different spatial dimensions. Through exploring these 
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different frames I hope to show how they are related, analogically, through 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. I then wish to demonstrate how these spatial 
dimensions are assembled, as a tools for perceiving mathematical phenomena, as 


















Section 1.5: Overview of Thesis 
1.51 Chapter Summaries  
Chapter 2 discusses the physical contexts within which mathematical research is 
produced. Section 2.1 compares the physical architectures of two institutes, and 
explores how such architectures shape the activities which take place within them. 
The next section discusses how individuals domesticate space and develop routines 
within space. In this section we will come to understand how work habits structure 
thinking in mathematics. In the final section of this chapter the thesis explores how 
physical spaces provide different stages on which to perform and produce 
mathematics. The thesis focuses on comparing performances in public and private 
settings, as well as formal and informal settings, and demonstrates how ideas 
change as they are presented within different contexts.  
Chapter 3 discusses how conceptual spaces are crafted by mathematicians. 
The first section explores the process of developing intuitions about mathematical 
concepts, and the role that supervisors play in guiding a student's vision of the field. 
Through use of exemplar objects and constructions a student develops perceptual 
schemas, which allow them to perceive mathematical structures. In section 3.2 we 
explore how mathematicians learn to manipulate these schemas through a process 
of experimentation. Such experiments take the form of physical engagements with 
mathematical concepts through sketches on blackboards and paper. In the final 
section (3.3) of chapter 3 the thesis explores how such visualisations and 
representations on blackboards and paper act as framing devices for manipulating 
and materialising mathematical constructions. Through such perceptual frames, I 
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argue that abstract spaces become structured in terms of our experience of 
physical space.  
The penultimate chapter, chapter 4, concerns discourse space in 
mathematics. It explores the role that the social world plays in shaping taste and 
judgement in mathematics. The first section (4.1) explores how individuals 
coordinate their reference frames, and come to share a common vocabulary of 
mathematical terms. The second section (4.2) explores the biographies of 
mathematical concepts, and demonstrates how such concepts change as they move 
within social networks. The final section (4.3) explores how authority figures 
influence the adoption and development of concepts in mathematics, returning to 
ideas concerning habitus developed in chapter 2.   
In the final, concluding chapter (Chapter 5), I provide a summary of the main 
arguments articulated within the body of the thesis. I also return to Bourdieu’s 
ideas of field and habitus, and integrate these concepts within his notion of social 
topology. I will explain how such topologies are created, through positioning 
individuals within social systems, and explore how these positions within 
topological spaces generate dispositions and perspectives by which to view the 
world. I argue that social topologies allow us to study not only field effects (social 
forces and influences on behaviour), but also effects of position, differentiation, 
integration and orientation. Finally I provide an outline of how social topologies 
may be of use to sociological analysis of complex social systems, such as 




Chapter 2: Physical Spaces  
2.0: Overview  
 
In this chapter I will establish the physical frames within which the mathematical 
field is produced. I show how mathematicians position themselves within physical 
space, and how such positionings shape their dispositions. I document how spaces 
are socialised and come to possess certain properties of privacy and formality. I 
then show how the presentations of self and ideas change as a function of these 
properties.  
The spatial resources of institutes are transformed through mathematicians 
inhabiting them. Each mathematicians' encounter with a spatial resource, I argue, is 
uniquely shaped by their positions within the mathematical field. The ways in which 
resources are utilised, and the self is performed, will therefore depend upon the 
unique engagements between an individual's dispositions, and the social structures 
by which a space is organised prior to the encounter. In the following chapter I 
document how such engagements unfold in practice, and provide a sense of the 








Section 2.1: Spaces for Thought  
 
2.11 Overview of Section 
In this section I will explore how physical space is used as a starting point for 
grounding and materialising abstract thinking in mathematics. This initial section 
(2.1) will serve to frame some of the later discussions, within the local contexts of 
mathematical production. I will explore how physical spaces in the institute are 
inhabited, and how physical spaces are used as machines for thinking and 
assembling mathematical concepts. I will begin the chapter by surveying two of my 
research sites, at UK-A and Germany-A. I will present descriptive accounts of the 
institutional spaces, and then build into these accounts the working practices and 
routines of the mathematicians who inhabit these spaces. Through such accounts I 
will position mathematical production within the mathematical field, and 
demonstrate how certain dispositions and orientations emerge through situated 
engagements between the schemas and resources of habitus.  
 2.12 Research Site 1: The UK-A Institute 
Let us begin then by building up a picture of the institutional habitats within which 
my ethnographic observations took place. My first research site was located in a 
small city in England, for the purposes of this thesis I refer to it as UK-A. This 
institute is part of a network of 27 European research centres on mathematics 
distributed throughout Europe. The UK-A itself was founded in 1992 with a 
mandate to promote the development of interdisciplinary collaborations between 
mathematicians and researchers from other sciences. Such collaborations take 
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place during organised research programmes, which range in time scale from 4 
week short programmes to longer 6 month projects.  
My research focused on a short, 4 week-long programme in Metagenomics. 
The aim of this research programme was to bring together biologists, computer 
scientists and mathematicians to develop statistical and mathematical tools for 
analysing and classifying large, complex data sets of sequenced genetic data. This 
type of inter-disciplinary programme is common at the UK-A Institute, but other 
more intra-mathematical programmes also took place at the UK-A, such as the 6 
month long "Free Boundary problems" programme which also took place in the 
institute during my study (this programme mainly involved mathematicians in 
differential geometry and analysis). Exchanges between programmes, which run in 
parallel, are encouraged, but the degree of communication between programmes is 
dependent on there being shared interests between participants.  
The institute is isolated from the centre of the city, located approximately 
one mile north-west of the city centre. The institute is part of a larger building 
complex associated with the mathematics department of the nearby university 
which, as can be seen from the map below (labelled A-H), takes up a sizable portion 
of the science park's endowment lands. The university buildings house the offices of 
the mathematics faculty of the university, the main library for mathematics, as well 
as lecturing and leisure facilities for graduate and undergraduate students. 
Although my observations do extend out into this wider environment, I will, for the 
purposes of this thesis, limit my analysis to activities taking place within the UK-A 
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Institute proper, and the adjoining gatehouse building, where the bulk of my study 
took place.   
 
Figure 1 Map of the UK-A’s endowment lands. Buildings A-H indicate the 
Mathematics department’s facilities 
 
Let me now give a sense of the physical environment of UK-A by providing some 
detailed descriptions from my fieldwork journal: 
The orange-brown bricked building is typical of the town, without a sign the 
building would go on, unnoticed, but the sign transforms it somehow. 
Within, the dental-whites, light, piny-browns and coarse-reds speak to the 
eye. Glass latticed with wood and concrete and steel. Looking up one 
glimpses the pine roof on high, looking straight ahead one sees into the 
lecture hall and to the right, one glimpses the library, through glass. It is a 
building made to be open, visible and on display; a building almost invisible 
on the outside, but of complete visibility and exposure within.   
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Just to the left of the entrance lies the reception staffed by two 
receptionists, one eying the stairway, with a mirror on the top of her desk to 
spy behind, and the other outward-facing to the entryway. A touch screen 
occupies space at one end of the reception's counter, on it a list of 
participant's faces flash one moment, and an itinerary the next. Behind 
reception glares a room, glass-fronted, manned and busy with 
administrative staff going about their chores; behind this stands a closed 
door to the private office of the director. Running through the centre of the 
building is a large, angled staircase leading up to the office space above. 
Behind the stair, to the left of reception, is a more private, but still 
commonly held area, lined with a glass windows and doors which open out 
onto a disused patio. A movable partition doubles as a notice board and 
blocks off some of the space from the door to the Director's room: it is a 
cosy, quiet corner populated by little more than chairs and coffee tables and 
at one end a large, green chalkboard.  (Day1, UK-A) 
 
 
Figure 2 Images of the UK-A  institute, clockwise, from top-left we see the entrance, 
view from the main stairway, common area, library, view overlooking common 
space, view to ceiling 
  
There are two seminar rooms in all, which can be booked through reception 
as required. The larger of the two is designed for lectures and presentations, 
and boasts four large, two-tiered blackboards, and an impressive three pull-
down projector screens.  To the right, there is an array of windows with 
glass doors accessing the courtyard to the mathematics department beyond. 
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The room is lit by nature, brightened by the sky. Six tiers of desks occupy the 
theatre-space, flanked by aisles either side - each tier offering berth for ten 
or so chairs. Overhead are suspended three large projectors and a number 
of microphones threaded from cables, dangling. Cameras peak out between 
the tiles. Circular loud-speakers spot the ceiling tiles, while a pair of oblong 
speakers stand like sentinels above each aisle. At the back of the theatre 
hides a small room containing monitors, recording equipment, and the 
unobtrusive, bespectacled Alonzo who works soundless, behind the scenes. 
To find the second seminar room we cross the courtyard and enter a 
building called the Gatehouse. Flighting the steps one comes across a small, 
semi-circular room without windows, with three half-moons of ten chairs 
congregating around a large two-tier blackboard. A small "On Air" sign hangs 
to the right of the board, lighting up only for the publically broadcast 
lectures, consumed online.   
Back to the main building, on the ground floor, through a glass-
paned wall the discussion room is made visible. One wall is filled with three 
large, two tiered blackboards, a projector screen is angled in one corner, 
and large cupboards, locked and contents unknown, occupy the opposite 
end of the room. At the room's centre eight desks make a square with an 
empty centre. (Day1, UK-A)    
 
 
Figure 3 Discussion room in use for large presentation and pair blackboard work 
afterwards, UK-A 
 
The library neighbours the discussion room, mirroring it with its glass-
frontage and foyer-facing gaze. At the entrance the opening hours read 
"9.00 - 17:00 Mondays-Fridays". With a card you can swipe through and 
enter to find the large windows opposite, letting in the light. The librarian 
watches the screen of her computer, and screens the entrance with a 
welcome smile. Across from her are four low-to-the-ground arm-chairs 
circling neatly arranged newspapers on a coffee table. Hugging the pine-
framed-glass-wall one confronts a display of UK-A-branded merchandise for 
sale. A small stand beside this bears the latest scientific journals. A small 
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seating area complete with flip-chart occupies the far left of the room, as a 
flight of stairs leads its way to the bookshelves of the upper gallery. In the 
centre of the room is a long desk, partitioned into four sections on either 
side, with a computer terminal snuggly fitted into each niche. To the far 
right, in one corner is a small, private space with a lonely chair, opposite this 
is a larger space with two desks, which six chairs congregate around.    
Exiting the library, back to the foyer is the main staircase. Ascending 
one encounters a mezzanine floor, directly ahead are pigeon-holed shelves 
which act as post-boxes. Names of participants bottom each slot. On top of 
the post-boxes rests a small plastic board containing pictures and names of 
the members of staff. Turning around, beside the IT office, is an LCD screen 
presenting faces and names of participants from the programmes most 
current. Four offices occupy this middle ground, directly above this level 
another floor contains a further eight offices, which look down on to a large 
expanse of common space. This common ground is populated by five tables, 
three low to the ground and two of larger size. Four chairs cluster around 
each. Tables range in size with two smaller coffee tables, and one larger, all 
topped with glass and paired with low-lying, lounging chairs. Two large, 
green chalk boards take pride of place beside pillars supporting the roof. At 
one end of the common space opposite and to the left of the main stair-way 
is the "kitchen" area, comprised of two arrow-shaped counters separated by 
a walking space. A microwave, dishes, cutlery, fridges, snack-selection and 
coffee machine are provided for, but snacks come with a price. The hulk of 
the coffee machine surveys its kingdom from the far side. (Day1, UK-A)   
 
 
Figure 4 Main common space of UK-A 
 
Eleven office doors confront the common space. Offices come shared two to 
three to a room, except for programme organisers who retain their privacy. 
Each possess a large window and comes equipped with blackboard, personal 
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computer terminal, two low-lying lounge chairs, a notice board, and a filing 
cabinet and an anonymised uniformity. (Day1, UK-A)  
 
Figure 5 Pair work in offices, UK-A 
 
2.13 Research Site 2: The Germany-A Institute 
My second research site is the Germany-A Institute, located within a mid-sized 
German city. Like the UK-A, Germany-A is part of the group of European research 
centres on mathematics. Unlike the UK-A Institute, the Germany-A caters mainly to 
pure mathematicians, and is not particularly concerned with interdisciplinary 
collaborations. Originally the institute was founded by a famous German 
mathematician in 1980, and emerged in its current manifestation in 1992. The 
institute is run by a board of directors who approve the applications of individual 
researchers who may undertake a sabbatical lasting a few weeks to several months. 
Both graduate students as well as professors may make applications to the 
Institute; full-time, salaried, post-doctoral positions are also available.  The institute 
specialises in a range of mathematical specialisms including Algebraic Groups, 
Arithmetic Geometry, Number theory, Representation Theory, Algebraic and 
Complex Geometry, Differential Geometry and Topology, Algebraic Topology, 
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Dynamical systems, Non-commutative geometry, Analysis and Mathematical 
Physics. Most researchers work independently on personal projects whilst at the 
Institute, however many take the opportunity to network and find collaborators.  
  
 
Figure 6 Locations of Germany-A and affiliated institutions,  
  
Unlike the UK-A institute, the Germany-A is situated in the heart of the city, located 
close to the cathedral, central shopping district and train and bus stations. The 
Institute is also well connected with the mathematics department of the nearby 
university, with many of the scientific staff and researchers supervising graduate 
students at the university. The Institute also has a close relationship with the 
nearby Institute H for Mathematics, the Mathematics Centre, the Research Institute 
for Discrete Mathematics, and the Institute for Numerical Simulation. But let me 
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now describe some of the physical spaces of the institute by using passages from 
my fieldwork journal and post-fieldwork reflections journal: 
The entrance to the institute is unassuming, I had walked right by it a couple 
of minutes before. A sign besides a glass-panelled, wooden door bears the 
words: "Germany-A Institut Für Mathematik". Pressing the button on the 
intercom I am ushered up to the 3rd floor. (Day 1, Germany-A)  
 
Figure 7 Images of Germany-A, featuring entrances, main stair, reception and main 
dining hall 
 
Another unassuming door, of glass and steel construction opens of 
its own accord at my approach. A receptionist grins and says hello. "Ah - first 
time?" I nod "I have presents!" she says, handing over a stack of forms "I 
also need one from you - a little photograph perhaps?" She takes it and 
shows me; it looks awful, but I smile and say "I'm not getting any prettier". 
The reception counter is shielded by glass on the side facing the main door 
to cut out the draught. It forms a semi-circular shape by which to better 
sight its surroundings: the corridor to the right, the stairs and the entryway 
to the left. Opposite is a lounge area - two coffee tables and two sets of low-
to-the-ground chairs surrounding each. Leaflets, brochures, magazines 
sprawl across the tables and populate the stands to the right. A couple of 
computer terminals press up against a glass wall looking on to the main 
stair. Two estranged orange plants pot about to the sides, separated by the 
computer screens. At the far end of the space glows a notice board, heaving 
with posters, pine-fronted lockers close in beside. A dark space looms to the 
left of this. Hidden from view, are a couple of offices. The left hand wall 
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bears four doors, all closed, a map of City, and more posters about events 
coming soon, or having passed. (Day 1, Germany-A)    
 
Figure 8 Reception and noticeboard at Germany-A 
 
Following the glass wall to the right, one comes across a grey 
cupboard filled with white coffee cups, a coffee machine beside, and a small 
kitchen with a lonely kettle. Behind this are some bar stools and a small, 
high, circular metal table, upon which a group of three now comfortably 
perch their cups. A frosted glass board nearby still holds onto its ink. To the 
right of the kitchen stretches another corridor, lined with artwork, office 
doors, whiteboards and notices. Opposite is the main stair - steel painted 
white and grey and pine planks for the steps. Pigeon holes populate the 
space beside and another computer screen sits at the foot of the stair. 
Directly ahead, beside the reception counter I spy a notice board containing 
the lecture schedules for the weeks ahead, as well as a picture board with 





Figure 9 Notice boards and wall of photographs of institute members 
 
Looking up the stairs, upon ascent, an oil painting of the founder of the 
institute stares down. More paintings, notice boards, photographs adorn the 
walls. Whiteboards, frosted-glass boards punctuate the space. Offices, doors 
ajar or closed, face out onto the landing. A couple of desks, eight chairs 
press up against the railings of the stair. Another flight leads up, another 
corridor opens out to the library in one direction, another leads to the 





Figure 10 Main spaces at Germany-A, clockwise from top left we see the main 
seminar room, discussion room, conference room and dining hall.  
 
The main lecture theatre is a cavernous room, made airy by the tall 
arched windows flanking either side of the space. At the far end of the hall is 
a two-paned, three-tiered, green chalk-board. The central space bears ten 
rows of desks, eight fold-down red chairs to a desk, a spiral staircase wends 
its way to a balcony with a further set of seats - all in all some 120 people 
could sit comfortably within.  
Exploring along the third floor one comes across numerous side 
spaces, inhabited by a few chairs, whiteboards, windows or computer 
terminals. They make quiet spaces to escape to, to ignore and to be ignored. 
Along a corridor lined with photographs of the who's-who of the 
mathematical world: Gauss, Lovelace, Poincaré, broken up by the open 
doors of offices. On the opposite wall are windows with plaster sculptures of 
manifolds on their sills which look out onto a small courtyard. Beyond a set 
of doors, to the left is the elevator and a small 10ft x 10ft room. It boasts a 
small metal table, two metal chairs, a view of the courtyard and the kitchen 
opposite, and two large whiteboards. People often use this space for skype 
conversations. I go here to talk quietly to people every now and again. 
Escaping the space, an oak staircase leads down to the conference room. 





Figure 11 Library spaces at the Germany-A Institute  
 
From a small glass-fronted room the librarian looks out. One cannot 
enter without being checked in. It is spacious, a spiral staircase winds up to 
an upper floor with lounge-chairs and coffee-tables. The lower floor is lined 
with rank after rank of book shelves. In between a seat emerges, a potted 
plant, a table, a window complete with window seat. Mid way through a 
cluster of four chairs surround a newspaper covered coffee table, palm-




Figure 12 Corridors and escape spaces of Germany-A 
 
Exiting, heading down the oak-stair one finds corridor after corridor 
filled with offices, a warren broken up by nodes of private spaces with chairs 
and boards, or kitchen areas. One room is open to the air, intended for 
smokers, complete with whiteboard, another is tucked away accessible via a 
separate walkway, again it is not complete without a whiteboard.  
Through the warren, back to the main stair, and up to the fourth 
floor one finds the main dining area. Two small, two tier boards stand off to 
the right, a passage-way heads off dead-centre, leading to more offices. The 
left wall is cut by six frosted-glass doors of offices. A table with coffee 
paraphernalia stands opposite the stair, with bar-tables opposite this, 
against the banisters of the staircase. Posters of graduate students’ PhD 
research plaster the walls, broken up only by the complexities of abstract 
art, classical sculptures, and photographs. Three long tables hug the area off 
to the right, beside windows looking out onto roof-tops. It is to the far table 
that I make my nest - I watch the day unfold, jot down anecdotes, record. 





2.14 Inhabiting and assembling space: How physical spaces are used  
I have discussed the spaces of the institutes abstracted from the people who 
inhabit them, but now let me add another layer of description to these studies, by 
exploring how spaces are used and interacted with by mathematicians. Here my 
intentions are to give ethnographic snap shots of different activities being 
undertaken within the various spaces of the institutes. Through exploring these 
varying activities in spaces I wish to demonstrate how different spaces are used in 
different ways throughout the institutes, and how these spaces are assembled 
together into a machine for thinking mathematically.  
There are a number of different classifications of space I have identified within 
the institutes. These are as follows:  
1. Common and private space  
2. Formal and informal spaces 
3. Productive and relaxation space 
  
Each of these different spaces are involved in shaping mathematician’s dispositions 
towards conceptual spaces in mathematics, and production of mathematical 
concepts proceeds through interactions (between people and mathematical 
phenomena) within the different physical spaces of the institute. The institutes 
each have different expectations of the mathematicians who enter their spaces, 
with the UK-A Institute emphasising the production of collaborative mathematics, 
and the Germany-A Institute having a more laissez-faire attitude, leaving the 
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decisions up to the individual researcher. These differing expectations of work 
create different scripts, or schemes, for organising and inhabiting spaces, as well as 
for organising the production of knowledge within these spaces. These schemes 
affect the performances which take place with such spaces and the dispositions of 
the mathematicians who inhabit them.   
Let me begin with discussing the differences between common and private 
spaces at the institutes. At the UK-A there is a greater volume of space dedicated to 
common areas compared to private or personal space. Such common spaces are 
visually accessible through the open and connected architecture of the institute. All 
three floors of offices are connected to the central staircase of the institute, which 
gives access to the common space at the centre of the main building. Offices are 
thereby visually accessible from this common area, and one can quickly survey the 
space to determine who is present. Access to participants is facilitated by the 
researchers themselves, who, as a norm, have decided to keep the doors to shared 
offices open (This convention is not so prevalent at Germany-A, only occurring in 
shared office spaces of three or more individuals). The degree of openness of doors 
is influenced by a number of factors, such as whether an office mate is present or 
absent, the desire to locate or interact with another participant, the individual's 
workload, their personal predilections towards collaboration, as well as their 
availability to be contacted. Individual's rarely close doors, except for when holding 
private meetings, personal skype conversations, or when undertaking tasks which 
require focus and concentrated effort.  
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The accessibility to the common space allows for individuals to feel 
connected to the activities of the wider group. Through the ringing of a bell during 
the start of lectures and meetings, individuals are assembled. Participants also 
make regular checks of the common space through "listening in", or "peeking out" 
into common spaces from their offices; participants will also make regular 
transitions to the coffee/ tea machine to scout out the common areas and improve 
the chances of encounters. The following excerpt from my fieldwork report 
highlights some of the main activities which take place between transitions 
between offices and the common area: 
The common area is a highly changeable space, as people move through it 
throughout the day. People transition through the space to move between 
offices, get refreshments from the kitchen area, rest in the lounging chairs, 
undertake desk-work on the high desks with pen and paper or laptop, or 
else casually read printed out articles on the lounging chairs. The common 
space is also a conversational space where people stage chance encounters 
with other researchers around the coffee machine, or else around 
blackboards. However, because office doors are often left open, people will 
talk quietly so as not to disturb the other participants - the common space is 
thus better described as a "muted conversational space" during working 
hours. The blackboards are used on a regular basis by participants, they are 
sites around which people gather, chat socially, or else explain their 
research to one another. Often gatherings around blackboards attract other 
participants and the material presented will be described and narrated to 
newcomers so that they can join in on the conversation (Day 20, UK-A)  
 
The excerpt highlights some of the qualities of open common spaces. We see that 
the common space affords interactions and chance meetings between participants, 
the space assembles and connects individuals and serves as the main hub around 
which social life at the institute unfolds. The chalkboards and coffee machine 
become central sites around which individuals interact and share ideas, as well as 
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social niceties. The common area is not however a site devoted purely to social 
interaction, as people bring their laptops and notebooks into this area to work.  
The multiple purposes to which the common space can be employed, from 
meeting place, discussion space, networking place, thinking space, social space, 
work-space, leisure space and dining area mean that there are multiple competing 
demands for the space, which can create friction between different individuals. 
These activities generate different levels of noise and thus have effects on the 
activities of surrounding individuals or groups. Discussions, debates, presentations, 
networking and social events all naturally generate noise. Work which requires 
intense concentration, however, demands silence. Individuals engaged in solo work 
will either complain about the noise, relocate, or close office doors. The net result 
of this activity is to scale down the size of social groups and to drive larger groups to 
discussion or seminar rooms, or else to locations outside the institute. Such 
activities also reduces groups’ sizes in general and lead to more private 
conversations in office spaces. Over time this led to a breakdown in group cohesion 
and a trend towards smaller social groups of 3-4 individuals.  
At the Germany-A institute there is less of a problem with these competing 
demands for common space, because the common spaces themselves are less 
centralised compared with the UK-A. The main common space is located on the 4th 
floor, in the dining area at the top of the main stair case. This area on occasion 
hosts receptions and after lecture drinks during notable events, but, on a day to day 
basis, the dining area is used by a few individuals who regularly work on the desks, 
or by individuals collaborating using the main boards. 
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4pm heralds tea time and, at this point, individuals throughout the institute 
gather for refreshments and biscuits, staying for up to one hour to converse and 
collaborate around the main chalkboards on the 4th floor. Although there are offices 
on this floor, they tend to have their doors firmly closed throughout the course of 
the day, and are not overly disturbed by events unfolding within the dining hall. 
Because the coffee machine lies on the 1st floor there is less traffic moving through 
the large common space, and so fewer encounters take place on the 4th floor, 
except for at tea time. Whereas the UK-A Institute privileged visibility (and the 
staging of encounters), the Germany-A relies on movement and chance encounters 
to locate individuals. One must move about Germany-A, bumping into people along 
corridors, or chancing them around the coffee machine. The many different, 
smaller, distributed common areas throughout the building, and throughout the 4 
floors of the institute, mean that groups tend to remain in pairs or 3 at most. Only 
during social events, or during tea time, do group sizes exceed 4 people.  
There is less of a problem with noise at Germany-A because of the rhizomic 
structure to common spaces. There is less need to seek out quiet spaces, as 
corridors tend to be quiet and office doors are more easily closed (except for PhD 
offices which have a tendency to hold up to 8 individuals). At the UK-A institute, 
however, the centralised, dendritic structure of space leads to the accumulation of 
noise, and the intensification of social life around the main common area. 
Periodically individuals will escape this intensity and enter escape spaces such as 
the library or lower common area, or else move to the nearby university 
mathematics buildings - here individuals seek out peace and quiet and a place 
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where they can concentrate on solo work, as the following extract from my 
fieldwork diary indicates:  
11.01am: Marina and Carlos are in the library, hiding away in a small corner, 
tucked away from the hustle and bustle of the institute beyond. Marina has 
her head-phones in, she's working on paper. 11.04am: Carlos has his laptop 
open, a folder in front of him, looking intensely at his screen. The library is 
perfectly quiet, the only sound being my pen scribbling away and Marina 
clicking through papers on her screen, Carlos turns from the screen, 
studying a paper. In another corner is a new mathematician (tall guy) with 
head phones in, concentrating hard. All is perfectly quiet, still, peaceful. It is 
a perfect refuge from the noise and exposure of the rooms outside. The 
quiet mathematicians, the outsiders, come here to work and think, and 
escape. This is a place of calm in the rush and movement, a place to hide. It 
is by definition an anti-social space. But nevertheless it has a purpose: 
Escape. More such spaces like this are needed. I feel very calm here, safe, 
relaxed, I can feel myself a little less observed (Day 14, UK-A).  
 
Individuals at the UK-A use the library as a private space to escape to. Head phones 
are equipped and Facebook is often opened up, as individuals take the time to 
escape their daily routine and indulge in non-work related activities, away from the 
gaze of fellow mathematicians. As the quote from my fieldwork report below 
indicates, the library space is also colonised by the staff who, lacking a staff room, 
take their breaks in the quiet of the library, socialising away from the main common 
space which is reserved for participants:  
The library, when it is empty of participants, also acts as a meeting point for 
the staff (IT staff, caterer and the librarian). The librarian and IT staff will 
often meet for informal chats and drink coffee or tea. It is a space where 
they unwind, laugh and converse fairly freely. For the most part though the 
library is a quiet space. It’s quiet, calm atmosphere can be an attraction for 
many of those who say they want to escape the constant flux of people 
through the common areas. There are a number of little niches in the library 
where one can be unobserved and can work in peace if required. Marina 
and Carlos come to the library to work, placing head-phones in and working 
at their computers. When asked why they work there, their answer is that 
they don't have a private office, although they agree that they prefer the 




As the above quote highlights, there is sometimes a need to become invisible within 
institutes, in order to escape and refresh oneself. When at the institute many 
individuals described to me how they feel that they must demonstrate themselves 
as being productive. As a result they will carry lap-tops or notepads whenever 
possible, and keep doors to offices open, in an effort to show that they are working, 
as well as open to collaborating. By making themselves invisible in escape spaces, 
such as the library, they can freely dip into the news, blogs, or Facebook without 
feeling guilty that they are not 'working'.  
At Germany-A, perhaps because the duration of their stay is longer, and 
therefore the pressure to be productive is less intense, individuals are more relaxed 
about checking Facebook, and social media platforms whilst in their offices. This 
degree of informality at Germany-A does not carry into certain spaces, such as the 
seminar and discussion rooms, or for that matter around certain shared chalk-
boards. Seminars are naturally formalised events, where presentations have been 
practiced and honed over time. The formal presentations of research are important 
for recruiting collaborators. Individuals must make good impressions and try to 
communicate their research as simply as possible, in order for them to make 
contacts and build their professional network. Formal presentations present ideas 
in finished forms, as they would appear in publications, and thus they are not 
opportunities to experiment or conjecture.   
Within formal settings, such as the seminar room or the discussion room, 
participants sit within ordered spaces, around tables or in rows, facing a chalk-
board or projector screen. This ordered space, according to some participants, 
150 
 
leads them to act in certain ways, and prevents a full and frank discussion of the 
research being presented. Below one participant, Luke, explains why one formal 
presentation in the discussion room wasn't successful: 
LU:    Yes, so for instance, like the…the presentation that Fred and I did just 
briefly – that was even too formal, because you know how, at the end is 
Daniel is really asking everybody: what’s wrong with this, you know?  
Identify these kinds of things! We both really want people to identify the 
holes, and noticed that it was only the really senior people who even said 
something; it would have been nice to actually really get…  You know, 
because everybody has a critique… so it would have been nice to actually 
get some free flowing critique, but… So I think the discussion room is good 
for at least three quarters of the way finished ideas, kind of thing, you 
know?  You’re all sitting round in a circle with a board, there’s one person 
talking at a time, you know, that kind of thing?  It’s less of a place to just bat 
around ideas.  That’s more the… you know, around the coffee machine, 
around the beer, dinner, whatever, late at night. 
 
The social norms which certain formal spaces demand inhibit the free-flow and 
free-critique that Luke was demanding. Formal spaces create expectations for how 
to interact within them; they are imbued with social expectations and these social 
scripts (schemes) interfere with the discussion process.  
I finally turn towards the last categorisation of space, which is productive 
and relaxation space. This classification of space is more difficult to pin down, as 
these are not well defined physical spaces as such, but rather they are spaces which 
individuals themselves create and assemble during the course of inhabiting 
institutes. These spaces are adapted to suit a given need, and they thereby have 
their frames (schemes) “re-keyed” (Goffman, 1957) according to the situated 
encounter between the individual and the space at hand. 
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There are of course certain physical affordances (resources), which makes 
space subject (predisposed) to transformation into one of these spaces, for 
example because of the privacy, formality, acoustics of a space; but such spaces are 
produced relative to individual's needs. The common space of UK-A, for instance, 
can be transformed into a relaxation space during quiet periods, such as the lunch-
time lull, or after the hours of 5pm. At Germany-A, the main dining floor, or many 
of the other common areas, become spaces where mathematicians pace and 
quietly reflect to themselves. Reflective or relaxation spaces are spaces within 
which people can step back and think deeply on a given issue or else take the time 
to escape from their work and play games or socialise.  
The quiet, productive space of offices, or quiet corners of Germany-A, are 
transformed into leisure spaces usually after 7pm. Mathematicians who do not 
have internet access in their apartments will escape to social media platforms, or 
watch a movie or TV show in the comfort of their offices, or in a secluded nook or 
cranny of the institute.  
At the UK-A Institute the usual productive spaces of the common areas are 
transformed into leisure spaces after hours, with a Pizza night every Wednesday 
seeing the mathematicians unwind and relax. They play board games, drink beer, 
and use the boards to present puzzles and quizzes. The architecture of the institute 
is thus repurposed (re-keyed) as a relaxation space, as the previous regime of 
productivity no longer needs to be enforced beyond the hours of the working day. 
Within working hours common spaces are similarly repurposed by both staff and 
participants, during lunch breaks. Here the regimes of visibility created through the 
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open architecture are undermined through creating auditory private spaces, by 
plugging in ear phones and listening to music, or watching programmes on their 
mobile phones or tablets. The quote from my fieldwork notebook highlights one 
example of people escaping into their own reflection spaces: 
Its lunch time and I'm in the open area again just looking at interactions. It’s 
empty though, many of the free-boundary people are still away, and the 
other metagenomics people have gone to Wolfson for lunch. The secretary 
is still in her corner eating secretly, away from the camera, she's checking 
her phone…I think - I can’t really see her…Lunch time at the institute is 
generally characterised by silence – it’s kind of interesting, you would think 
that people could bring their own lunches, but people seem to want to 
escape their place of work more than anything else (Day 4, UK-A).   
 
Here individuals create their own escape spaces through hiding away, relocating, 
listening to music, or becoming oblivious to the world through focusing their 
attentions on their phones, or computer screens. Individuals screen out the world 
through this process of gazing at the screen, and in this way they become invisible 
to others who may be surveying the space. The regime of productivity and visibility 
is thus undermined through this mode of escape. Through this method of screening 
the individual thus transforms public spaces into private spaces, using technology to 
reassemble the spaces around them to better suit their needs.  
Such re-purposing of space demonstrates the multiple schemes which can 
be applied to the spatial resources of the institute. Such schemes of informality, 
productivity and privacy are able to be transposed to different spatial contexts, 
depending on the affordance of the spatial resource and the individual’s practical 
necessities. Within situated practice, we therefore see the mutability of the 
structural schemes of habitus. We see that individuals produce multiple realisations 
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of habitus, by adapting schemes according to the specificities of the encounter at 
hand. In the next chapter I shall explore these situated encounters in greater detail, 
and outline how engagements with spatial resources produce certain dispositions 


















Section 2.2: Production of Space 
 
2.20 Overview  
The following section will discuss how individuals inhabit space. I will demonstrate 
how different habits and routines shape and are shaped by institutional spaces, and 
how these practices structure not only one's daily routines, but also one's way of 
thinking in mathematics. I will show how physical order and personal habits give 
structure to a mathematician’s work and ways of thinking, through generating 
schemes for shaping practice.   
2.21 Introduction: How are social spaces produced? 
As we saw in the previous section (2.1), space is not simply the passive backdrop for 
social life, but rather it shapes and is shaped by the individuals who live within it. 
The rooms of the institutes provide spatial resources for organising work and 
thought, and are selectively manipulated in order to support an individual's plans 
and activities. In the previous section I introduced the idea of assembling space and 
adapting spatial schemas, but now let me explore how space is "produced" by 
mathematicians at the institutes.  
The idea of producing space seeks to emphasise the role of the individual 
inhabitant of space as the agent involved in generating and scripting action within 
space. Physical architecture is inscribed with "scripts" (schemes), which influence 
how space should be used. These scripts, however, are adapted by the inhabitants 
of a given architecture, and transformed so as to support their needs. Different 
individuals may inhabit space in a variety of ways, and thereby develop their own 
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personal scripts for acting within given spaces. Such scripting unfolds through the 
process of becoming habituated to a space. At my field sites I observed how, with 
growing familiarity, mathematicians developed patterns and routines of work, and 
learned to domesticate the spaces they inhabited. Through the act of working, 
mathematicians at the institute produce not only ideas, but architectures for 
thinking and producing these ideas.  
At any one time there are a multiplicity of schemes being executed within 
the architecture of the institute, as each inhabitant goes about their daily routine. 
Individuals move between offices, transition across common spaces, escape, return, 
relax, reflect, congregate around boards, coffee machines, computer screens. The 
following quote from my fieldwork journal captures a snap-shot of this complex 
unfolding: 
5.37: I can see Constantine in his office - hand on head, pen in hand, paper 
in front of him. He gets up, grabs a book from the book shelf. Meanwhile 
three mathematicians, along with Tall, climb the stairs with their cups of 50 
cent coffee cupped in hands. They gather around the blackboard in their 
room and chat, each stepping back and letting one speak, then write, taking 
turns to present and question. The Russian guy in the room opposite has 
headphones in, I think he's skyping again9. The Russian lady is speaking on 
the phone, loudly and in Russian. The Red-shirt man beside me has left his 
desk for the past 30 minutes with his laptop plugged in and notebook open, 
a LaTex scripting interface opened up before him.  (Day 13, Germany-A).   
 
                                                          
9 The composition of Germany-A was an even mix of young researchers (under 35) to older 
researchers (35 – 70s). Researchers at many different levels of their career were present, from PhD 
students to tenured professors. Social media and skype use spans all age ranges and degree of use 
depends on the individual predilections, however use more prevalent and intensive amongst the 
younger generation (PhD-Post-doctoral researchers especially), older professionals however tend to 
use phone-calls rather than skype to communicate with individuals not in the immediate vicinity. 
Younger members of the community tend to occupy public spaces to a greater degree and are more 
anxious and on the look-out for potential collaborators. Older professors adopt a more relaxed 
attitude to forming collaborations and are not overly concerned with their productivity to the same 
extent as those researchers under 35.  
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The ethnographer's eye catches only a glimpse of the happenings within the 
institute. From the extract above we see the difference between people who I 
know and are named and those who are quickly jotted down and reduced to 
adjectives or nationalities: "Russian", "Tall", "red-shirt". Space for me at this point is 
not yet familiar, and neither are the people who inhabit it. This is much the same 
for those mathematicians first entering the institute and still getting used to it. They 
must learn how to use the space, to position themselves within it, and they also 
must learn how to perceive each space's affordances. They must know where to 
look to find a book, a collaborator, or an unclaimed board they can write on. In the 
above extract Constantine puzzles over a problem in private, while four other 
mathematicians take their turns at solving a problem collaboratively on a white 
board. Other individuals keep in touch with friends, family, or colleagues, via skype 
or phone. Some are scribbling away some half-formed idea on scratch paper, while 
others read papers on already solved proofs, or else perfect their own ideas in a 
word processor. Ideas lie about the institute in various levels of construction: some 
are completed, consumed as Pdf's on a screen, or else in physical print; other ideas 
are only just forming, sketched out on boards or on paper; still others are being 
made ready for publication, crafted in LaTex (a mathematical scripting program) or 
debated amongst colleagues. But the process of assembling these thoughts are 






2.22 Rhythm and routine: Understanding how spaces shape habits 
At the UK-A there are similar processes of assembling people and ideas in space. 
The work-day is more formally structured by the programme organisers, which 
leads to individuals in the programme becoming synchronised in their work 
activities. Their daily routines are concentrated in the common area on the second 
floor, unlike in Germany-A, where activity is distributed about four floors. Below I 
provide some transcripts of activity recorded in my fieldwork notebooks, as well as 
passages from my fieldwork report which illustrate a typical work day at the UK-A 
Institute: 
Morning Start  
 
7am - 9.15am: From 7am a few participants begin arriving at the Institute, with 
early morning people grabbing a quick coffee before heading to their offices. 
Typically the majority of participants will arrive between 8.45-9.15am. Participants 
usually head straight up to their respective offices and at the beginning of the day 
they will close their doors if their room-mate has not yet arrived. During this arrival 
period they will check emails before exiting their office to grab coffee or tea. After 
the initial period around 9.30 doors are generally left open.  
9.10: Rodney is in his room, the door is firmly closed. 9.26: William, Stan, 
Alfred and Andrew keep their doors open, I spy inside and see them all 
tapping away on keyboards, or scrolling down a PDF.  10.14: Mathew 
arrives, gives a nod in my direction, but, without nonsense, heads straight to 
his office, the door closes. Nigel meanwhile is working away on his laptop on 
a high table, close to the stair. Beside the coffee machine Alfred has popped 
out for a chat with Vas. He says he's sceptical of finding anything worthwhile 
on the 4th domain research. 10.46: Donald chats with Luke, asking what 
time the meeting will be. Donald is unsure and says he'll ask Grant. 10.48: 
Sam is in William's room, puzzling over a blackboard. 11.34: The common 
space is filled with Free boundary people. Three tables are occupied with 
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some eight individuals from the other research programme. Felix comes up 
the staircase looking around, shocked. He comes past and says with a smile: 
"They've taken over" - he enters his room and closes the door (Day 17, UK-
A).  
  
Late Morning  
 
 9.15-11.00am: Morning sees movement through common spaces based around 
the search for coffee. Participants will sometimes get coffee and then return 
immediately to their rooms, or else linger in the common area, pacing or sitting in 
the lounge chairs. It is during this break that chance coffee-time encounters occur. 
Occasionally a morning meeting will be scheduled, and participants will be attracted 
by the sound of a bell, rung from the foyer below. Participants quickly assemble, 
bring laptops or note-pads from their offices. The morning is dedicated to "normal", 
non-UK-A institute work, received during the early morning email-check. Such work 
can comprise checking over data sent from a lab, looking over PhD theses and 
making corrections to papers participants have written.  
10.56: I'm in the open area scouting out. Luke has arrived. Han and Vas are 
still talking about their data-set, off to the side of the coffee machine. Felix 
has his head-phones in, listening to music, ignoring the world. William is 
sending an email to the group. 10.59: Annie talks to Roger and an unknown 
man I haven't seen before - a guest perhaps. 11.00: Felix walks down with a 
notepad and knocks on M2 - Zen is inside. They close the door and come out 
a moment later in search of coffee. Two minutes later and they return. 
Penelope arrives a little later - car trouble on the way up from London. 
11.08: Vas leads the unknown man to his room for a chat, and Roger heads 
up to his office on the mezzanine floor (Day 11, UK-A).    
12.20: I sat in on Luke and Felix, in their office. I found a perch on the 
window sill and merged into the background. Felix jumped after a while as 
he turned - he had forgotten about me - he says I'm like the Cheshire cat. 
Luke had prepared some graphs to show Felix. He had worked on them 
overnight after both had chatted back at their apartment block.  
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Felix is keen to interrogate the data and asks specific questions 
about the results. Luke clarifies. "What does this one mean?" say Felix 
scratching his head, peering down at the plot. Luke describes what he's 
seeing, giving a break-down of his approach. He turns to the computer and 
begins playing about with the heat-map plot, changing the python code he's 
working on to generate a new visualisation. He brings up another plot and 
says to Felix to look at the comparison with another program he's used 
called metaphlan. Felix is concerned at the comparison. He begins to 
compare metaphlan to different levels of K-mer size10 - 30, 50 etc. Felix 
looks disheartened, it's not what he expected. Luke is more optimistic and 
tells him that in quality, speed and range their method is better at 
distinguishing between the different species in the data set. Felix asks 




12.00-2.00pm: Lunch is usually eaten away from the institute, usually at a nearby 
college, or else in the main building of the university mathematics department. 
Usually only staff will eat their lunch at the institute in the common spaces upstairs, 
which have been vacated by the participants. Participants will either leave in pairs, 
knocking on each other's doors to talk on a one-to-one basis, or they will leave as 
part of a larger group, recruited on an ad-hoc basis.  
13.41: Back in open area after I took Alfred, Luke and Carl out to lunch. It 
was a good opportunity to learn about their research. Sam, William, Grant, 
and Cat ate lunch together - they sat on the table beside us. Returning to 
the common room William asks Cat if he could explain his problem as simply 
as possible. Cat suggests that Sam and Sarah should be in on the talk as well. 
1.49: Alfred heads to Rogers room to talk about their project. Meanwhile 





                                                          





2.00-5.00pm: On returning to the institute, participants will often break down into 
smaller groups and continue conversations over coffee, with others simply 
returning to their rooms to check emails or return to writing papers. Much of the 
work conducted at the boards takes place during this period of the day, as they are 
more willing to focus on collaborative work. After lunch we see movement between 
rooms as participants ask questions, and exchange information. Often participants 
will present data to each other by moving between rooms with a printout, or their 
own laptops, or else take other participants to their own rooms and show them 
their data there.  
2.01: Luke and Felix head off to Luke's room. Alfred speaking with Indiana 
and Anna, giving a summary of his research interests. William tries to 
reinterpret what Alfred is telling them by saying "let me try to fully 
understand what you're saying", before rephrasing what Alfred has told 
him. 2.21: Eventually Anna leaves and Carl comes to spectate, sitting back in 
his chair, listening in.   
  2.26:  I'm in Luke's room now, observing. Felix and Luke look 
intensely at the screen. Luke is trying to figure out what visualisations to 
include in the PowerPoint presentation they're giving. Felix asks to flick back 
to one of the plots. "Look there - what's this structure? Funny right?" He 
points to the screen. Luke looks puzzled and tries to make sense of it. 2.40: 
William sits down to talk to Felix in Alan's room. Felix is at the board 
drawing something out, William meanwhile draws out a grid with green 











5.00-5.30pm: The institute quickly clears around this time. Some participants will 
come by each other's doors, give a knock and chat before departing. On occasion 
participants will leave together, other times they will form larger groups to travel 
into town, whether it be to a pub or a restaurant.  
5.30-8pm: For those who remain, the late hours are spent either playing 
games like "Go", or chess, or else just casually checking emails or watching lectures. 
Skype calls can be heard from closed doors. Every Wednesday around 5.30 the free 
boundary people will have their pizza and beer party at which point the institute is 
transformed to a buzz of activity, laughing, spontaneous conversation and 
merriment.    
5.07: Anna knocks on William's door. I call over to Nigel. He's going to read 
up on some papers on the 4th domain work, he heads up to his office. 5.13: 
The free boundary mathematician in office M14 leaves. Grant goes over to 
William's room. 5.24: Henry stops by Penelope's room: she's having trouble 
with a piece of software Henry's written.  5.26: William visits Anna's office. 
Blue shirt and Yellow shirt come up from the downstairs common room, 
they've been collaborating around the main board there, leaving the "please 
leave sign" in place. 5.48: Felix, William, Alfred, Henry and Simon congregate 
outside Felix's office, they tell me they're going to the theatre to see a play. 
Felix says "It's Shakespeare…I think". Luke leaves separately, saying he'll 
meet them there just after he returns to his apartment. 5.50: Vas and 
Charlotte leave; Vas doesn't look too happy. Maybe see them in the pub 
later. 6.12: Anna Skyping her student in Germany; he's been waiting for her 
to send back a report he's written. 6.26: All quiet in the Institute. Penelope 
returns to her office to use the WiFi. She says she's not sure where the 
theatre is and needs to google map it.  
6.28: Anna leaves, we have a quick chat. 6.34: The free-boundary 
mathematician in M11 leaves. 6.35: Simon returns to drop off his laptop in 
his room. 6.46: Italian Free-boundary mathematician from M11 begins 
taking pictures of the common space. Takes 3 pictures in all: one of his 
office, one of the coffee machine and then one of the LCD screen showing 
the faces of mathematicians present in the institute. He locks his office door 
then leaves. I scuttle off to the balcony and watch as he takes pictures of the 
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library, reception, the main stair and then the lecture theatre. He leaves 
then. 6.46: Penelope leaves in a hurry. The office mate of M11 returns. 6.58: 
Blue shirt comes down to use the photocopier. 7.04: Blue shirt leaves. 7.24: 
M11's office mate leaves. 7.41: Yellow shirt leaves from M12. 7.54: IT comes 
past me to get a cup of coffee, blanks me (Day 10, UK-A).   
5.50 - 6.27: I'm in the common area. Felix and I are chatting about 
his new dance class called 5 Rhythms. I tease him for a while, saying I hadn't 
realised he was into the New Age kind of stuff. Felix laughs and says that he 
finds it therapeutic, but quickly changes the subject when Luke arrives. Luke 
says "Let's talk normalisation" and Felix jumps up and both head to the large 
chalkboard beside us. Felix writes down the problem in a spidery hand, 
starting at the top left of the board. Luke looks on, making comments, finger 
on lips as he listens to Felix's explanation (Day 12, UK-A).  
 
From these observations of day-to-day routines we can begin to see the complexity 
of interactions taking place within the institute, as well as the different assembly 
points for people and ideas. The office space features prominently in individuals' 
work-routines, with individuals holding private meetings, skype conversations, or 
black-board presentations within the confines of their offices. The common area is 
also a place for work, a place to meet, present ideas, chat and reflect, and is 
adapted for these different purposes throughout the work day.  
Different sites outside of the institute are also important: such as the college 
dining halls, where the mathematicians eat lunch, socialise as well as share ideas. 
Note-pads or lap-tops are brought to lunch and are kept close at hand, as any 
activity is an opportunity to present one's ideas or to forge a new collaboration. The 
fact that individuals carry their notebooks and laptops or tablets around means that 




Because of the coming and going of individuals at the institute it is necessary 
to stay visible in order to contact others, and open oneself up for collaborations. 
Staking out common spaces and remaining conspicuous is therefore important to 
some early career researchers, who will make "nests" in the common areas, 
choosing a favourite chair or table to set up as their work-space. High visibility sites 
are sometimes chosen, which include positions facing main entrances and 
staircases, heavily trafficked sites near to the coffee machine, or sites near to main 
chalkboards. This siting is sometimes due to individuals not possessing a private 
office, but in other cases the siting is more deliberate (they are positions from 
which to stage encounters with others): in order to catch someone's eye, or 
ambush a would-be collaborator with questions. The open doors of offices are also 
a sign that one is open to collaborating. Sometimes doors are left completely open 
to allow individuals to monitor the common spaces, as well as to show that they are 
welcome and open to collaborating or chatting.  
The workday is broken up by the ringing of a bell which summons individuals 
to a meeting or a seminar, or else by gatherings in the common spaces. Such 
gatherings will either bring individuals out of their offices, or see doors firmly closed 
to screen out the noise. Coffee breaks are a regular habit and take place every 
couple of hours throughout the day: they are an opportunity to look at who is "in", 
or "around", or just to sit in the common space on the lounge chairs and relax for a 
while. Usually during these periods individuals come out and engage in an informal 
"chit-chat" with me, or with any other common-space inhabitant.  
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On a day to day basis individuals will engage in home-institution and 
administrative activities, such as checking emails, reviewing PhD theses, writing and 
editing existing publications, skyping with existing collaborators, and organising 
other events outside of UK-A. Time devoted to UK-A work can often become 
radically reduced, as pre-existing deadlines loom and normal work takes 
precedence. Oftentimes, the mathematicians inform me, this prioritisation of their 
normal work leads to them feeling guilty that they are not collaborating enough. 
This is another factor leading to the open office doors and conspicuous work 
activities. Individuals tell me that it is a privilege to be at the institute, and so say 
that they feel that they must be seen to be working and being productive to justify 
being there.  
The conspicuous nature of work, and the need to appear productive during 
working hours, influences how individuals use spaces and present themselves. 
However these scripts for how to use space are no longer in effect after 5pm. As 
mentioned in the previous sub-section, individuals escape work by going to the pub, 
or dancing, or going back to their residences, or else they transform the institute 
into a more social space by playing games, streaming television programmes on 
their laptops, or just chatting socially. Time of day thus serves to demarcate the 
temporal boundaries of work, and provides another structure by which work and 
thought are ordered within the institute.  
At Germany-A mathematicians provide their own structure to the workday. 
Only presentations by members of the institute or lectures provide formal 
structures to their work routine. 4pm tea time on the 4th floor provides an 
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opportunity for individuals to gather and chat socially, or else explain ideas using 
the two large two-tier boards in the main hall. The following quote from my 
fieldwork journal documents the scene: 
A man and a woman took their mugs and perched on some stools around a 
high, round bar-table, next to the stair railings; they chatted casually. 4pm 
hits and there is a mad rush for coffee - people seem to be programmed to 
come out at that time because the place quickly fills up and there is a buzz - 
something I had not encountered in the mornings.   
The groups slowly moved out from the centre around the coffee 
pots, forming bands of concentric circles, all oriented inwards towards the 
coffee and the conversation around it. They spontaneously formed pairs and 
groups of 3-4; many others were itinerant, just listening in, floating between 
groups and interesting conversations (Day 7, Germany-A). 
 
Life at Germany-A follows a different rhythm to that of UK-A. Tea time creates large 
gatherings of up to 20 people for an hour, but for the better part of the day 
interactions are mainly in pairs or 3-4 people at most. These interactions are 
dispersed across all 4 floors of the institute. The institute is quiet throughout the 
day, and so interruptions in the silence bring people out of their offices to 
investigate, as the following extract from my fieldwork journal describes: 
1.06: A Russian woman is working away beside me, tapping on the keys of 
the keyboard one at the time using only one finger, looking intensely at the 
keyboard at the different keys as she logs away….  
Another Russian man across the landing, in a room opposite stepped 
out of his room to have a Skype conversation; he left the room he was 
sharing with another guy in order not to disturb him, but sitting in the 
common space, and concealing himself in a corner he was able to have a 
conversation (in Russian), despite the other people within this common 
space. The idea of privacy through both physical concealment and isolation 
via language thus allows people to create a privacy bubble around 
themselves, without actually being in private. In this case being in an open, 
common area with people present.  
2.43: It’s perfectly quiet in the institute: people are in their rooms, 
mainly at their laptops or desktops, reading articles. Interestingly most of 
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the work is done at desk with pen and paper. Almost no work is done using 
the blackboard: the blackboard just appears to be a social thing (Day 8, 
Germany-A).  
Grey T-shirt is back and is just surfing the internet. Indeed the 
internet does appear to keep a lot of people at the institute. Outside, in 
their apartments for example, internet is not provided (If you're smart you 
can pick it up outside in a quiet café; it’s patchy though). They are thus 
almost forced into spending time at the institute. But the work of a modern 
research mathematician, I should say a young research mathematician, does 
depend on constant internet access, just in terms of accessing email and 
research papers.  But also there is a social aspect to this: connection to 
Facebook, distractions from work via blogs and news reports. These small 
things are built in to the day to day work practices and thinking practices of 
research mathematicians. Indeed periods of escape and socialising seem 
essential in this process of thinking. People need to step outside of their 
thought spaces, beyond their computer screens, or papers and think about 
something else. Sometimes they literally step out: they pace outside their 
offices, they grab coffee, or else they go for a walk around The city. On 
returning they are able to re-engage, and get back into work mode. The 
constant process of escape and return is thus important in building coherent 
concepts, as it means that the information originally written down needs to 
be refreshed, rethought out, and reconstructed.  
Another person steps out of the institute for lunch. 1.30: Grey shirt 
steps out. A tall German guy steps out of his office and begins pacing the 
dining area, back and forth, arms crossed. Looking at the different posters 
on the wall, pausing, returning to his room, and then finally settling back at 
his desk: a short escape, but also breathing room to think. The Russian 
woman is on the phone again; it’s loud and echoes, so the professor from 
Taiwan in the far office closes her door. Constantine comes out of his office 
and looks up the stairs to see who is speaking, a look of annoyance on his 
face. My office mate has a similar aversion to noises (Day 10, Germany-A).  
 
From the above passages we get the sense that Germany-A is a place of retreat 
from one's day to day work at home institutions. Mathematicians come and go, 
moving between other mathematical venues in the city, taking breaks in coffee 
shops, restaurants, libraries. They may stay in the city or else use their travel 
stipends to meet collaborators in other cities, or even institutions in other 
countries. The institute also encourages members to invite guests, providing 
funding for researchers to visit in order to collaborate. The institute thus serves as a 
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tool for individual members to build their own collaborative networks and their 
own personalised thinking spaces. Since there is no compulsion to attend seminars 
or events, one's work day is structured according to one's own personal choices. 
Such choices give members of the institute more flexibility in how they allocate 
time to work and social activities. In the above passages we see that skype and 
telephone conversations with collaborators, friends and family play a major role in 
one's work routine. There is a constant movement into and out of the institute, 
there is also movement within the institute, which takes the form of pacing, coffee-
breaks, or Skype-breaks in secluded spaces.  
Freedom, however, is not an absolute, as can be seen by the fact that 
individuals retreat to the institute to use the internet, because many apartments do 
not come with a broadband connection. Individuals thus spend leisure time at the 
institute as well, watching movies, TV shows, or using social media platforms such 
as Facebook. The private, focused work also necessitates silence, which again 
restricts many people's behaviour in private spaces or shared offices. To have more 
animated conversations one moves to unoccupied offices, or else discussion rooms, 
or the open-air lounge room on the second floor.  
2.23 Creating order, structuring thought: Balancing structure and agency  
Structuring one's work life thus is a product of both personal choice and 
institutional influence, we see that it is a balance between freedoms and 
constraints. However, what I now want to explore is how individuals’ rhythms and 
routines structure their work and thinking. Through such explorations we will get a 
sense of the flexibility of mathematicians’ work routines at the institute:  
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Spoke with Morry - he's a German mathematician working in topology. We 
began by speaking about my research on collaboration among 
mathematicians, which really opened the door to speaking. He stressed that 
mathematicians are not necessarily geniuses; in fact they are people who 
have understood the fundamentals of the language and have been able to 
use it effectively to think with. Morry says that most mathematicians are 
lazy and they like the freedom of having no rules: they get up when they 
want, work when they want, and produce what they want. He says the only 
thing they need to do is to write applications for their research. He says he 
doesn’t like rules, but, he says, some rules are necessary to continue living 
the life he leads. But he says that applicability of the research shouldn't be 
what motivates mathematics. People should write papers and then see 
what happens, the applicability is not something which should be a concern 
for them.  
People seem to have different rhythms. Saul said he prefers to take 
the morning off and read some articles and "books" which he's "acquired" 
online (he was a little nervous of saying where he acquired them, but finally 
relented by saying a Russian website). Saul said he doesn't usually come in 
until 2.30pm; mainly because there's no advantage to coming in earlier, as it 
appears that the mathematicians he speaks to start work late and finish 
sometimes around 6pm. Tonight we're staying until 7.30 because we're 
heading to a pub called James Joyce with the rest of the post-docs. (Day 16, 
Germany-A)   
 
We see above how certain mathematicians enjoy the freedom and flexibility that 
life at the institute provides. The temporal boundaries of the day are relaxed at the 
Germany-A, with some individuals coming in after lunch or mid-afternoon, in time 
for tea-time. Other mathematicians will work 9am-5pm, as at the UK-A; still others 
work late into the night, with individuals even known to sleep overnight at the 
institute.  
One's work, thought and habits are thus shaped through a negotiated 
practice between the formal structures of institutional contexts and the agency of 
the individual. Individuals shape situations in order to better suit their agendas. 
Some mathematicians use the institute as a chance to escape from their day to day 
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routines, and undertake focused work on a given problem, as Simon comments 
below: 
Si: I’m able to be more focused, so I can work longer hours.  The fact that 
the place where I’m staying is very close to where I work means that I’m not 
commuting for a half an hour or an hour each way.  Yes, it’s really the focus 
and the fact that I want to get something before I go that really gives me the 
drive to finish things.  And the fact that because I’m somewhere else, I can 
consciously focus on something else rather than have the, you know, the 
various duties of [my home] institution to distract me. 
 
As researchers at the institute informed me, the geographical location of the UK-A, 
away from the city centre, makes it a perfect retreat from normal city living. The 
proximity to their accommodation also reduces their daily commute, and means 
that more time can be allocated to their work. Being "somewhere else" also allows 
individuals to escape their normal frames of reference and look at problems with 
fresh eyes, as well as escape their day to day administrative routines. They are able 
to craft new routines and tailor their work-life to a single problem. The short 
duration of this escape period also means that individuals are motivated to try and 
get the task completed within their allotted time, as they feel they will not get 
another opportunity for prolonged and concentrated work. William says the 
following: 
Wm: So over the years, probably seven years at least, I’ve been playing 
around with these other ideas and they’re gradually coming together.  It’s 
taken a long time, but you need a lot of pure, concentrated thought.  You 
can’t do that in fragments of time, so what I did, I… beginning last year, I 
resigned half my job and I’m on half pay, and the idea was I would have 
more time to do research on the things I thought were important because 
otherwise, I couldn’t find such time.  You know, you really need months on 
end to think about these things uninterrupted, and you simply don’t get that 
in a university setting. 
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So I had to basically go part time in order to get time to work on 
these things.  That’s what I’ve done, although it hasn’t quite happened yet 
because I had so many… you know, as an academic, when you decide to 
stop something, you can’t just stop it.  It’s like a juggernaut.  It’s all these 
things that you’re kind of committed to, this programme being one of them, 
that you can’t just say, that’s it, chap, I’m off, you know, and the whole thing 
goes down the tubes.  You can’t do that.  So it’s taken me 18 months to 
actually… working more than full time, to actually deal with all the things 
that I needed to deal with, but when I get back to X the hope is that I 
actually will then have some real quality time to really concentrate on a few 
things that I really want to concentrate on without any distractions.  That’s 
what I’m planning to do when I get back. 
 
Mathematicians require time to be creative, to play around with ideas and 
assemble the fragments of thoughts into one coherent concept. To nurture such 
creativity requires that day to day pressures and stresses be suspended, and that 
the burden of productivity be lifted. The institute, as a liminal space, outside of 
their normal work life, gives individuals the opportunity to step back, to think 
deeply, reflect, and collect their thoughts11. This process of crafting ideas is 
integrated into the practices associated with developing routines and becoming 
socialised within institutional spaces.  
From the excerpts above we see how these routines vary as a function of 
the individual, as well as the institutional contexts they occupy. The architectures of 
the institutes, as well as the expectations of the institution’s directors, funders and 
administrators, shape the dispositions of the individuals present within institutional 
spaces. The individual inhabitants themselves bear certain pre-dispositions, 
                                                          
11 This phrase means that the institute provides a liminal space, outside of the contexts of one’s 
home department, within which the individual is given the opportunity to work freely on research. 
Such freedom however is not absolute, as their departmental responsibilities are replaced by the 
specific institutional responsibilities, requiring an individual to “be productive”, by writing papers or 
forming collaborations.  
171 
 
expectations and motivations before they even enter these institutional contexts, 
and these also serve to shape their interactions, habits and dispositions. The 
patterns of behaviour, thought, and production which emerge within the institutes 
are thus a complex product of these different sets of structuring principles.  
In the next sub-section I shall discuss how these patterns of behaviour and 
dispositions are manifested through individual’s performances of their 
mathematical selves and ideas. Such performances are functions of the situated 
engagements between individuals’ habitus and the affordances of the spatial 














Section 2.3: Performance Spaces  
 
2.30 Overview   
The following section will explore how individuals present themselves and their 
ideas within institutional contexts. I will explore the importance of such 
performances of the self in constructing collaborative networks and successfully 
disseminating ideas. Such performances take place within both the public, visible 
theatres of Goffman's frontstage, and also within the more private, informal 
backstage areas. The movement between front and backstage is important in 
successful performances of individuals' mathematical selves and ideas. Such 
transitions between frontstage and backstage, we shall see, are important in 
creating "common ground" between researchers, which serves to build bonds of 
friendship, trust and free intellectual exchange.   
2.31 Introduction: Performance spaces 
Individuals escape the normal, departmental contexts of mathematical production 
at their home department, only to escape into other regimes of work and 
productivity at the mathematics institutes. Individuals are freed from the obligation 
to teach, but not from the need to present their research and to produce papers. 
This pressure to be productive comes from a number of sources: from research 
councils, institutes, university administrators, heads of department, and from 
competition with colleagues and fellow researchers. Such social pressures form 
fields of force, which generate habitus that influence the predilections, dispositions 
and actions of individuals who inhabit these mathematical fields.   
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In the following section we shall see how these pressures to perform and to 
be productive are manifested in the behaviours and interactions between 
researchers at the mathematical institutes under study. We have already seen how 
the environments of mathematical institutes are socialised and assembled into 
productive spaces, and we have seen how these spaces position individuals within 
the mathematical field, and how such positions generate habits and dispositions. 
What I now want to turn towards is how different spaces are utilised in the 
presentation of ideas and the self within mathematics.  
I shall use Goffman's idea of frontstage and backstage in order to explore 
how different areas of the institute become adapted as "performance spaces" for 
"fronting", or foregrounding, mathematical identities. I shall show how the pressure 
to be productive manifests itself in an increasing need to make one's mathematics 
visible, measurable and presentable. Such need to perform foregrounds the more 
formal, visible, frontstage at the expense of the backstage of production. But I shall 
demonstrate that the more informal, private, backstage world is equally as 
important in shaping the mathematical self and the mathematical habitus.    
2.32 Life on stage: How the self is performed in mathematics  
The frontstage is the place where mathematics is presented and made visible. It 
includes virtual spaces, such as online, on personal web-pages, blogs or forums; it 
can include literary spaces through published proofs or pre-prints; but, for our 
purposes, I focus on the physical sites for presentation at institutes: the lecture, 
seminar, discussion rooms and public spaces. It is within these spaces that proofs 
and ideas are presented formally, in more refined, coherent states. These formal, 
174 
 
public spaces are where an individual's main purpose is to present information, to 
debate ideas, and to keep people up to date on research in a given area. Within 
spaces such as lecture halls, seminar rooms, and discussion rooms, individuals are 
placed within a hierarchically ordered space, where one or more individuals are 
constructed as performers, who face another group of individuals who take their 
positions as an audience.  
The audience, however, is not in a passive or submissive role; instead the 
interaction between audience and presenter is much more dynamic, with questions 
often being asked by audience members throughout the course of a presentation. 
Questions can have the aim of clarifying an issue, asking for more description, 
examples, or counter-examples; or questions can be aimed to probe the veracity of 
a statement, or the strength of an argument. Statements which provide details, 
examples, counter-examples, counter-arguments, or opinions are also offered to 
the presenter, as well as errors being pointed out, or "corrections" provided. 
PowerPoint presentations are rarely given at Germany-A, but are encouraged by 
UK-A, in order to facilitate knowledge transfer between participants, as well as 
facilitate dissemination of knowledge online (via their website). At Germany-A, 
presentations take the form of "chalk-talks", where presenters write out their 
research on chalk-boards, narrating an argument or proof as they go along. Below is 
an example of such a chalk talk, recorded in my fieldwork journal: 
I sat in on one of Constantine's seminars on "translating theoretical physics 
concepts to mathematicians". Constantine's presentation was mainly 
focused around developing examples which he thought the audience would 
understand. He set out at the beginning with some definitions from 
theoretical physics, which he then translated into mathematical terms. The 
examples were incredibly detailed and involved a lot of differentiation of 
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terms, which at times could be difficult to follow, as the board quickly filled 
with a zoo of terms, which stood for different physical phenomena.  
During his differentiating he mistakenly placed some terms on the 
boards, which the audience picked up on and periodically commented on, 
saying: "That term chi, shouldn't be there", "I think you are mistaken", 
"Remove the double dot", etc. They then went through and tried to find 
more holes: one person thought he had seen something, but Constantine 
quickly countered, leading to the person backing down quite quickly, 
apologising.  
One professor at the front continued to ask questions about what 
some of the things presented actually meant. Constantine would go through 
and explain: "yes it’s a tensor bundle", or "No it’s a flabby space". At the end 
Owen asked a "technical" question, on whether the manifold was "fine and 
soft and not flabby". Constantine was stumped, he didn't know how to 
interpret the terms "fine" or "flabby", and asked why it was important. 
Another professor however stepped in and said that the fine-ness was 
important in this case. Constantine called a break in order to talk to the 
student and the professor in private. Others gathered around to listen in; 
the rest broke into their respective cliques and began talking amongst 
themselves (Day 11, Germany-A).  
 
In the extract above we get a sense of the difficulties in presenting material to a 
mixed audience of experts and novices. The intention of the seminar had been to 
introduce concepts in theoretical physics to novices, however experts in the area 
had turned up in order to "audit" the course. The result was that Constantine was 
set upon by a host of technical questions and error corrections. To give such a 
presentation, in which one is constantly interrupted, does sound somewhat 
daunting, however such presentations are common ways of testing one's 
knowledge, as well as one's rigor. To survive such onslaughts allows one to grow in 
esteem. The trial by seminar, which younger mathematicians go through, thus acts 
as a proving ground for mathematicians, giving them a chance to hone their skills at 
arguing and presenting their ideas.   
176 
 
On a separate occasion I had talked to Constantine about his Tuesday lectures. My 
fieldwork journal records the event: 
We talked about his Tuesday lectures. He said that he was often worried 
about them because directors and senior mathematicians - as he put it 
"actual" differential geometers - would turn up to “observe”. Sometimes, 
although the lectures were tailored to graduates with a low level of 
knowledge, when a senior person arrived, Constantine explained to me that 
he and his fellow mathematicians felt that they had to "bump up" the rigor 
of the talk and include more detailed, complex information. As a result of 
this, the graduate audience could easily become lost and not follow what 
was going on in the talk.   
Constantine spoke of how mathematicians who came to the 
institute, although they were masters of their given field, also wanted to 
spend the time learning something new. Often though they would be too 
embarrassed to admit they didn't know a given concept in a different field, 
and so would not ask questions. They did however want to understand a 
little about that field, say physics for example. The seminars - on 
mathematical physics - were thus aimed to communicate certain ideas in 
physics to mathematicians, in ways they could understand. Deep knowledge 
of the physics was not required, according to Constantine. Rather what was 
sought was a motivation for the mathematicians to understand why certain 
questions could be interesting for them to study (Day 12, Germany-A).   
 
The extract gives us a glimpse behind the scenes, and highlights some of the 
anxieties that mathematicians have about performing their mathematics. Short-
cuts, short-hands, or "loose" language is left by the wayside, and instead precise 
definitions are provided, which often requires that the audience possesses a 
sophisticated vocabulary, in order to be able to fully grasp what is happening.  
The chalk-board is the preferred medium of presentation because it allows 
individuals to adapt their exposition depending on the audience's questions, or 
level of understanding. The mutability of chalk allows for individuals to rub out 
incorrect statements, to elaborate on concepts, and to show their working clearly. 
The rate at which a presenter writes on the board also sets a pace which allows for 
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the audience to follow along and make their own notes in parallel. The act of 
writing out and unfolding a presentation through chalk-work thus keeps the 
audience attentive and engaged, allowing them to return to definitions on a 
previous board, and re-trace their steps if they become lost. By rubbing out an 
entire board the presenter provides a much needed pause, which allow for both 
presenter and audience to take a break and collect their thoughts together.  
Both at Germany-A and UK-A the act of presenting research is important in 
the social processes of institutional life. The initial presentation is a rite of passage 
which introduces researchers’ thought and themselves to the group. Without such 
presentations researchers find it difficult to find collaborators, as the presentation 
provides "excuses" for individuals to approach presenters, to ask questions, and 
introduce themselves and their own research, as one researcher, Sarah, explains: 
SA:   I’m very shy.  I don’t... even if I read a paper, I find a paper very 
enlightening, I don’t usually email the person.  I have a lot of colleagues who 
do, but I am much too shy.  It’s usually if I meet them.  I have to meet 
somebody and say, oh, actually I have this question, it’s a silly question, 
but... and that’s how it starts. 
 
Individuals make first contact through approaching presenters and asking "silly" 
questions, to break the ice. They then begin informal investigations into an 
individual's research, and attempt to establish common ground. Sarah goes on to 
describe the importance of giving talks, for the purpose of attracting potential 
collaborators: 
SA: At the beginning it was a little bit funny because when they invited me 
to come, they didn’t invite me to give a talk, and I had to beg them to let me 
give a talk, and it was very strange. It was a very strange interaction, that is, 
they had invited me quite a long time ago - more than a year ago - to come, 
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and I said yes, and then sent out a programme with the talks, and I wasn’t 
on the programme and they hadn’t asked me to give a talk, and I... and I 
found the interaction weird, and then I said, well, I’m willing to give a talk.  If 
you have time, I’d really like to give a talk, because I know that giving a talk, 
people always come and talk to you after they’ve heard your talk. And until 
you’ve given a talk, they won’t talk to you, and so it was very important to 
me the first week to give a talk... but I, sort of, had to struggle with that.  
They didn’t... they hadn’t programmed that... so that was a little strange. 
But the Institute, you know, the facilities and the way we have coffee and 
things like that, that was good. And the way of doing a week of talks at the 
beginning, as I say, that’s the way to get to know people.  They have to give 
a talk and then you know, oh, that person’s doing this, that person’s doing 
that. 
  
The talk thus is a way of setting up shop, and displaying intellectual wares. In giving 
a talk presenters become open to talk afterwards, and to show that they are 
accessible and open to collaborating. The talk also allows for individuals to classify 
one another according to what they do, and what problems they are interested in. 
The talk thus is the starting point from which individuals can order ideas, by putting 
names and ideas to faces. Through the presentation, or "talk", presenters gives face 
to concepts, and begins the process of socialising themselves and their ideas.  
2.33 Behind the scenes: How performances are practiced in privacy   
By "socialising ideas" I simply mean that concepts become part of assemblages of 
people and things. Ideas become grounded in day to day life through their 
attachment to people. At the institute people speak of Sarah's technique, 
Penelope's data, Luke's theorem, and use these names to act as handles for 
searching MathSciNet, Arxiv.org, or google scholar, for related material by which to 
trace the origins of the ideas.  
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Knowledge in mathematics is embodied. Individuals act as repositories of 
knowledge, and many researchers prefer to ask a question directly to an expert, in 
order to find out more about a problem or idea, rather than consulting written 
material. The oral transmission of knowledge in mathematics is a means through 
which information contained in publications can be expanded and summarised, so 
as to provide the key points, motivations and overall structures of proofs. 
Interviewees highlight the importance of asking experts about a problem, paper or 
approach, which can serve a number of purposes: 
1. As a time-saving device. 
2. As a means of acquiring interesting techniques and problems.  
3. As a way of getting up to speed in an area. 
4. As a means to socialise and share interests in mathematics.   
The following gives an example of why oral communication is important to one 
researcher, Nemo:  
N: So I'm not fast in oral communication. So I like to discuss maths with 
others, but at the level that is of motivation and general interests, 
questions. But when I want to think really deep, I need a pen, and I need 
some loneliness at some point to think through a question. When someone 
is watching me I am not so good at thinking in front of somebody. But I need 
communication and exchange about questions, in fact to be interested 
about a problem I need to understand why we should all care, as a 
community, about this question, not just "Oh it’s a hot problem - you should 
try this". 
IN: So you use people to get a problem and interrogate them to find 
out why the problem is interesting? 
N: Yes I use people in that way, and also I see it as a cultural thing 
also. So I like to exchange, and see what the vision of mathematics we 
have…Doing maths with others is all about what questions we can work on 
between ourselves. It’s not just "Oh lets go to the blackboard and solve a 
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problem", it’s rather: "Oh have you heard of that, and look I can do this, 
describe some simple examples and so on". At some point exchanging 
around this, and maybe having a small idea or small example, and then 
afterwards have more quiet and just think about the natural places where 
these ideas should sit.  
 
The informal, back-channels of communicating are important in shaping 
researchers’ interests. Informal chats in private offices, over coffee, or in common 
rooms, help researchers to disseminate their own research interests, as well as gain 
new insight or perspectives from their interlocutors. Many interviewees spoke of 
needing to "pick the brains" of experts, of "gaining insight" on a problem, trying 
different approaches to solving a problem, or else moving in different research 
directions as a result of informal chats with fellow mathematicians.  
Often times the process involves an exchange of research interests, at a 
general, "motivational" level, before moving deeper and asking more specific 
questions, through probing each other's knowledge of a proof. Once a researcher 
understands how and why a given proof or construction is useful, they will go about 
the process of "reading around" a subject. Such "reading around" involves obtaining 
key words, names and references from their interlocutors, which act as handles for 
searching archives, personal webpages and research databases. 
As many mathematicians explained to me, it's important to "know who is 
who and who knows what". They must know where to access certain information, 
who to speak to about a problem or proof, and who to follow to keep up to date on 
developments in a field. People thus are "repositories" of knowledge; they are living 
archives or databases, whose knowledge can be accessed through simply asking 
questions.  Below, Adrian describes how an individual researcher must learn their 
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own limitations, and must extend their social networks so as to compensate for 
their lack of knowledge or expertise in a given area: 
AD: Of course it’s like pond life - I mean if you are in a pond you know 
everybody. But on the other hand the really good people tend not to be so 
narrow. I mean number theorists have had to learn algebraic geometry, 
algebraic geometers have had to learn number theory and topologists have 
to know everything. Not that I know everything being a topologist. But 
nevertheless I have to have some feeling, if I can’t do something I should 
know it or I have to be friends with someone who knows these things. I tend 
to use my collaborators who I talk to as repositories of knowledge. It’s very 
important to know who knows what…. You have to talk to people, you have 
to know what they can do, what they can't do. You have to have a feeling 
for the knowledge, for where the knowledge repositories are - there's a lot 
in published papers but that's not enough, you really have a little bit more 
of a fluid approach. 
 
Adrian notes that reading the formalised, published papers is sometimes not 
enough. Rather a "fluid" approach is necessary, by which an individual can question 
a person who is a “knowledge-repository” on specific questions related to a 
concept or proof, in order to "get the bare-bones" or the "gist" of an argument. This 
is an important task to undertake before a researcher decides to fully commit to 
investing time and mental energy in reading a given paper. The informal back-
channels of questioning knowledge-repositories serves as a means of scoping out 
potential problems or useful concepts, narrowing down the search parameters 





Figure 13 Over-the-shoulder work at Germany-A 
  
 
Figure 14 Developing personal spaces at UK-A 
 
Such back-channels of communication are where the problem-finding/ 
problem-solving, experimentation and proof-construction take place. Behind closed 
doors, or in quiet corners, a great deal of one-to-one work takes place, at a 
blackboard or shoulder to shoulder around a sheet of paper. Prior to such 
engagements, individuals will spend time reading up on a mathematician's work, 
accessing their personal web-pages, or skimming through their papers on the 
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Arxiv.org website. Before any presentation, such preparatory work takes place. 
Individuals will ask what they call their "stupid" or "silly" questions before face-to-
face encounters, utilising close friends or colleagues, or else will use the question 
and answer site MathOverflow.com. Then when it comes to asking the expert, or 
giving an exposition, one does so effortlessly.  
Such displays of effortlessness are important in showing that a researcher 
possesses "natural" ability within their field, and thus they are important in 
developing their reputation as a competent, rigorous, trustworthy researcher. In 
public, much of the hard work of learning is made invisible. Through downplaying 
the effort involved in understanding concepts, so individuals create distance 
between themselves and their audience. Some individuals, I am told, are perceived 
as "naturals", "geniuses", "gods" because of their effortless ability to perform and 
demonstrate their understanding of mathematics. When many such "naturals" talk 
in private between themselves, or when being interviewed, the struggles involved 
in grasping concepts are revealed.  
Individuals may talk of being "demoralised" by not understanding a 
presentation, or struggling to understand a concept after repeated attempts, or 
even of feelings of inadequacy of their cognitive faculties, in comparison to that of 
their colleagues. One example comes from a night when four post-docs and myself 
decide to tour the pubs of the city. It was fairly early in the evening when we 





Andre snatched away a little booklet Paolo was holding. 
"Hey give that back!" Paolo says, but Andre is already flicking 
through. "Derived categories…" Andre mutters "I never understood this". 
"Now is your chance" Paolo smirks, as Andre flicks through.  
"I was wondering what this was” Andre continues, “you've been 
cradling it all day and this was my chance to nab it". 
Paolo says that he needed to learn it. Already he had gone through it 
in detail, reading and re-reading the text. Indeed the printed booklet had 
obviously been flicked through multiple times, and it was covered in notes, 
under-linings and coffee stains.  
"Tell me what you know about it" Paolo asks Andre. Andre is a little 
flustered and gives a really high level overview, Paolo laughs in response.  
"You shouldn't bother going to lectures! What good will it do you 
when that's all you know? You need to read this. From the first chapter" 
Paolo says, as Andre is on Chapter two.  
"Hey, I know that stuff" Andre retorts, looking a little hurt. Paolo is 
insistent. Paolo continues to mock him and asks if Simon can help explain to 
Andre what the topic is about. Simon backs away and says that he's only 
used it once to prove something.  
"I could, but I wouldn't be able to do it well" Simon says shyly. Paolo 
persists on the topic, poking fun at Andre's lack of knowledge for the next 
ten minutes, making most of us at the table uncomfortable. Andre is 
downcast as he sips on his beer, flicking through the battered little book. 
Eventually Paolo seems to become aware of the change of mood, and he 
moves the conversation towards Perelman's proof of the Poincaré 
conjecture, telling us why it should have been more widely publicised in the 
popular press. 
"It should have been written out in full on the New York times!" 
Paolo cries, we all giggle, leaving Paolo to continue the rant (Day 26, 
Germany-A).  
 
The above anecdote reveals the tension between the formal and the informal. In 
this instance, what Andre had considered an informal moment of play or light-
heartedness, was transformed by Paolo into an opportunity to interrogate Andre on 
his knowledge, and make visible Andre's lack of knowledge. The mood around the 
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table changed, from one of intimacy to that of distance, as Paolo began to perform 
his knowledgeability, and challenge others on what they knew.  
Such "outings" of one's lack of knowledge are not uncommon at tea-times 
at Germany-A, when in groups of four or five, or during chalk-talks. They are less 
common during informal beer-nights, or when senior mathematicians are present, 
but, none-the-less, the public and the private do sometimes intersect, leading to 
the backstage becoming the frontstage, and individuals finding themselves having 
to perform their knowledge in front of others. Such pressures to perform contribute 
to many mathematicians preferring to avoid tea times at Germany-A altogether, as 
well as avoid discussing mathematics with colleagues in common rooms, for fear of 
being "outed" as being ignorant of certain papers, problems or proofs.  
2.34 Setting the stage: Constructing public representations  
It is because of this pressure to perform and the fears around visibility, that it 
becomes important in investing in backstage and backchannel communication 
networks. Keeping the backstage private and invisible is achieved by filtering out 
those individuals who are anti-social and overly competitive. To facilitate such 
filtering, a researcher needs to invest in socialising with other researchers. Through 
socialising, individuals get a sense of other people's research interests, their degree 
of shared interests, their personality, and whether they are "compatible" for 
collaborating with. Socialising in common spaces, around coffee machines, or 
outside of the institute, thus are ways of building rapport and trust between 
researchers. Such rapport is important in reducing the formality of interactions, and 
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trust is important in being able to more freely exchange ideas during informal 
presentations.  
When inhabiting foreign spaces, such as institutes, individuals must begin 
the process of domesticating these new spaces, making them their own through 
personalising their surroundings. By decorating space, furnishing walls, desks, office 
doors or notice-boards with their own things, according to their own tastes, so 
individuals appropriate their office spaces, making them more "at home", more 
"domestic" and thus more informal.  The pictures below contrast an office space 
within an institute, which has relatively low levels of personal investment, 
compared to a private office at a mathematician's home department, which is fully 
personalised according to their own tastes.  
 




Figure 16 Personal investment in departmental office space, UK-B 
 
Individuals entering as visitors to institutes, once they have acquired their 
office, will only hesitantly begin the process of personalisation. The reasons for lack 
of investment in space, at both UK-A and Germany-A, are that individuals will often 
share office spaces, and so their spaces are not completely private. The short 
duration of visits, from one month to one year, also means that there is less 
likelihood that they invests in modifying their working environments. Institutional 
administrations themselves can also discourage personal investment in space, 
stressing cleanliness of workspaces, and a desire to minimize clutter and untidiness. 
This is especially important within institutes which are accessible to the public, 
where untidiness of spaces is viewed as a sign of disorganisation among the 




Figure 17 Biographical information outside of personal offices, Germany-A 
 
 





The socialisation of space, however, does occur to varying degrees, through 
the habitual occupation of certain common spaces; through the personal ownership 
of chalk/ white boards throughout the institute; and through the furnishing of office 
doors and notice boards. At Germany-A the notice-boards outside of offices have 
short research biographies posted outside them. Such biographies contain 
information about individual's research interests and the areas they're looking to 
collaborate in. They may also contain a small picture of the researcher and an 
example paper, result, or favourite visualisation that the researcher wants to show-
case. These notices can be as detailed as the researcher likes, and in some cases 
may sprawl into several pages of text. Such personalisation can thus quickly 
become another way of presenting one's ideas, and performing one's abilities and 
achievements in mathematics. Many PhD researchers may thus become 
intimidated by such displays, with their biographies reading simply: "Come inside 
and find out more!" 
The degree to which an individual feels at home in a space, that is to say the 
degree to which they domesticate a given space, is therefore dependent on how 
comfortable an individual is in performing their mathematics, and engaging in such 
displays of knowledge. For many researchers, displaying their ideas is a way of 
being "outed" as ignorant, and so many are naturally reluctant to reveal too much 
about themselves in public. Other researchers are more adept at communicating 
their research, and more confident in displaying their intellectual wares. For the 
less confident researchers, their strategy of sharing information relies on 
developing informal relationships through socialising, and then sharing information, 





Figure 19 Small group exchanges, UK-A, built up by the end of the 3rd week. 
 
Figure 20 Close work, in private spaces, UK-A 
  
Most individuals interviewed stressed the importance of trust, friendship 
and rapport in creating informal spaces within which they can test ideas and 
communicate their thoughts. Many commented that collaborators were also 
friends, highlighting the importance of friendship in making mathematics a 
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pleasurable activity. Oftentimes research can be a lonely, isolating experience, but 
the ability to communicate, socialise and work at the same time makes 
collaboration an attractive alternative to solo-work. As geometer Jason explained to 
me, the social aspects are his main motivations for creating collaborations: 
J: Yes So I really enjoy collaborating, and it is absolutely fundamental for me. 
So maybe the only time that I did not collaborate was during my PhD. And as 
soon as I discovered this interaction I completely decided that it was my way 
of doing mathematics, and it’s definitely changed the type of questions that 
I'm interested in, so when I really need ideas and motivation I really need to 
find someone to work with. I had a lot of such collaborations, maybe, well I 
never counted, but maybe 10 people. And obviously they provide very 
different motivations and change the kind of questions that I'm interested 
in. And sometimes I even choose to work with them on their problems, this 
can happen. And usually my pleasure is, that when I've understood 
something, I will go to the office of my collaborator and explain it to him. It 
is the way I like to do mathematics. For instance it's difficult for me to have 
long distance collaborations, I really need people to be here. I did it, but 
only after working with the person. Afterwards we need to fill in the details, 
finalise the project, but the active part of the collaboration was really 
together.  
And another part you may be interested in is the fact that all my 
collaborators are my friends… I believe that doing maths should be a 
pleasure. In some sense this is broken if you don’t have a good relationship 
with someone. I don't know how it works…My motivation when we start 
collaborating, we spend a lot of time at the blackboard saying: "I don't know 
how to do that, I don't understand that" - and usually when I come back to 
my office if I have the motivation to spend a lot of time trying to solve this 
specific problem because I want to help, to give this pleasure to this 
collaborator. It’s really a kind of service. For that I want is to give something 
back, you understand that?  
 
Above we see how collaboration becomes more than just seeking new ideas or 
problems, or increasing productivity through co-authored articles. The 
collaboration sometimes is not simply a means to an end - the production of papers 
or grant proposals - but rather it becomes an end in itself, through the creation of 
friendships. Jason speaks of the pleasure of collaborating, and of how producing 
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papers serves to strengthen the relationships with his collaborators. Jason describes 
how his motivations to solve a collaborative problem are not necessarily because of 
a need to produce papers, but rather to strengthen the bonds of friendship 
between his collaborators. Such collaborations, he argues, are based on reciprocity, 
and the exchange of gifts between himself and his collaborators.  
The case above stresses the importance of the inter-personal, informal, 
aspects of knowledge production in mathematics. The emphasis is on developing 
friendships and furnishing the private, back-stage world. Here researchers are 
motivated by working with others and building friendships, rather than just 
publishing to survive within the competitive world of mathematics. Of course the 
interviewee recognises that the pressures to be productive do exist, and that such 
pressures do force an individual to collaborate with people they would not consider 
to be friends. However sometimes such collaborations are unsuccessful, as Jason 
tells me in the following: 
J: I cannot imagine having collaboration without this very close relationship. 
I had once a collaborator who didn't work out because of an incompatibility 
of character, or something - it just didn't go well - it was a very bad moment 
for me and I really saw that it was impossible for me to do maths with 
somebody that I wasn't really friends with. But I have a lot of other friends 
who are mathematicians   
I just had this bad experience and I had to just stop completely. And I 
had to say “no”; and it was hard for me to continue, and I had to say to this 
person "I'm sorry but I just can't go further". Well we had this small 
problem, but maybe for him it was something he could put to one side and 
go on working, because we had a lot of things to do, but for me it was too 
hard. I really noticed that I couldn't collaborate anymore, and I had to say to 
him directly, because he didn't understand that. It was very hard but I 
decided to go and say "I'm sorry but…" maybe I didn't really say the exact 
reason, but I had to say to him directly that I had to stop the collaboration. It 
was really, completely emotional in some sense, nothing to do with 
mathematics. And at the same time collaboration, scientific collaboration is 
much to do with relationships, maybe.  
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Here the reason for collaborating was oriented towards publication, rather than the 
fostering of social relations. Ultimately the market nature of the exchange 
conflicted with Jason's social need to create friendships, leading to the termination 
of the collaboration. The pressure to be productive influences many individuals in 
their decisions to collaborate. Often the case is that collaboration is undertaken not 
out of pleasure, but out of necessity. Collaborating becomes a strategy for 
producing more articles, and fulfilling certain funding criteria, which often succeed 
through using key words such as "interdisciplinary" or "collaborative" in their 
proposals. 
Indeed the rhetoric around collaboration, and the focus on measuring one's 
productivity, through successful grant applications or published articles, leads to 
"collaboration" being valued not as an end in itself, but rather as a means to 
produce "collaborative" publications. The field thus transforms this informal, 
private, gift exchange into a much more visible, public, market exchange of ideas. 
What had once happened spontaneously, in a researcher’s home department, in 
the home, or around a coffee, beer, or lunch, now has become operationalised 
within institutes as a means of making the process of collaborative knowledge-
production more predictable, efficient and measurable. In this movement from the 
backstage to the frontstage the field of production and competition becomes 
visible. The seeming disinterestedness of knowledge-for-knowledge’s-sake gives 
way to the self-interestedness of the game of capital pursuits. The visibility of ideas 
thus makes knowledge public and thus transforms it into a form of social capital, a 
status symbol, whose possession leads to a repositioning of the individual within 
the field of production.   
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2.35 Creating common ground: Negotiating performances of the self.     
Ideas are becoming ever more global, visible and accessible since the advent of the 
internet. Researcher productivity is likewise being subject to measurement, with 
research output itself being more easily measured. With increasing information on 
researcher outputs: from lectures given, collaborations formed, awards obtained, 
conferences attended, or papers produced, so individuals are more easily compared 
against one another, and ranked as a result. The by-products of this visibility, 
accessibility and measurability are that individuals are better able to compete 
against one another for scarce resources, such as grants and research positions. A 
researcher’s intellectual and professional life is increasingly available for public 
consumption, and thus individuals feel a need, or pressure, to perform their 
mathematics. But this increased visibility and competition is of course not 
completely negative, as Benjamin comments below: 
BN:  You can now, for example, 20 years ago, when you heard a name, 
unless they were very famous, like super famous people like Atiyah, 
Grothendiek, Fields medal winners, of course you would know who they 
were, but of course there were people who were lower down the foodchain, 
you really had no idea what they did. Now you can go to mathematics 
reviews and you see everything that they did, or use the Arxiv. So its 
enormously competitive, so that when you hear a name you don't know, 
and you want to know what they did, you can find out. And it’s very good. 
It’s more competitive, but I mean in a good way. There's much much more 
information. So if I want to talk to somebody who knows x, y or z then I can. 
In the old days this was a big problem, you had a graduate student and you 
gave him or her a problem and they worked hard at it, and they did it or 
didn't do it or whatever, and then you find out that someone somewhere 
else has done this - this cannot happen now. I mean it really is the 
supervisor’s fault. In the old days you could be ignorant - there was no way 
of finding out who wrote PhD theses - now you can of course hide from the 
internet, if you want to. But by and large, as I say to my students, the first 
thing you do when you write your thesis is that you post it on the internet, 




Benjamin highlights that this increased visibility does make the field more 
competitive, but such competition has positive aspects. Visibility, through the 
internet, makes the once invisible work of some mathematicians more accessible 
and visible through search engines. Individuals can now better understand where in 
the field they can make a contribution, and can measure their impact on their field 
and on other researchers, through measuring citation counts, or other bibliometric 
data. Individuals can access potential collaborators through googling their names, 
or else obtaining information on personal web-pages, or on reference databases. 
The field of competition and display thus is moved from local contexts, to become 
global in character. Such a move towards globalised knowledge-production and 
competition presents opportunities for some individuals to perform their 
knowledge, but disadvantages others who may be less confident, or less willing, to 
present their research, or those who are more modest, or introverted in 
disposition.  
Many see the mathematical field as a competitive field, a battlefield, where 
they must compete against other researchers for scarce resources. Researchers are 
taught earlier on in their careers, during their PhDs, to have papers in mind for 
publication, to be on the look-out for potential collaborators, as well as to hone 
their performances during chalk-talks. Increasingly, as information flows freely 
through blogs, forums, social media, friendship networks, through supervisors, or 
through institutions, so individuals become habituated to becoming expert 
performers of their knowledge, as well as expert strategists in planning their 
professional development.  
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Such an awareness of the field appears to be the result of the visibility and 
survey-ability of knowledge-production within the community. Among the 
researchers interviewed, there is an awareness of their place within the 
community, of who their competitors are, of who knows what, and what actions 
they need to take to develop their careers, connections and knowledge. The very 
fact that the individuals were present at the institutes marked them already as 
having found success along their mathematical career paths. Such success, 
however, was achieved through individual's own personal negotiations with the 
field of production, through their own personal strategies for managing the ways in 
which they present and position themselves and their knowledge.  
The presentation of self within mathematics institutes provides us, as social 
scientists, with some insight into the day-to-day processes by which knowledge is 
communicated and constructed. We see that not all performances are designed for 
public display. Rather, successful performances are based upon balancing action 
within the public, frontstage, with the private, backstage. Both these theatres for 
action are important stages upon which social actors can perform their identities. It 
is through the assembling various spaces of institutes into stages for performing 
mathematics that individuals carve out a niche for themselves and their ideas 
within the wider mathematical field. Within institutes we have seen how individuals 
adopt and adapt their surrounding habitus to their own personal needs.  
At the institutes we are provided with microcosms for studying the different 
realisations of mathematical habitus. We come to see that institutional spaces do 
not simply imprint their socio-cultural scripts upon the individual, but rather the 
197 
 
process of domestication of space is dialectical in nature, and negotiated through 
practice.  
Individuals assemble spaces for their own needs, personalising them, 
investing them with meaning, constructing the backstage and frontstage, producing 
formal and informal spaces according to how they wish to present themselves and 
their ideas. The processes of assembling space and performing one’s self and one’s 
knowledge within such spaces are selective, experimental, and evolve over time. 
Certain stages are important earlier on in the process of concept development, 
such as the informality of the backstage, whereas, as concepts gain their strength, 
so they are tested in more public arenas, such as during chalk-talks, which then can 
provide opportunities for growing a researcher’s social network and increasing their 
reputation and esteem (social capital) amongst the community.  
The path from problem to proof thus is a process of negotiating the formal 
and informal, the visible and the invisible, the public and the private. The assembly 
of physical spaces is an important part of this negotiation process, as is the 
assembly of a researcher’s social network. The institute provides a common space 
within which the mechanisms for knowledge production can be assembled 
together; the institute enframes the theatres of performance, the actors and their 
activities. We see that the sites, the physical spaces and architectures of the 
institute, shape mathematical production.  
We have also seen how dispositions are generated by inhabiting and 
domesticating space, and how movement between public and private spaces alters 
the presentation and performances of a researcher’s ideas. But the questions that I 
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want to address, in the following chapter, will be around how these ideas of the 
frontstage and backstage, the private and the public, the visible and the invisible, 
shape the conceptual spaces which mathematicians inhabit. I want now to move on 
to a discussion of how the processes of crafting and domesticating conceptual 
spaces bears certain family resemblances to the ways in which physical space is 
given structure and order. In the next chapter we move from the performance of 





































Chapter 3: Conceptual Spaces  
 
3.0 Overview  
 
Here I establish how mathematicians position themselves within conceptual spaces. 
I chart out how perspectival frames are generated through becoming socialised 
within the mathematical field. The perspective a mathematician adopts depends 
upon their position within the field of production, which are products of education, 
social relations, and possession of social capital. Such positioning shapes 
individuals' orientations towards phenomena, and thus shapes the reference 
frames by which mathematical phenomena are construed.  
I argue that perceptual frames are crafted through a mathematician's 
situated engagements with mathematical problems. Through such engagements 
mathematicians construct frameworks of reference objects, by which to orient their 
perspective of the field. These reference frames serve as bases for differentiating, 
relating and categorising mathematical phenomena. Operations of position, 
differentiation and integration are used in perceiving and classifying mathematical 
spaces. I shall argue that the schemas used in organising perception of conceptual 






Section 3.1: Shaping the Conceptual Habitus 
 
3.10 Overview of Section 
The following section explores the ways in which mathematicians become 
habituated to thinking about mathematical objects and spaces. Using interviews 
taken from across my field sites I will analyse how mathematicians gain intuition 
about mathematical phenomenon. I will study how this intuition is built up through 
becoming familiarised with certain viewpoints, techniques and canonical examples. 
We shall see how PhD problems serve as starting points for exploration within 
mathematical spaces, how such PhD problems are inherited from supervisors, and 
how these initial problems go on to shape a mathematician's later research 
interests.   
3.11 Introduction  
Much of a mathematician's day to day work is invisible, not subject to measure, not 
counted as productive, nor articulated as important. This invisible work takes the 
form of emails sent and received; conversations with colleagues or students; 
references written; applications sent, received, reviewed; meetings attended; 
lectures given. Such work falls to the background of the day-to-day, and yet even 
more work remains hidden from view: in the hours spent in silence, thinking; in the 
sketching of a figure on a scratch-paper note; in the endless figuring and erasing at 
the blackboard. Within departments, within institutes, there is much work that is 
not measured, but still is essential to producing and disseminating knowledge 
within mathematics. The contours of the working day thus change as the 
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mathematician balances competing demands: a meeting, a lecture, an email. As 
differential geometer Ivan says below, there are no average days, but within such 
busy working days there are moments of escape, where he can turn towards 
mathematics, not only as work, but also as leisure: 
I: So my favourite periods are the periods when I can just think, sit down and 
think peacefully. Well it happens, but sometimes I need to write something. 
In particular it can happen that I need to write down some parts of an 
article, in this case I just try to write, but there are also other things that one 
has to write from time to time, there are also some recommendation 
letters, other letters and other administration duties, so it really depends on 
what I need to do at any particular time. From time to time I need to, after 
exams, I need to grade. And this also takes some time. It's probably, for me, 
it's an important advantage of this profession in that, in a sense all the days 
are different. I don’t really know what my average day is.  
There are many various things that should be done and I try to mix 
them somehow, I try not to spend too much time on my emails, but on the 
other hand if I don't look at my email box for the whole day, then the next 
day, at least at the beginning of the next day is a nightmare as I have 50 
messages to treat. So I don't know how to answer the question of an 
average day, and I think it’s a good thing. I don't really like the idea of some 
typical day. And well from time to time I need to work more intensively 
because when I have some idea I prefer to think and not to be disturbed by 
other things. In this case I can think more or less in any place, it’s not 
important for me to be in my office, I can think at home, it’s completely OK. 
From time to time, when I'm tired and something doesn’t work, [phone 
rings] I'm sorry.  
  
Above we see the burdens of invisible work, as well as the ways in which Ivan 
balances the competing demands on his time. Only a small fraction of the narrative 
relates to the writing up of a paper, the rest is devoted to administrative work, and 
most importantly to the work of "thinking". Such knowledge work is again mostly 




Research consists of reading and writing papers, books, proofs; attending 
and giving lectures; creating and giving presentations; discussing and collaborating 
with other researchers; exploring and experimenting with ideas, as well as 
generating problems and solutions. To seasoned mathematicians and researchers, 
these qualifications of what research entails may appear obvious. These activities 
have become naturalised into one's work routines and they have ceased to be 
pondered, or spoken about. But for a graduate student the meaning of "research" is 
not yet fully understood. What it means to experiment, find a problem, produce a 
paper, construct a proof - all these constituents to mathematical activity are known 
in principle, but are alien in practice. So how then does a mathematician learn to 
produce mathematics, and to think "mathematically"? We shall explore this process 
of learning to become a mathematician by attempting to understand the means by 
which graduates learn the tools of the trade, and become familiarised (socialised) 
within mathematical spaces. We start at the beginning, in the act of finding a good 
supervisor and research problem.    
3.12 Learning to see: How are research questions found in mathematics?  
The first stage in a graduate mathematician's career begins with selecting a 
supervisor. Oftentimes such supervisors are chosen on the basis of 
recommendations from other students or professors; through google searches on 
departmental websites; through familiarity with published works or previous 
teaching experience; or through simply random choices within a general area of 
interest. Another guiding factor in choosing one's supervisor is the degree of 
familiarity an individual has with a given area of mathematics. They may have 
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enjoyed classes or readings in algebraic topology, analysis, or arithmetic geometry 
etc. Such preferences help define their choice of research area to work in. But, as is 
often the case, graduates do not go into their graduate degree having concrete 
questions or problems in mind. Rather their level of understanding of a given field is 
rather limited, and thus a concrete and interesting problem is not yet within their 
grasp.  
Because of the graduate's limited vision of the field of enquiry, the 
supervisor must help guide the student's research and their interests in certain 
directions, in order to narrow down their research questions. According to the 
mathematicians interviewed, narrowing the field of possibilities can take the form 
of providing "interesting" papers, or, as is mostly the case, of directly gifting a 
problem to a PhD student. Such a gift helps orient the researcher within the field, 
and puts some limits on the boundaries of their explorations. The limited vision of 
the young researcher means, as Martin says below, that the PhD must “advance in 
the dark”, trusting that their supervisor has furnished them with a concrete, precise 
and interesting enough question: 
M: When you're going to start a PhD in mathematics it has to be very 
specific. If you are going to start a PhD in pure mathematics someone starts 
by saying that this is an interesting question, and you have no way of 
knowing and understanding "what does that mean, what is that question?" 
You have to advance in the dark.  
In order to do your own research you have to understand what the 
state of the art is. And this can be Impossible. So that’s the kind of 
contradiction to start with, you don’t even know what people are doing, so 




Due to the rapid pace of developments within mathematics, and the abundance of 
publications, a young researcher can quickly become overwhelmed by the vastness 
of the intellectual landscape. For Martin this vast landscape is conceived of as a 
desert, which lacks familiar landmarks, is hostile and dangerous: 
M: Because, of course, after a while, it may be typical of the PhD, but you 
have to cross the desert, and once you've done that, you have some 
experience, and you have your own questions. And in the end the rich thing 
that you've developed are that you have your own questions - the questions 
that came from you.  
 
Crossing the intellectual "desert" is an act of taming or domesticating the foreign 
problem that the researcher first confronted, making a once strange and alien 
landscape habitable and familiar. Through this intellectual struggle, Martin 
describes how he gained the skills and experience to find his own problems, and 
survive within the wider mathematical world. Martin below describes the 
experience of choosing his thesis advisor and receiving a PhD question:   
M: Knot theory is kind of beautiful, but also a specific field of geometry and 
topology, and so in the lab where I did my first year before I had to choose a 
PhD advisor, there was a Romanian guy who was extremely vague all the 
time. Kind of vague about many things, and in many aspects had ways of 
thinking about mathematics which are opposite mine. As, in order to 
understand something, I need some precision of mind. But he had obviously 
a very broad knowledge of what was going on, so I went to him and said 
"Please give me a PhD question", and he said "OK, so here is your question!"  
And I had no idea of what that meant, what the picture was behind 
everything, but I had the trust that he knew what kind of things I liked, and 
so there was the confidence that he could give me a question that would fit 
somehow. There is a lot of danger in this procedure of choosing the right 
PhD advisor. There is no solution to this problem, you just have to try and 
see what comes afterwards I think. And when I started to understand the 
question years later, then it turned out to be a question that I liked very 




The quote above highlights the degree of trust invested with the supervisor, as the 
student does not have sufficient knowledge to evaluate the quality of the questions 
gifted to them. It is only years later, towards the end of his PhD, that Martin 
recognises the problem as being a good one to have tackled. But for other 
researchers there are many dangers associated with being gifted a problem, as 
Martin recounts: 
M: Sometimes I still meet regularly my PhD advisor and we were talking 
about someone of my age, comparing careers, and everything, and he told 
me: "Oh this guy never got out of his PhD question", and I told him: "Come 
on, you know I never did either!", and he said: "No, no you did things 
completely different" -that’s very subjective.   
 
Some students in mathematics are unable to find a solution to their PhD problems, 
and thus are unable to complete their studies in mathematics. Martin too recalls 
how he could not directly tackle the question he had been given, after he 
discovered the history and difficulties in developing a proof for it:  
M: I did not answer this question [laughs]. Because I couldn’t do that. First 
of all I started to try and understand what was already known about this 
guy, and this goes back to Poincaré. And there's a lot of literature to read 
about this stuff, and there's an enormous amount to read. And this guy has 
a finite number of connected components and one of these connected 
components is called a Teichmüller space, and it's very classical. And 
actually the question of my thesis, which I didn’t know at first, was to try 
and understand to what extent a Teichmüller space could be transposed to 
the other connected components… So I started out - I don’t even know why 
- but to understand if for that very specific thing I could extend something to 
the other connected components, and actually at the end of my PhD it was 
bad, because I had no result and my PhD advisor was not happy any more.  
M: In the end I tried to prove that something you could say about 
Teichmüller spaces could be said about this space. And I used something 
relatively simple, that would be simple to prove. And I could get my PhD and 
have it over with. So I took this property and I tried to prove that it could be 
extended. So I took a plan, propositions, etc. to make a proof. And then I 
had something, and I was requested to do talks at conferences. This was 
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really the end of my PhD, so I had to hurry and write something. And then I 
started to sit down and prove the lemmas, and realised that there was a 
major gap in the lemma that I thought was true. And this gap became bigger 
and bigger and gave me counter examples to the whole thing. And so this 
very reasonable thing that you thought "OK, this is going to extend", seeing 
that this does not is so surprising that, in the end, it made a very interesting 
PhD; and now look, I'm here! [At the institute] 
M: This happens a lot in mathematics: that you think that something 
is true and you start to write the proof and, at some point, you see that 
there is a gap, and a counter example to the whole thing might very well 
come from this gap. But this was a big piece of luck… This very first question 
is still open, and I had no idea before starting my PhD, but the very same 
question has recurrently been the question of many PhD students, starting 
from the 80s. All these people who tried to solve the same problem, they all 
did something else, or maybe they didn’t do anything. But yeah, that’s a 
good problem, in the sense that it’s asking about something that we don’t 
really understand. But we understand it enough to be able to ask a lot of 
questions, and some of then we have no idea, and that’s a good source of 
research because that means that’s a good place to dig. 
 
For Martin the initial problem he started with was not the final problem he ended 
up proving. This is indeed common among many research mathematicians. Through 
the process of engaging with a question they discover different problems, new 
approaches, dead-ends or counter-examples. Their problem evolves as their 
knowledge of mathematics matures. As Martin experienced, starting off with a 
large, open question, he eventually developed a simpler, more specific question, 
which related to the original problem. When first approaching the problem, the 
researcher is somewhat naïve, and does not have a sophisticated enough 
understanding of the mathematical landscape to see the full complexity of their 
problem. But, over time, a researcher's vision matures, and they are able to see the 
relatedness of their problem to other problems, and to other objects within the 
mathematical landscape. This "double vision" is highlighted in the following quote 
from Martin, when asked to explain his PhD research problem in detail:   
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M: So that's math. Can I use the board? [Erases board].  So I can try to tell 
you, from the perspective of the student, what the question was; or I can try 
to explain from the viewpoint, now, what the question is. They are different 
- completely. It's because when you ask a question, if it's not too naive a 
question, then there are many connections to many problems. If you have 
no idea, then it's just a bare question. Once you understand the relations, 
which requires you have read the literature, you see this from above. Then 
one question is linked to other similar questions which, to the student, are 
very different questions, but which are essentially the same question.  
 
As the quote above suggests, there are multiple perspectives from which to view 
research problems. A mathematician’s vision of the problem changes as they learn 
a given mathematical language, and learn the necessary vocabulary by which 
certain phenomena can be discriminated and discerned. Through developing their 
mathematical vocabulary, they are able to "see" certain objects as belonging to 
certain conceptual categories. By being able to identify such objects, the researcher 
is then able to relate them to similar objects, which are already present in their 
classificatory system. The researcher is then able to "see", or perceive, objects or 
problems as belonging to certain categories, because of their shared sets of 
features, or family resemblances.  
 
3.13 The guiding hand: What influences research directions?  
The ways in which mathematical objects are perceived are shaped by the 
mathematical tools, objects and literature that a mathematician is exposed to 
during their research life. This corpus of ideas forms the backdrop against which 
their research questions are given meaning and related to. The ways in which a 
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researcher confronts a problem is thus mediated by the conceptual tools and 
vocabulary that they have acquired throughout the course of their education.  
This mathematical corpus forms part of the habitus: the system of scheme-
resource sets which produce orientations and dispositions towards phenomena. 
The conceptual machinery that a mathematician acquires thus serves to produce a 
certain way of perceiving mathematical objects and spaces, and also generates 
dispositions by which they are able to confront problems within certain 
mathematical domains. Through becoming familiarised with certain techniques, 
objects, languages or papers, mathematicians furnish their habitus, and this, in 
turn, re-shapes the perceptual lenses by which they are able to perceive a problem.  
For a mathematician to be able to discern features in the mathematical 
landscape, they must first be able to give structure to their perceptual stimuli. 
These structures are provided through the mathematical languages they learn, 
through the rule systems they adopt, and through the exemplar objects they use to 
ground their understandings. Mathematicians spoke to me about the importance of 
having examples, which ground their understanding of a theory or proof. Such 
examples provide concrete demonstrations of how a proof or technique works, or 
what a given object "looks like" or "relates to". For a PhD student these exemplar 
objects form part of the working vocabulary they will need to solve their problem. 
The first examples they grasp form fixed points, or landmarks, within the landscape, 




For many PhD researchers the supervisor provides much of the motivation 
and conceptual machinery for tackling a problem. Some advisors have a more 
laissez-faire approach to supervision, encouraging their students to explore and 
think independently. Other, less experienced researchers, however, require more 
guidance, as oftentimes they may come from outside of a specific research domain, 
and have not yet developed a working vocabulary adapted to tackle their PhD 
question. The advisor, in this case, takes a more active role in the student's 
research, providing papers, problems, and explanations to guide the researcher's 
enquiries. As one PhD student, Jenny, tells me:  
J: So I didn't really have this knowledge before. My advisor - I think you met 
my advisor - so he knows a lot of things, so he explained to me a lot of 
things in topology and dynamical systems. So in these kind of things there 
are good books to read.  So actually it's really hard for me to read math, and 
so it's good to have somebody who can explain stuff. That's why my advisor 
is good. But there are a lot of things that I don’t know. Sometimes he's 
telling me that I should read that and I print it and I think - "uh-huh" - and 
then you just look at this thing for 2 hours and it turns out you've just read 
one page.   
J: So yes he told me to read this one article and said I would 
understand things. But it was not well written, it was something like 30 
pages. He said "OK, so if you read it in the first year it will be good for you". I 
said "30 pages in one year?…yes I can do that [laughs]". But this was really 
hard. For every word you have to understand a lot of things. You can read 
that, that, that, that and you just get used to the different notions.  
He had a lot of time for me, so I could just discuss about things, and 
he explained a lot of things to me. It's easier to read when someone explains 
the story before. I mean you don’t have the details but you know where 
you're going, and you just fill in the details when you read. 
 
 
Here Jenny explains how her advisor influences her research directions, by 
providing exemplar proofs and papers containing certain tools and or objects 
related to her research interests. The advisor, in providing such material, creates 
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anchor points in the mathematical landscape around which her future explorations 
will be oriented. The 30 page paper she speaks of provides a concrete starting 
point, from which she can begin building up her mathematical vocabulary. Every 
word needs to be unpacked and explored, in order to understand the bigger picture 
that is being discussed. Through such an unpicking and unpacking process, she can 
start to familiarise herself with the mathematical landscape she finds herself in. 
Through the advisor providing the "story", or the motivation, behind the paper, 
giving summaries and explanations, Jenny is able to orient herself and knows the 
research direction she's going in.  
This form of guided discovery in mathematics, is mirrored in another 
interview with a PhD student called Marie. Below we see how Marie's supervisor 
(Estevan) introduces her to a new domain in mathematics called "Contactology", 
and how, eventually, she is able to build up her own vision of the mathematical 
landscape, developing her own questions and interests in the process:  
M: I think, in principle, he wants me to be free and encourages me to do 
what I like. It's not over-protective, but he holds my hand all the time. I can 
see him every day in a week for discussion - he's really present, you know. I 
don’t know if he's really orienting me, but he's there to speak about 
anything I want to talk about. It was a little risky, Estevan  was not in the 
same domain that I was working in when I started my PhD - I was doing 
algebraic topology and knot theory, so I didn’t know about contact topology, 
or differential topology. So for the first 6 months of my PhD he taught me 
everything about that. So I didn’t know any of the questions in that domain. 
So he helped form that domain and presented to me all my objects and 
questions, and now they're natural for me. He presented the questions by 
himself and others were coming from me. Maybe I'm able to formulate an 
interesting question just now, over this one year maybe, before it was 
always suggested by Estevan.  
M: I wasn’t saying "Why is that interesting?" I was careful, I didn't 
know him - the student must be interested all the time. Now I'm asking 
questions all the time, saying "why am I doing that?" Before I was not asking 
questions, because I did not want him to think that I am so stupid. So there 
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were many complexities and I didn’t want him to think that I was so stupid. 
Now that I know him, I don’t mind asking stupid questions. Even if I try to 
hide it, he knows that I'm stupid, so it's OK. The manner to catch me was 
through the blackboard, and through the discussion. I need to have a person 
motivated to present to me the ideas and the drawings. Really he was able 
to draw contact topology, and so I came into the contact world through the 
drawings, because the formulas are absolutely not able to speak to me.  
 
The above interview with Marie also shows the evolution of the relationship 
between student and advisor over the course of the PhD. Marie above starts off as 
a passive receiver of information, simply learning the language and absorbing the 
tools that she has been given. However, as the PhD progresses, and she gains 
familiarity over the tools and the domain, she is better able to interrogate the 
information that her advisor is providing her with. As she becomes more confident 
so she becomes less fearful of appearing ignorant and, instead, more actively wants 
to interrogate the objects and the supervisor himself. Through both the student 
and advisor inhabiting shared conceptual spaces they are, over time, able to 
establish some common ground by which to discuss shared objects. Marie, below, 
discusses this process of building up her "tool-box" of concepts, and expanding her 
tool-box according to the needs of the problem at hand: 
M: I can learn a language if I need it. I learn the first toolbox to survive, and 
it’s the same with mathematics. I learn a small tool box to survive and then I 
play with it. But to really master the discipline or master English, that is 
another step for which I need another strong motivation to go there. I don’t 
need this motivation in English because we speak a lot of French here. And I 
don’t have a strong motivation in symplectic geometry either, because I'm 
still satisfied with my little tools. I'm happy like that right now.  
 
Here we see how Marie's vision of the mathematical landscape is expanded 
incrementally, through "playing around" with a small set of tools and objects. Her 
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motivations are not to develop a big picture of the field of symplectic geometry and 
how it relates to the wider field of differential geometry, but rather it is to equip 
herself with tools by which she is better able to explore her given objects, with finer 
and finer detail. In this case the wider field falls out of focus, and it is the specific 
features within the landscape attract her attention.  
3.14 Shaping perception: How are habitus constructed? 
This question of what to attend to in the mathematical landscape is a question 
again of perception and discernment. In the case of the relationship between 
advisor and student, the advisor is teaching his students how to see features in the 
mathematical landscape. For Marie and Jenny, their objectives were to develop a 
working vocabulary by which to discern such features, and to speak about them 
with their supervisors. In the day to day life of research mathematicians, this need 
to establish a working vocabulary is equally important. As Martin tells me, 
researchers need constantly to communicate with other mathematicians and learn 
new things, in order to participate in the research community: 
M: You have the danger of dying. You have to keep alive. You have to keep 
doing things that you want so much to know the answers to. You must be 
able to hurt yourself to know the answer. That’s being alive. If you have too 
much teaching, that’s the danger in research. You need to keep alive, but 
also you want to try to talk with people around you. And you want to get 
out with something. I think it's difficult, during the first years. Of course PhD 
is difficult because you have to cross the desert, but even afterwards you 
have to survive. The fact is that you change completely the environment 
[when entering a new institute], and the mathematical objects that other 
people around you are familiar with change too. And you have to work with 
these new things. And I'm sure that many people don’t even see these 




In order to “keep alive” within the mathematical landscape, a researcher has to 
adapt to their changing environments, and learn new languages by which to 
communicate with their colleagues. Over time, they need to learn new vocabularies 
and gain access to new ways of inhabiting and exploring the mathematical 
landscape. This process of developing a shared working vocabulary is not confined 
to the office, the institute, or the seminar room, but as the following conversation 
with Han and Bernie indicates, the process of building a shared knowledge base is 
continuous, happening throughout the working day: 
H: This is very important: the word vocabulary. Because this vocabulary has 
built up not only through working one day a week, but this vocabulary has 
been created when going to take a  drink, or when walking, or when talking 
about another subject. This vocabulary pops up in math, so it's difficult to 
say. Every day there is new input into this vocabulary. It took us really one 
month to have a common vocabulary, but this vocabulary has become richer 
and richer with time.  
B: But it was about one month, and we could speak to one another, 
and we knew what the other guy was talking about. But we did other things. 
During this month we were explaining and asking and saying "I do not 
understand could you explain in more detail?"  
H: This is like what we said at lunch, he was speaking German and I 
was speaking in French...  
 
The above dialogue reveals that one’s dispositions and orientations towards 
phenomena are continuously being shaped throughout one's working life. Habitus 
thus are not bounded and discretised within the confines of a mathematical 
institute, but rather expands out, in a continuous fashion, into one's day-to-day 
world. The conceptual space thus intersects with one's social spaces. The same is 
true for the PhD student who is likewise affected by their environment. As 
topologist Nigel says below, the influences on his research, and on the shaping of 
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his perception, came not only from his supervisor, but also from other PhD 
students, as well as other members of the department: 
N: In my case I'm not sure so much, because it turns out that I didn't really 
work on his [his advisor's] subject. So he worked on the topology of spaces 
with 3 dimensional coordinates. But the conjecture he mentioned to me was 
for any dimension. And it turned out that I spent much of my time working 
on higher dimensional space, related to arithmetic constructions, so coming 
from number theory. So I got quite early, quite far from his own interests. 
So of course he shaped some part of my work. But [it was] the direction of 
the entire department - where other members played a role, not only my 
official advisor. I discussed quite a lot with other PhD students and other 
researchers, and so the whole was important.  
 
Although the advisor does have a central role in shaping the development of a 
researcher's perception of the field, they are not solely responsible for the 
intellectual maturation of a researcher. Often, when researchers are questioned, 
there are rarely defining, eureka moments, where they can pin-point the origins of 
a concept. Rather the process of proving is articulated as existing along a spectrum 
of events, from which ideas evolve. The student must assemble knowledge 
together from multiple domains, and select certain elements from the continuous 
stream of stimuli into something coherent. The wider environment within which 
the researcher is placed thus creates a field of force, which shapes the researcher's 
thoughts in a given direction. But, ultimately, it is as a consequence of the 
researcher's choices that certain elements are selected and assembled together 
into a system of thought, which goes on to produce a proof or publication.  
The systems of dispositions which constitute habitus are thus constructed 
through both passive and active processes of adopting and assimilating new tools 
and vocabularies. The process of learning to see the mathematical landscape is, at 
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first, guided by the student either finding their own research problem or being 
gifted one by their advisor. Such initial problems form the starting point from which 
they can begin their mathematical explorations. At first these explorations prove 
difficult, as researchers advance in the dark, unable to fully grasp the relevance of 
their investigations. The mathematical landscape appears foreign and hostile to the 
researcher, as they begin to cross the mathematical desert. But, over time, their 
vision of the mathematical landscape changes as their knowledge grows, as 
landmarks appear, and as they become more familiar with the spaces they are 
inhabiting.  
We shall see in the next section how, through the mastery of technique, the 
tools and language of mathematics are moved to the background of consciousness. 
The perception of the mathematical landscape becomes second nature, and the 
researcher learns to use their intuition. We shall explore the processes by which the 
language of mathematics becomes naturalised and backgrounded, so that working 
memory is freed up, in order to focus on the process of discovery, creativity, and 
assembly. Mathematics, we shall see, becomes a craft, and the mathematician is 








Section 3.2: The Mathematician’s Craft  
 
3.20 Overview  
The following section will explore the practices involved in assembling and 
experimenting with mathematical constructions. Mathematics we shall see can be 
thought of as a form of craftwork, involving very physical engagements with 
material artefacts. Mathematics thus is not a purely abstract system of symbolic 
manipulation, but rather it is also a subjective process rooted in the body and 
extended out into the physical world. This role of the body is played out through 
the practices involved in constructing mathematical proofs. It is through 
manipulating material representations by assembling, selecting, sorting, ordering, 
tinkering and relating that the mathematician builds up the machinery of proof.    
3.21 Introduction  
Once mathematicians have gained proficiency in a language, once they have built 
up a certain set of conceptual tools and working habits, so they are able to start 
perceiving features of the mathematical landscape. With perception comes the 
ability to explore the landscape, and to identify new features within it. But 
discovery is not a passive process, as we have seen in the previous chapter, it is an 
active process of interrogation of a problem.  
Through such guided questioning the map of the landscape becomes more 
detailed, and the mathematician becomes more attuned to the possible paths they 
can take to navigate around problems. This process of navigating through the 
mathematical landscape involves first rooting this abstract space within the physical 
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world. Through inscribing mathematical concepts on blackboards and paper the 
mathematician objectifies mathematical reality, and makes such reality visible and 
accessible to manipulation. In the following section we shall see how this process of 
assembling and manipulating mathematical reality takes place. Through studying 
such construction processes in terms of craft-work, we shall see how the 
mathematician comes to resemble a bricoleur.    
3.22 Practicing mathematics: Documenting the mathematician’s craft 
We have seen already how different work-spaces are assembled throughout the 
working day, as well as the different routines which take place within such spaces. 
Now we turn towards exploring the work processes themselves, and the life-
histories of problems and proofs. The creative work of the mathematician extends 
out of the office spaces, following the mathematician wherever they go. My 
interviews suggest that the problem is worked away in the backstage of the 
unconscious mind, as well as on the frontstage of consciousness. As one 
mathematician, Gordon, explains to me, thinking is process of rumination, of 
chewing over and digesting ideas; and such ideas follow the mathematician around, 
both in their minds, as well as in their notebooks: 
G:  In the last 40 years I simply never spent a week without thinking about 
mathematics, a day yes, but not a week. It's like ruminating you know, we're 
like cows but what we eat is mathematics. It’s a long rumination. Some 
people work late at night, and usually the best are like that and I'm not one 
of the best. For me it's like a long rumination, OK, mathematics is with you 
whatever you do.  You can go and something else, of course, but it is always 
escorting you around. I was mentioning these notebooks, they are with me 
essentially always, and sometimes I don’t touch them for a week because 




The thought process extends out into the world, and the origins of ideas often 
cannot be neatly packaged into a single event or eureka moment. Rather thinking is 
a messy process of assembling knowledge together, of digesting it, chewing it over, 
processing and reprocessing it, searching for patterns, or else experimenting with 
different possibilities, until finally thoughts are distilled and ordered into some 
argument or construction. The dislocations and disordering of the thinking process 
gains visibility in office spaces, with the various scratch paper notes, articles, 
chalked-out blackboards, inked whiteboards, and window-laden computer screens 
giving testimony to the eclectic and multi-faceted nature of research.  
 




The mathematician's notebook also bears testimony to the eclectic nature of 
thinking. As Gordon tells me, his notebook is always present, in order to jot down a 
thought or to sketch something out. Notebooks collect such fleeting thoughts, and 
form an assemblage of heterogeneous entities, bringing together elements such as 
calculations, sketches of geometric objects, idle scribblings, to-do lists, lecture 
notes, theorems, definitions, or references. The notebooks can contain fully 
developed proofs, or they may just house experiments or vague ideas. There is thus 
no "typical" notebook, only individual examples within the genre. Such notebooks 
are very personal to the mathematician and they reflect idiosyncratic ways of 
"figuring out" problems. Below, Nemo guides me through one of his own 
notebooks, walking me through certain representations: 
N: I have mathematical notes but it's still vague, when I write down, it’s still 
at the early stage and it’s really badly handwritten. It’s more like a collection 
of "Oh this can work like that" or else just sentences to myself. But I can 
show you this. So currently [flicks through notebooks] it’s a mixture of 
papers that I have printed, and notes like this where I'm working on some 
random walks in some spaces, and these are the random walks. These are 
the kinds of stuff that I write. This is really not that precise. And when it’s 
crystallised into being something special like this, you have a statement 
labelled lemma and you can see that there is no proof behind, because 
when I'm at the level of proof then I will start writing things down the paper. 
And you can see stuff like this, where we can relate these two theories and 
these are notes from a discussion with a colleague. Not very precise, but 
quite helpful. At some stage it’s written in the computer and at some stage I 
will just chuck these. Maybe I will take this same paper and write down 
something else on it. At some point when I'm thinking I just need to write 
something down to help me think. I don't keep these notes. The notes I 
keep are already type-set.  
In fact seeing it like this - only a very few people will it be meaningful 
for. I think what is interesting is to see that even if the paper has no picture, 
but I've wrote a picture for myself here… So one important thing in writing is 
to help the mind to concentrate. Sometimes it’s not important if it’s right. I 
explained this to a collaborator once: that I just need to write. It’s not 
strictly useful to write down, but it helps to think. And also the 
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mathematician does not want to be naked in public. You don't want to show 
that you were really dumb at some point.  
  
 
Figure 22 Examples of notebooks from researchers at Paris-A 
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Writing, as Nemo tells us, helps him concentrate, to reformulate and to re-figure 
concepts. Such thoughts start off as vague, but over time they are shaped into 
something much more concrete, "crystallising" into definitions or lemmas. 
Mathematical writing thus provides a physical scaffold for crafting ideas. For many 
researchers this scaffolding is a way of offloading certain processes from working 
memory, distributing memory onto an external storage device. In the following 
interview with geometer Aaron, we see this use of the notebook as a memory aid: 
A: And so sometimes after some scribble I understand something and then I 
can write down the proof. Another one [flicks through] maybe it's not here, 
and sometimes, here it’s mainly questions. But sometimes I'm reading a 
paper and I take notes on the paper. That happens, it's easy to forget 
otherwise. Because when you have a long paper it's hard to remember all 
the definitions, you can turn all the pages, or you can go back in the pdf, but 
sometimes you need to write it down. So I take notes if I needed to teach 
something, or I take notes in the subway of what I will do. And then when I 
take it in the other way round [refers to back of book] it means that I'm 
doing something else. So here I was just thinking about music, this was 
Indian music, this was some rock and roll. This was a meeting. 
IN: There's little sketches, crossing out,  
A: So you have an example, stuff that does not work…And 
sometimes I repeat myself, maybe it’s not visible here, sometimes there's 
the same thing on three pages, and again on the next three pages, it’s 
because sometimes I need to start again and I start the same thing.  
IN: Is that because you need to go back to ideas? 
A: So for the last three or four of them I know that I need to go back. 
I have another blue book like that one where I have some information that I 
haven't used yet. So I don't want to throw it out. And the other I don't throw 
it away because I don't throw away anything. I don't know precisely why. I 
have many notebooks which I haven't reopened.  
IN: Is there examples where you go from these scattered thoughts to 
a paper? 
A: The problem is that I don't write papers by hand. So I go straight 
from that to the computer. Sometimes I keep intermediate versions, but 
usually not. But then on the typesetting programme there is a lot of 
reworking. When you write a sentence or you write a paragraph you look at 
it and you write it again because it's not a good way to write the sentence or 
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the proof, so you change everything. You write a mistake and you remove 
the mistake, so you take your notebook again just to remember what you 
should have done.  
 
The passage highlights the role of notebooks as memory aids which help a 
mathematician to return to ideas, clarify issues, and rectify mistakes. They return to 
the notebook in order to reconstruct a thought process, rediscovering the threads 
of thoughts which lay at the root of an argument. They return to the notebook to 
re-fresh their working memory and re-collect their thoughts. The process of 
recollecting the past is thus sometimes literally a process of re-collecting ideas, 
which are present in written form within the notebook. The process of proof 
construction thus becomes as much a physical task as a mental one, involving 
collecting papers, proofs and notes together into an assemblage of thoughts. From 
this mass of information the mathematician then begins the process of finding, 
ordering, experimenting, sorting, selecting and storing information. These 
processes are what I refer to as the craft of mathematics.     
3.23 Crafting mathematics: Documenting the assembly process  
To start the crafting process one needs raw materials. These are mined from books, 
articles, lectures or conversations with colleagues, and they collect as notes on 
scratch paper, in notebooks, in LaTex documents, or on blackboards. Such material 
accumulates upon the desk, on a hard-drive, or on cloud-storage, and it can take on 




Figure 23 Collections of notes and papers, UK-B 
  
Such accumulations are often scanned into pdf files and stored on the computer. By 
scanning documents, one researcher, Alfred, says such documents can more easily 
be searched for and sorted: 
A: No I do have to scan things, I use the computer as a kind of Index file - an 
exo-memory - actually that is the word - have you come across the word? 
It's an outside memory. So people use this all the time , you forget words or 
you forget something or you forget what you did - it's all in the computer. 
Unfortunately it's not linear but nevertheless…my correspondent - over the 
years we have had many email exchanges. My emails are always much 
longer than his answers …But I used the computer a lot as a storage device. I 
tend not to compute. I tend just to store information - books, papers, ideas - 
I mean whatever scans. It has changed my life for the better - enormously.  
 
The archive indexes ideas and makes them accessible through searches by date or 
name-tag. Alfred refers to this archive as his "exo-memory" - his external store of 
ideas, which provides the source of inspiration for his proofs and publications. 
Other researchers prefer to keep physical notes, collating related material in one 
place. The material is sorted manually, reading through each note and either 
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keeping or discarding what is considered relevant for a paper. Geometer Mark 
describes this process below:  
M: Very often I keep my drafts. Just pictures, rough pictures and everything, 
related to a project I put it all in the same folder. I put them together, and I 
do this absolutely all the time... So I keep my drafts until I solve the problem. 
So after that, everything that is not relevant to the solution, I'm going to 
drop it. But not until the project is finished.  
 
This process of sweeping through, sorting and selecting, is a repeated action in the 
process of constructing proofs. Like the sculptor, the act of shaping the proof is a 
reductive process of paring the argument down to its simplest, most elegant form. 
With this process of selection and sorting comes the process of ordering ideas, 
giving them some structure within the framework of a proof. Alfred describes how 
this process of constructing proofs resembles that of building a house:  
A: I have the intuition and then I have to make sure that the examples fit 
into the theoretical model. It’s a lot like building a house - you have all kinds 
of jumbled things and you build a house and you want to make sure that all 
these jumbled things fit into it - that there's enough room in the house. 
Suppose I had a brand new office and suppose I wanted to reorder this 
office - if I just had a replica of this office, that's just not good enough. I have 
to have a better ordering to the one I've got now. But I don’t have a great 
theoretical foundation to what I do, I just do things. If I just wanted to do 
theory - I perhaps would not have become a pure mathematician  
 
The ways in which the muddle of ideas is given order is through developing an 
awareness of, or an aesthetic appreciation of, the things that fit together. Alfred 
describes how the process of sorting occurs through the development of an 
intuition of mathematical spaces: 
A: Instinct. Instinct. The things I've been doing for the last day, week, month, 
year, decade work. At the moment with these kinds of things which attract 
recognition - they are not so frequent. It has happened. And you see very 
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clearly either where you have gone wrong, or not deep enough, and 
suddenly there is a shift, and you kind of suddenly things fit into place 
A: When everything fits together, you just have an instinct. That this 
is the right way of doing things. And of course you can test it against other 
examples. In fact it’s one of the things I dislike when reading other people's 
papers is when they have a theory and no examples.  
 
Like the craftsperson, the mathematician must decide whether certain ideas fit, or 
"work", together. The proof must be well proportioned, aesthetically pleasing, and 
must accomplish the tasks that it was built for. As a way of proving that a given 
proof performs its desired tasks, the mathematician then tests the proof against 
known examples. The examples provide a training data-set for testing the strength 
of a given mathematical construction, through comparing the obtained results from 
those which are expected. Such experiments take place throughout the process of 
producing proofs, as one researcher Martin explains: 
M: …You experiment all the time, you experiment with points on the board. 
Once you've figured out what you want to do, you experiment with the way 
you write it. You keep experimenting on the formalisms. Once you're done 
with the formalism it takes a week to write out the full article. The writing of 
the proof is itself the result of an experiment.  
 
The act of tinkering never ceases, taking place on scratch paper notes, blackboards, 





Figure 24 Sketches on scratch paper and blackboard, Paris-A 
The craftwork of mathematics sees mathematicians moving between 
different representational mediums: from paper, to word-processor, to black/white 
board. Looking at one white board below we see the zoo of terms and diagrams 
that emerge through the process of "figuring out" a mathematical construction. The 
board shows an assemblage of different geometrical shapes, operations and 
equations/inequalities. The same object is broken up into separate "views" or 
representations, which give access to varying perspectives from which to visualise 
the operations being performed on the object. Narrating the board, in this form, is 
difficult, because of the many erasures and over-writing that has occurred over the 
course of the thinking process. To the outside observer, even a mathematician, the 
meaning of such a board is difficult to reconstruct. What we observe is a mess of 
different shapes and symbols; but to the craftsperson themselves, they see a 
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pattern or a structure taking shape, refined through the act of figuring out on the 
board.   
 
Figure 25 Preparatory sketches and concept formulation on white board, at 
Germany-A 
  
From the board the mathematician returns to scratch-paper and will often 
"re-work", or "chew over", the information on the board: condensing, clarifying, 
and re-ordering the material so that it follows a certain logic. Through removing 
certain elements, and reducing the "bushiness" of the concept tree, the 
mathematician narrows the scope of the proof to following a single line of enquiry. 
The construction thus is transformed from something that was unstructured and 
rhizomic in nature, to something that is structured and dendritic, with definite 
premises and conclusions. The process of crafting the proof is thus to reduce the 
number of interconnected concepts, to limit the possible story-lines and create one 
single, coherent, dominant narrative. The process of crafting proof is thus designed 
229 
 
to make it more palatable for an audience to digest. Below we see the processes by 
which the messy thoughts begins to be classified and structured into boxes: 
  
 
Figure 26 Classification and structuring process in paper notes, at Paris-A 
  
At the point at which the paper is written it still undergoes a long process of 






Figure 27 Reworking printed articles in preparation for publication, at Paris-A 
  
In crafting a proof, the mathematician remains for a long time in the 
backstage, informally manipulating information in note-books, scratch paper and on 
the blackboard. The various elements are configured in a variety of ways before 
their structure is formalised and given coherence. This vagueness and informality at 
the start of the thinking process allows for a wide field of possibilities to be 
explored and manipulated on the blackboard.  
The blackboard or whiteboard are ideal mediums for mediating this 
discovery process, for a number of reasons: they allow for elements to be 
presented at once, on one viewing surface; elements can be quickly linked by 
arrows and related to one another; or elements can be isolated through drawing 
boxes around them; finally elements can be re-ordered through changing their 
positions, which can then be quickly re-configured through erasure. The 
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adaptability of this medium thus allows for different ways of seeing mathematical 
spaces to be simulated, as well as for objects within such spaces to be easily 
manipulated. Topologist Norman explains to me how the board is a "synthetic" 
medium for assembling and relating ideas, and crafting one's perception of 
mathematical spaces:   
N: I prefer general feeling, and discussion when you know "this should be 
like that because" and I like to have an explanation, at least at a certain level 
why things should behave like that. And so at the blackboard you can be 
very synthetic. And when it comes the time where you need a really 
rigorous statement, that’s the time when I already trying to write down the 
proof. There is already this level, it can stay for longer, the level where you 
are very vague, during the discussion, where we are pretty sure that it 
should work and when it is something that comes to a certain maturation 
where we say "OK, it should work for a certain amount of times now we 
should try to write it down" and so I go and try to write down a proof. That's 
the way I remember things in my mind. This is where I sketch out an idea. 
There are many things that I don't know how to prove, or maybe I just 
haven't paid attention to, and it can turn out to be a real problem, but that’s 
not the way - I need to have a big light which gives a reason to believe that. 
And that's only at the stage of writing that I see that "Oh this thing that I 
always considered completely obvious, or it didn't matter, and then you 
have to confront it - that usually comes later. But I first like to have a big 
picture and then go to that stage.  
 
The sketching out that takes place on boards and scratch paper is thus similar to the 
processes involved in artists sketching out and experimenting with forms in their 
sketchbooks (See Gombrich 1977: 147; Verstijnen et al. 1998: 521; Goldschmidt 1991). 
The process involves testing out different ways of representing and perceiving 
spaces and objects. Through such informal sketching the mathematician gets a 
"feel" for what a space should look like, or what a tool should do. They become 
familiar with the space or object, and thus they can begin to probe how it will react 
when they tinker with it some way. Through manipulating equations and shapes on 
blackboards mathematicians begin to build up an intuition about how their 
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mathematical "machines" function. Through successive manipulations on the 
blackboard the kernels of proofs start to emerge. Below we see the start of the 
process of formalising a natural language statement into a mathematical statement. 
We see the process of linking through arrows, boxing, and relating geometric 
(coloured red), natural language (in yellow) and algebraic objects (in green) 
together.  
 
Figure 28 Highlighting the different perspectives involved in producing mathematics, 
taken at UK-A 
 
3.24 Mathematician as Bricoleur: Documenting how perception is crafted  
Constructing proofs involves a continuous process of formulation and refinement. 
Ideas are sketched out on paper or on blackboards to test out ways of representing 
or envisioning them, and these sketches serve as scaffolds for building up clearer 
definitions, orderings and arguments. The act of writing out mathematics serves to 
objectify concepts, offloading mental processing costs from working memory onto a 
physical, "exo-memory", which takes the form of notebooks, paper and digital 
archives; as well as computer screens and blackboards. The inscription process thus 
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serves to extend working memory and frees up the brain's processing power, 
allowing for higher-order thought processing such as pattern detection, comparison 
operations and argument construction12. Such higher order thought processes take 
place through visual inspections and physical manipulations of mathematical 
representations on blackboards, paper or computer screens.   
Like Levi-Strauss' bricoleur, the way of constructing mathematics is a matter 
of assembling, selecting, sorting and structuring isolated elements of language into 
systems of thought, which serve to articulate arguments. Through experimenting 
with the order and composition of mathematical assemblages, the mathematician 
as bricoleur is able to tailor their own mathematical habitus through which they are 
able to perceive the mathematical landscape. Sketching out objects and spaces 
allows mathematicians to craft ways of seeing such objects, making abstract 
concepts visually accessible and open to manipulation. "Picturing" a concept on 
paper or on the blackboard thus serves to objectify abstract mathematics, allowing 
concepts to be apprehended by the body's senses. Below, Gordon explains to me 
this process of picturing mathematics and the role such picturing has in crafting 
ideas: 
G: Not a real picture, sometimes again you work with actual pictures for one 
problem or another, but the object is like a concept, somehow it is a 
concept actually. Let us think about, let me take the concept of freedom for 
example, because I mentioned it before, you have some feeling of what 
freedom means. Sometimes you have pictures or sentences that go with it, 
it can be a painting, it can be liberte, egalite, fraternite, I don’t know, but 
                                                          
12 This process relates to work in cognitive science on distributed cognition in which the cognitive 
processes of individuals can be offloaded and extended out into the environment and to members 
of a social group (Hutchings 1995). In this thesis I explore processes of memory management and 
extension of working memory using blackboards, archives and scratch paper notes as a form of “exo-
memory”. I also explore how cognition is distributed within mathematicians’ social networks, 
through individuals acting as knowledge-repositories.  
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those pictures do not reduce or explain fully the concept of freedom. So 
mathematical objects are really concepts in a sense. And the way you see 
them, or the way you remember them it’s a little hard to tell. At least, since I 
used the word to see, our actual perceptions, that is vision and hearing play 
a role in mathematics, the other senses, to the best of my knowledge, play 
no role. But vision and the ability to hear play a role in the way we perceive 
and work in mathematics. So it’s really I would say, seeing objects, rather 
than hearing them, or any other perception. It goes, and this is at a different 
level, with the way you remember things. For instance I remember better 
what I have seen written on a blackboard, or on paper. And sometimes I 
remember if it was written on the left or on the right of the blackboard, 
even very long after, OK. SO at least for me, the relationship between 
mathematics and vision is very strong.  
 
 Gordon explains that the picture sketched out on the blackboard is more than just 
a depiction of an object, like in a photograph; rather it is an interpretation of an 
abstract concept which is given expression within a painting. The painting, 
depending on the skill of the artist, can encode within it a number of concepts 
(Gombrich 1977: 44). Understanding what information is encoded within an 
artwork depends on one's understanding of the style and language of the artist. The 
act of sketching out objects thus is a means of condensing mathematical concepts 
into a visual short-hand, which provides a further scaffold for constructing complex 
arguments. Through condensing information into a visual format, arguments or 
concepts become subject to visual inspection and interrogation, which facilitates 
the process of pattern discovery and the synthesis of information, as Marie explains 
below:  
M: Yes. For example I've found out in my research a kind of singularity that I 
was able to draw and I was sure that it was the same singularity listed by 
Arnold in one of his books. And there is this List, and my object should be 
part of this list, or it’s a deformation, it’s a neighbour of one of these things 
in this list. First I had to see if it’s one of the listed objects. It appears that it’s 
not on the list. But just by looking at it, no formulas, just looking at it. It was 
not the same. And then, so if it’s not the same it’s a deformation - but which 
one. And all this with my PhD advisor - he was able to convince me that it 
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was not the same on the list and we spent a lot of time just trying to figure 
out what was the difference and all without making any calculus. Just 
looking at it, looking at it [laughs]. It’s funny. That’s a big part of my work, 
just looking at objects.  
 
Visual perception thus plays a role in apprehending the mathematical landscape. 
The picturing process allows for mathematical concepts to be projected into 
physical space, and perceived using one's sensory apparatus. Through this process 
of objectification and the analogy made with physical space, the mathematician is 
able to experience abstract mathematical objects as if they were real, physical 
objects. Reification then allows for one's in-born intuitions of the physical world to 
be repurposed to intuiting over abstract mathematical spaces. It is for such reasons 
that the first attempts to understand mathematical objects or spaces involve first 
drawing them out, and manipulating them by hand, as Jessica explains below: 
J: I first draw pictures and then go and try to explain it in a mathematical 
way and I ask "what is this picture really trying to say". That’s the really hard 
problem. It's like: "OK I have to write every details…ahaha" How do I do 
this? SO it has to be a real proof so everybody says "yes this is true"...For me 
I like speaking with my hands. But then we have to write rigorously... But if 
you look at my drafts it's like picture, picture, picture.  
 
Oftentimes mathematicians begin by working with pictures, building up intuitions 
about objects through manipulating such pictures. It is only later on in the proof 
construction process that these physical intuitions are erased, as the pictures are 
abstracted away, in the formal process of "writing up". In writing up much of the 
informal processes of experimentation, as well as the physical intuitions on which 
arguments are based, get written out of the end publication. However, in erasing 
pictures and examples from the published proofs, it can often become difficult for 
236 
 
other mathematicians to follow a proof. Much of the working processes, the many 
choices, and other potential narratives, are made invisible in the act of 
formalisation. This serves to distance the author from the finished product, and to 
make the end result appear less of a product of human artifice.     
When we show mathematicians’ working practices we begin to see the 
complexities involved in constructing mathematical habitus. We see how the 
mathematician tinkers with objects and representations, and how they work and 
rework their proofs, formalising and abstracting out superfluous elements, in an 
effort to attain an aesthetic ideal of elegance and simplicity. In the pursuit of such 
simplicity, the choices, intuitions and experiments are written out or erased. The 
embodied processes of crafting mathematics on paper or on a blackboard are 
forgotten. However, these embodied processes, as we shall see in the next section, 
are integral in constructing mathematical habitus, and in the experience and 












Section 3.3: Frames of Reference  
 
3.30 Overview   
In the following section we will explore the ways in which the mathematical 
landscape is visualised and perceived. We shall see how paper and blackboards act 
as tools for enframing mathematical objects and spaces. Such frames are synthetic 
tools for generating relationships between different mathematical representations, 
and they serve to give the mathematical landscape structure and coherence. I argue 
that constructing boards and paper as reference frames allows mathematicians to 
perceive, explore and manipulate mathematical constructions.   
3.31 Introduction 
Pictorial representations play a major role in constructing the mathematical 
landscape. Without pictures, abstract spaces are difficult to visualise and interpret. 
Drawing, as we have seen, provides means of grounding understanding in the 
material world, and results in malleable, manipulable objects being created, which 
extend one's working memory. By writing and drawing on blackboards and paper 
mathematicians create perspectival frames for viewing and structuring the 
mathematical landscape. The board and paper, for the mathematician, act in much 
the same way as the canvas does for the landscape artist: they are representational 
mediums for presenting a perspective or viewpoint on reality. For the 
mathematician this "reality" takes the form of an abstract, mathematical landscape. 
In the following section we shall explore the processes by which the mathematical 
landscape is framed and perceived.  
238 
 
3.32 Landscapes of thought: Understanding mathematical perception   
We can imagine mathematical reality as composed of spaces which contain certain 
structures, objects and processes which can be described and related using 
mathematical languages. These mathematical spaces are what I will refer to as 
mathematical "landscapes", and they form the structural frameworks within which 
thinking in mathematics takes place. Landscapes, at their simplest, are composed of 
landmarks or features, which are related to one another by measures of distance. In 
our mathematical landscape we can imagine the landmarks to be numbers such as 
pi or e, or perhaps shapes or surfaces, or equations; they are, in short, objects or 
concepts which have some mathematical identity and description. The relationships 
between these conceptual landmarks manifests itself in our notion of distance. 
Similar concepts are closer together in the mathematical landscape; more 
challenging concepts may be represented by height, with tall peaks representing 
concepts which require a great deal of effort to understand.    
To begin to understand the landscape, the mathematician must first learn to 
identify and perceive the features present within the landscape. This first 
requirement involves learning definitions, and building up a core vocabulary of 
mathematical objects, tools and concepts. This core vocabulary forms a key 
landmark within one's mathematical landscape, and is the local fixed point from 
which one relates to one's surroundings. From this origin point the mathematician 
can gauge distance to other landmarks, creating a point of reference within the 
landscape. It is against this reference point that artefacts are compared, based 
upon the features shared in common. In this way the mathematician’s perception 
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of the mathematical landscape is shaped by the landmarks that they are already 
familiar with.  
This set of local landmarks is a product of one's education in mathematics 
(as discussed in section 3.1), and is often based around the examples one becomes 
familiar with during graduate studies. These landmarks provide a perceptual frame 
for viewing the rest of the landscape, and shape one's future orientations and 
interactions with the wider mathematical landscape. For many mathematicians, 
their positioning within the landscape is shaped by their ability to construe 
mathematical phenomena in terms of pictures. They then base subsequent 
interpretations of the landscape upon this pictorial frame of reference. One 
mathematician, Alex, below describes how she bases her understanding of 
mathematics upon a "geometrical" frame of reference: 
A: When I chose mathematics it was because of geometry. You can reason 
on figures, for example, if I cannot draw a picture I cannot even understand 
what I'm doing. It’s clear for me that without a picture I cannot prove 
anything. I'm sure not all mathematicians are like that. I know many who are 
interested in very abstract things, it’s a conflict all the time. They can be very 
abstract and I cannot follow them. If I do not have a visual support I cannot 
understand their language.  
 
Construing mathematical concepts as geometrical objects allows Alex to "reason on 
figures". Mathematical concepts are visualised as shapes which undergo certain 
changes, as a result of functions being applied to them. Because of the abstract 
nature of mathematics, mathematicians require visual supports, as Alex claims: 
"Everybody is visualising something, they have their own way of approaching the 
abstract thing". This sentiment is echoed by other mathematicians, but the basis of 
240 
 
this "visualisation" is not always geometric in origin, as one topologist, Max informs 
me: 
M: Everyone must have an intuition, or manner to visualise things in their 
mind. I think some people are seeing some formula, and the numbers speak 
to them. For me, absolutely not. I don’t know if it's because of me, or my 
past, because I've done algebraic topology. I think it's because of me, 
because I was oriented towards algebraic topology, I was motivated to draw 
things. But even for people who prefer to work with algebra and number 
etc. they have their own kind of visualisation.  
 
These modes of visualising mathematical reality are referred to as gaining 
"intuition". This "intuition" is what we refer to here as a perceptual frame. This 
perceptual frame is built up over the course of one's career as a mathematician, 
and comprises of the vocabulary of concepts that an individual has internalised 
within long-term memory. To perceive such objects first requires an active phase of 
"picturing" the object, bringing it to the foreground of one's attention. Through 
repeatedly reconstructing such pictures they eventually can become naturalised 
within their mind, and so fall to the background of attention. One topologist, Jim, 
describes this process of becoming habituated to certain representations:  
J:  Yes…hmmm well I'm a topologist, in knot theory and it’s very visual in 
some sense. But maybe I'm trying to get into more algebraic constructions. 
Maybe at the beginning I was very visual, I had a lot of pictures…it also 
depends on the kinds of questions you ask. And I feel that the older I get the 
less I need these pictures. I have made the same pictures 1000 times, and 
after a while you don't really need it, but it's clear that I have it in mind, in 







3.33 Exploring structure: Relating perception to habitus  
Mathematicians thus use pictures as visual supports for building up their intuition 
of the mathematical landscape. Such pictures can often be recalled without writing 
them out, as they become naturalised within one's habitus. However, in the early 
stages of understanding concepts, the mathematician must figure them out at a 
blackboard or on scratch paper. The blackboard or paper act as tools for visualising 
and exploring the architecture of concepts, allowing elements to be related to one 
another and assembled together. One mathematician, David, describes the 
importance of visually exploring mathematical structures and gluing elements 
together on blackboards:  
D: I am a visual thinker but the math I do - I need some structure. In some 
sense I am almost afraid because sometimes if I have to write down the 
proof and if there is not enough structure I'm afraid I won't be able to…in a 
sense if the mathematics is too soft it’s a bit frightening, because I feel I will 
have a hard time in writing down, completely, the details. So I like really the 
mathematics where there is a lot of structure, but where you can visualise 
the structure and know that you will need it and you will be able to write 
down the proof at a table.  
So you have a lot of things that can be done, but that doesn't mean 
that I know how to do it, if you ask me just right now. But I know that I will 
be able to do it if there is the kind of structure which makes things glue 
together. And because I know these things are here I can have the visual 
thinking of the theorem I want to prove; and when I have the theorem I 
come back to the more structured thing and painfully write the proof. And 
so, to summarise, the mathematics that I am doing is very structured, so 
there is a lot of heavy things in there. But I like to think that the object that I 
want to understand is very geometric, and I use this structure to say 
something geometric, and that it can be described on this object.  
 
Understanding a mathematical construction becomes a process of visualising its 
component parts, and seeing how they function within the larger mathematical 
mechanism. The drawing provides a visual scaffold for extending working memory 
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and for exploring abstract constructions; also, concepts in picture form become 
observable, referenceable objects, which can be reasoned about. But perhaps the 
most important aspect of visual representations is the fact that they simplify 
complex constructions into visual short-hands. They are able to condense complex 
information into symbols, signs and graphics, which represent complex processes 
and phenomena. Through simplification and condensation into two and three 
dimensional drawings or algebraic symbols, so the background structure of the 
construction becomes more apparent. A topologist, Peter, highlights the role of 
"picturing" concepts, in order to reveal their underlying structuring principles: 
P: Yes, yes, completely yes. I do have a picture. Of course I can only draw 2-
D and 3-D pictures, and it's very helpful for me to have them. I think I 
understand really an argument when I can have a picture of it. In fact there 
are several aspects in my work. The most geometrical aspect, the one I 
would say that I most understand is when I can draw a picture. And then 
there are more algebraic aspects, where it’s more about where I understand 
how the structure is built together. But to make a proof I need to be able to 
summarise it, in my head, into a few steps, because if that’s not the case I 
feel that I don’t really understand what's going on.  
  
3.34 Framing the landscape: How metaphor functions as a reference frame 
Creating visual analogues to abstract mathematical constructions transforms 
concepts into perceptible objects. The visual representation approximates the 
structure of the mathematical construct, sharing with it certain characteristics. 
Visual representations in mathematics are used in similar ways to how metaphors 
are used in natural language. The visual representation bears certain resemblance 
to, or shares certain features with, the mathematical construct that it refers to. The 
visual representation thus acts as a schema for organising the abstract 
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mathematical construct. Modifying the visual representation becomes analogous to 
transforming the mathematical construct in some way.   
Visual representations serve as frames for viewing and organising the 
abstract, mathematical landscape. The visualisations are not the mathematical 
objects themselves, but merely approximations of these objects, projected into our 
physical reality. They serve as a means for us to relate to abstract objects and 
spaces through our understanding of the physical world we inhabit. Often a 
mathematician must become habituated to using such representations, learning 
how to translate the picture in terms of the mathematical construct it stands for. 
Such ways of thinking about or translating mathematical concepts are called "tools" 
by mathematicians, and they provide a way of educating their perceptions into 
being able to perceive the mathematical landscape. One Algebraic geometer, 
Gillian, tells me how learning to see an area of mathematics through such a visual 
tool transforms the way in which she experiences the mathematical landscape:  
G: For instance I was teaching group theory in the first semester. Sometimes 
it's not always possible to draw pictures for groups. But one of my 
colleagues told me that one way of understanding groups via the subgroups, 
and you draw the sub groups and when I saw that I said: "Yeah, that’s what I 
was looking for". When I don’t have the right tool, I'm looking for it. Maybe 
it's also a handicap. Whenever I cannot draw pictures anymore I'm a little 
handicapped. Now mathematics has become very abstract, with category 
theory, functors, etc. Maybe these people have a secret drawing behind the 
way they think.  
 
Over time a mathematician will learn more visual schemas for organising their 
experiences within the mathematical landscape. They will learn the function of 
these tools, and how to use them to manipulate abstract concepts. Through 
acquiring these representational tools they gain an intuition of the mathematical 
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landscape, and understand the possibilities for acting within it. As a topologist, 
Margret, explains, one's intuition of the mathematical landscape grows as one 
becomes adept at using representational tools: 
M: For this it’s a problem of experience. He [her supervisor] has more 
experience than me. It’s more clear for him the notion of co-dimension of 
generic objects. It’s more clear for him what can happen and what cannot 
happen in some way. [Goes to board] For example, if I pass from this 
drawing to this one you can imagine that you can take the tangent lines and 
force the tangents - you take this put this here. So when you do this you 
have a film of singularities from this one to this one. So in some way this one 
is an exceptional situation of this one. As soon as the tangency is not there 
you have this. If you push this more you will not have the tangency again. So 
what can generically happen… it's one of experience. Actually the genericity 
I'm speaking about is about moving from this to this, but staying within an 
object like this. If I just push those objects without asking anything it will not 
stay like this, this singularity will spin off. So what am I doing? I'm trying to 
go from this thing to this thing, in this class of objects, and asking is that a 
big constraint or not? You understand? And for Erik those things are more 
clear. For me it’s slowly, slowly more clear.  
 
3.35 The Horizon of vision: Exploring the limits of pictorial representations  
Using visual representations as perceptual lenses for framing and viewing the 
mathematical landscape does have its limits. The limitations stem from the fact that 
the visual representations are only approximations to the abstract mathematical 
concepts themselves. Pictures distort certain features of the mathematical 
landscape, emphasising one aspect with respect to others. In some sense, as Gillian 
explains below, visual representations are "bad pictures", in so far as they are not 
completely accurate depictions of spaces or objects:  
G: The problems that I work on are geometrical. It's about varieties, draw-
able objects. But it's because of my taste for drawings. I'm also interested in 
what other people have to offer. To see their way of thinking, I will adapt. 
But my definite taste is for something I can express with an image. For 
instance in the library here we have an exhibition of surfaces. I wasn’t even 
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aware that surfaces could be presented like that. When we're studying 
surfaces we don’t draw the right drawing. For example with a singularity we 
have a local drawing and you don’t really see what's happening around. We 
do projections or sections. But when the computer is showing you exactly 
what it looks like, you are quite amazed. But they say that geometry is the 
art of reasoning well on bad pictures, so I quite agree with it. Because when 
the picture is too good you get confused, you don’t know what to prove any 
more. It's so obvious from the picture that you don’t realise that you have to 
prove it.  
  
When an object or space is computed, and a computer visualisation generated, the 
mathematician comes to understand how their own visualisations deviate from the 
"truth". But, as Gillian explains, the bad pictures mathematicians draw are 
representations which emphasise certain features, and motivate certain actions or 
interpretations. For Gillian, her visualisations serve to emphasise what aspects of 
the mathematical landscape need to be explored and explained through proof. 
However, sometimes a picture can not only distort the underlying mathematical 
reality, it can also mislead the mathematician, as Nemo explains: 
N:  You mean can a picture be misleading? Yes, I'm not so sure I have a good 
example in my own work, but certainly. It happens sometimes that I see a 
picture, when I'm reading somebody's work, and I make a picture which is 
not the right picture and it can take me several times before I realise that I 
have been completely misled by this picture which was not what he was 
thinking. There are also famous examples in my field of theorems that were 
not considered possible, because the way we thought of things, in terms of 
pictures, which were naturally occurring, and were showing the opposite of 
the theorem. In general these are the most interesting theorems, because 
you really understand why your picture was not the right one.  
 
The pictures which mathematicians use to frame the mathematical landscape 
structure perception so as to construe reality in a certain way. Such interpretations 
of mathematical reality can often turn out to be false, but, as Nemo argues, the 
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very fact that they are false provides insight. In other instances, visual 
representations of complex or higher dimensional spaces are not always possible. 
Sometimes such objects can be represented through projections into 2 or 3 
dimensional space, or else through slicing the objects and studying their cross 
sections. But as Algebraic geometer Eleanor explains below, such projections or 
slices are not always able to render the complexity of certain objects or spaces: 
E: Yes so I have my own ideas. Buts it's very difficult to visualise. So what I'm 
working on is in complex dimension 2. Which means that it is real dimension 
4, so it's already a mess to visualise. So you develop an intuition of your own 
which has not much to do with objective slices, 3 dimensional slices, etc. So I 
developed an intuition of this space, which is one more dimension from the 
space we are living in. And there, more or less, I know what's going in my 
area. So its intuition. It’s a way of seeing things, but I don't see it in the way I 
see you for example. And if I want to combine it with real vision which 
means slicing and getting 2 dimensional slices, or 3 dimensional slices, the 
truth is that it rarely helps me. It doesn't help me you see, you need other 
avenues.  
There is a very famous conjecture in my field which is called the 
exception of minimal set for formations of ℂ² on the complex projective 
space. So you have a complex space which is of dimension 2, which is 
compact and which is the projective space, which is the simplest case which 
one can imagine, and you study global foliations with singular points on this 
object. And the conjecture is that there is no invariant minimal set. So 
people started using geometric ideas, it didn't work. And then they had this 
idea of using pictures, so using computers…and it doesn't help at all 
[laughs]. So doing pictures, trying to see if there is a minimal point "how 
could it be? where could it be?" so you get a huge amount of pictures, which 
of course are not 4 dimensional, which are just projections, and then you 
don’t know how to deal with them. It doesn't help much in my field. 
Touching the reality through computations etc. doesn't help much, its more 









3.36 Translating thought: How metaphor structures knowledge domains  
Some spaces resist interpretation and representation within 2 and 3 dimensional 
space. As a result some mathematical spaces and objects cannot easily be 
presented in the form of visual representations. Rather, mathematicians construe 
the mathematical landscape within another kind of representational medium, 
within an algebraic language for example, reducing its dimensions to another form 
of symbolic short hand. One mathematician, Alfred, explains that spaces or objects 
can be interpreted not as shapes, but as maps or graphs: 
A: Not really. This space for example, is a space of maps. So I visualise 
moving into the space by having a map, say a translation and you deform it. 
So the question was how to deform this space.  
 
Transforming objects thus becomes encoded as movements between different 
nodes of a graph, or as functional mappings between different algebraic symbols. 
Indeed the process of representing objects can take the form of natural language 
statements, algebraic equations or inequalities, graphs, or maps. The mathematical 
landscape is thus open to multiple interpretations (framing from multiple schemas), 
many of which are layered on top of one another. As mathematicians learn to 
construe objects in different ways, through different frames of reference, so they 
learn to move more fluidly between different perspectival frames, or "intuitions". 
One algebraic topologist, Jessica, explains to me how mathematical objects are 
transformed by the mathematician, and how the mathematician learns to move 




J: I think there's lots of different layers to this. In my head I think of a knot as 
a three dimensional thing that's sitting inside space. Obviously when I'm 
working I will draw a 2 dimensional picture of it and work with that 
particular diagram. And if I think about 4 dimensional geometry then 
suddenly it becomes very algebraic and I don’t really look at the pictures any 
more. A 4 dimensional space is just 4 coordinates, it doesn’t matter whether 
you work in n dimensions; it doesn’t make any difference to have n 
coordinates. So the more abstract it is, you move to different techniques to 
study it. Depending on the context you will think of one object in many 
different ways.  
I guess even when I'm thinking of something really abstract. Like a 4 
dimensional knot I just have to relate it back to something that I already 
know. So if it’s a sphere I can't possibly think of how a sphere can be 
knotted in 4 dimensions. But I sort of know how a circle can be knotted in 3 
dimensions. So you sort of have this picture in your mind of a sphere that 
when you take a cross section you get some sort of knot. Although you can't 
quite picture it, it gives you enough of a concept that you can start to work 
with it.  
Or an example that I’ve used more concretely, for kids to think in 4 
dimensions. If I were to draw a picture of a cube for you on the paper. So If I 
draw something like this, most people would tell you that you're looking at a 
cube, or you're looking into a box. So this is the back of the box, this is the 
front of the box and these are the 4 sides. Most people have no problem 
with the idea that that's a cube. So this in real life, this strange trapezoid is 
actually a square. And in real life the small square at the back of the box is 
the same size as the big square at the front. So people have no difficulty in 
seeing how a 3 dimensional shape becomes distorted when we put it on 2 
dimensional paper. So then you can say, "So what does a 4 dimensional 
cube look like? How can we generalise this? So instead of having a square in 
a square, you have a cube inside a cube, and now I'm drawing a 4 
dimensional object. You have a big cube on the outside and a small cube on 
the inside and the corners of the cubes are joined together. Something like 
this. And in 4 dimensions the cube on the inside is the same size as the one 
on the outside, but one is further away in the 4th dimension, so it looks 
smaller. And all these shapes on the corners they're all cubes, but they've 
been distorted by the way we're observing it from the outside.  
So even though your brain cannot possibly picture what a 4 
dimensional cube looked like, you can use the analogy of something that 
you already understand to try to at least have an idea of the structure of 
how it would work. And then from there you can't really talk about the 5th 
dimension but you can start saying things like. Well we know the 
coordinates of all these points are, so in 4 dimensions it will have 4 
coordinates, in 3 dimensions there are 8 vertices of the cube and the 
coordinates are: they all have zeros and ones. And all the combinations of 
zeros and ones gives you all the vertices of the cube. And in 4 dimensions 
you have the same thing. So there are 4 coordinates so you have 16 
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dimensions and so on. So it's very easy to generalise to any dimension you 
want. So you're sort of moving between the idea of the abstract 
coordinates, the algebra, to the geometrical picture, to the projections of 
things and it's all happening at the same time in your head.  
 
The mathematical landscape thus is not something that is fixed and unchanging. 
Rather the terrain is contested, multi-layered and multiply interpreted. The 
landscape can be viewed from many different perspectives, and mathematicians 
perceive it according to their existing knowledge and experience (that is to say 
according to their positioning within the field). Such multidimensionality of the 
landscape indicates its metaphorical nature. Like metaphor in natural language, the 
mathematical landscape can be interpreted in multiple ways, and mathematicians 
are able to fluidly move between these different points of view. It is towards the 
metaphorical nature of mathematical concepts that we will next turn, as we explore 
how mathematicians become habituated to certain visions of the mathematical 
landscape. We shall see how those visions are shaped, how they evolve, and how 










Chapter 4: Discourse Spaces  
4.0 Overview  
 
In this final chapter I position mathematical perception within the wider social field 
of mathematical production. This social field is shaped through the distribution of 
social capital, which generates fields of force which influence individual's decisions 
and orientations within the field. Mathematicians' dispositions towards phenomena 
are products of their positions within this social field, and their socialisation within 
certain habitus.  
I explore the field as a competitive field, in which individuals are motivated 
by gaining social capital, through making their knowledge visible and recognisable. 
Ideas, in order to be assimilated within the wider field, and constituted as capital, 
must be structured so as to fit certain socially valued characteristics. Knowledge 
therefore must be coordinated and related to existing bodies of knowledge, in 
order to be accepted and assimilated within the wider field. I explore this process of 
coordinating local frames of reference to global reference frames, and show how 







Section 4.1: Sharing Visions  
  
4.10 Overview of Section 
In the following section I explore how an individual's personal vision of the 
mathematical landscape is coordinated with that of the community of practice. 
Private thought is transformed into public knowledge through conforming to 
certain structuring principles. Such structures order knowledge into categories 
which the wider community utilise and, in this way, new ideas are assimilated into 
the existing lexicon.   
4.11 Introduction 
To communicate their private vision of the mathematical landscape, a 
mathematician must refer to objects and concepts that other mathematicians 
already recognise. They must co-ordinate their personal understanding with that of 
the community's, and generate a shared frame of reference. Using this shared 
reference frame, individuals can refer to objects, and have them recognised by 
others as bearing certain qualities and meanings.  
The following section will explore the processes by which individuals come 
to share the same reference frames, and the means by which private thoughts are 
translated into common knowledge. I will argue that such reference frames are 
built up around a core of fundamental concepts and objects, which form key 
reference points within the mathematical landscape. Such reference points act as 
conceptual bridges between different knowledge domains, and serve to coordinate 
individual perspectives. I will demonstrate that all reference points ultimately 
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converge to a common origin, not at infinity, but rather within our own physical 
world. Such a convergence, I argue, is manifested in mathematicians’ ideas around 
mathematical intuition.  
4.12 Between worlds: How are domains of knowledge are connected? 
The first stage of understanding a novel concept or object is to relate that unknown 
entity to things one is already familiar with. Mathematicians thus explore unknown 
objects and spaces, in relation to the features or qualities which objects within their 
existing lexicon already possess. Once familiar features are identified, so a 
systematic process of comparison operations can proceed, between unknown 
concept and familiar concept. The mathematician is then able to notice similarities 
between different entities. The process of assimilating new information into one's 
existing concept categories can be summarised in the steps below: 
1. Feature detection and recognition 
2. Feature mapping and systematic comparison  
3. Classification and ordering  
By this simple process, a mathematician relates the unknown features of the 
mathematical landscape to the features they are already familiar with. New 
elements thus accrete around existing conceptual structures within the lexicon, 
becoming dependent upon the originating reference objects for interpretation. 
Through this mapping procedure the mathematician creates analogies between 
categories of objects or concepts. These analogies then influence how the 
mathematician interacts with the foreign concept, by creating certain expectations 
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about its characteristics and functions. Mathematicians thus use their knowledge of 
a familiar domain to give order to the foreign domain. We see this phenomena 
when mathematicians undertake interdisciplinary collaborations, or when a 
mathematician branches out into another field, as Amos describes below: 
IN: So you are very much crossing different fields. 
A: Yes I like that. For example, a big project that we are doing with a 
colleague...we asked for a number-theoretical reason. It's important to 
study some variants of analytic spaces that look like usual spheres and so 
on, and to make differential calculus on them. But those spaces come from a 
strange part of number theory and strictly speaking they are totally 
discontinuous, so it's more like scattered sand, or something. So it's not a 
usual vision of what a differential form is. There are some analogies that are 
possible, we developed a full kind of calculus that works and allows you to 
speak of objects the same way that you speak of them in the classical world, 
so I wanted to push forward the analogy and create objects with this. 
IN: But in order to have the analogy you have to have… 
A: A basic knowledge of the other field. Yes, yes. Also a basic 
understanding of why the technology that is used in the other field is 
important in that field. And how it is supposed to interact with mine. But for 
example, with previous work in number theory I had already observed that 
some machinery that works in analysis was useful for me, but it was useful 
for me that I knew that some analogue was working or should be working in 
the other so the idea was to try to cross the border. 
IN: When you've determined that something is an analogous object 
in one field, do you use the techniques from one field to explore the object 
in the other field?  
A: Yes and no, for example, concerning the subject I was just 
mentioning. For 10 years I really just used the tools and the theorems from 
the other field, and then for the last project, we tried to develop or create 
objects which satisfies the same rules as the other field. But the proof of the 
rules, that the object satisfies these rules, is not really the proof that comes 
from the other field. So the statements of the theorems were inspired by 
the other field, but sometimes the proof, we need to have new ones. 
IN: Can you go backwards to exporting the object from one field and 
reimport it back into the other? 
A: In principle it could happen. But it has not happened yet. Probably 
because our analogy is not yet deep enough, and has not yet produced 
enough results, so there's nothing to pull back to the other field yet. Except 
that, for example, we were mixing between two fields called Tropical 
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geometry and differential-form-occurrence-distribution theory and so what 
we did, so I was motivated by distribution theory and at some point we 
observed that the tools from tropical geometry were useful, but I had no 
interest at all in tropical geometry, except that I used it. And it happened 
that our work has implications for tropical geometry. But it was not planned 
it was really a surprise. We proved a very general formula, and we 
understood that it generalised some formula in tropical geometry, but we 
were not so much interested in that, but people in tropical geometry were 
interested to know that we had another proof.  
 
Identifying analogues allows for tools and techniques, used to describe one domain 
of knowledge, to be applied systematically to studying the analogical domain. The 
degree to which the conceptual "machinery" can be adapted to studying the 
analogue is, however, limited by the degree of similarities between the knowledge 
domains. Amos speaks about "deepening" the analogy between the concepts, in 
order to extend the techniques from one area into the other. The reference domain 
thus serves as a guide to structuring the analogical domain, influencing how the 
mathematician experiments with and interrogates the foreign entity.  
4.12 Anchoring thought: How shared reference frames are constructed 
The reference domain is often built around a small set of familiar objects, concepts 
or techniques. Such reference points furnish the mathematician with an intuition 
about comparable spaces or objects, motivating them to ask certain questions, use 
certain tools or techniques, or interpret the object in a certain way. Below, Eleanor 
describes how her mathematical intuition is shaped by her "favourite objects", 
which serve as guide-posts for navigating around the mathematical landscape:  
IN: How do you develop this intuition? Do you have specific tools and 
objects in mind? 
E: Yes, that's right, I have some favourite objects [laughs]. I'm very 
often testing my ideas on very simple cases, which doesn't mean much 
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because it may work in this case, but not in generality. But that's true, and I 
like to make small computations so to grab the object more, rather than just 
speculate.  I cannot just be satisfied with a purely computational argument. 
The starting point, in many cases, is an example. Yes, it's an example. It's an 
example I'm working on or somehow things that I've heard in a seminar that 
I relate to what I'm doing. So from a particular case I start to investigate and 
from that it grows into a theory.  
IN: You then test the theory on more and more examples and try to 
make it more and more general in some way? 
E: Yes, so if my idea doesn't work, in a basic example, then it means 
that there's something that I've missed obviously. So I'm trying not to 
resolve the problem for that specific example, but to think of what could be 
going on in that particular question that I didn't see. So that's where more 
abstract arguments become involved. And ultimately I can make a 
statement that yes it works like that in that example - because people like to 
have examples, they're not satisfied with just pure theory. It comes and 
goes. I start from the example, then add new ideas, and then I ultimately go 
back to the examples. Not to be sure, but just for fun, I check on the 
examples just for fun.  
 
The mathematician tests novel phenomena against their exemplar objects, in order 
to determine the features held in common. The exemplar thus serves to anchor the 
mathematician's investigations around a specific set of questions. These questions 
narrow down the possible categories to which the object can belong to, and thus 
they serve to organise the novel phenomena within a given class of object. Through 
incorporating an object within a given category, the mathematician is then able to 
subject the object to the same interpretive framework that other objects in the 
class are subject to. In this way, the novel object becomes semantically anchored to 
the contents of the class.  
As a mathematician builds up their library of exemplar objects, furnishing 
and diversifying their classificatory systems, so they are able to detect a greater 
range of mathematical phenomena, and categorise them accordingly. Greater 
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experience leads to a more developed mathematical intuition, which results in 
experienced mathematicians being able to more easily identify possible solutions to 
problems. As one researcher, Gordon, explains, the experienced mathematician is 
able to identify the relationships between objects in a similar way to the chess 
player is able to identify possible moves on a chess board:  
G: It’s a little hard to describe actually. Giving a sense of what intuition is, is 
getting a little involved. What I can say is that mathematical objects live 
their own lives. And for a mathematician they are as real as a rock can be for 
a geologist or a star can be for an astronomer, they are actual objects and 
you get to know how they behave. It’s a vision of objects and the 
relationships between these objects, OK. On the one hand you have the 
mathematical objects themselves, on the other hand you have the 
techniques, proofs, this theorem, that theorem, which gives you direction, 
ligne de fuite we say in French, in which that particular technique can be 
efficient. I would compare it with chess, ok. When you see one bishop for 
instance on a chess board. Inexperienced people see the bishop itself on a 
given square, experienced players see the lines on which the bishop is 
actually efficient. And for experienced mathematicians it is exactly the 
same. You see where and how the technique can be applied and then 
usually colleagues see it as well as you do, but sometimes you can say did 
you use these types of things and sometimes the idea did not even occur to 
the person you were talking with.  
 
Mathematical intuition manifests itself as an ability to "see" certain connections, or 
possible solutions to problems (that is to say that mathematicians gain a practical 
mastery of the field and thus are able to construe the field as a field of possibilities 
for action). Solutions appear as visual representations of the mathematical 
referents, and come to mind in the form of mental "pictures", which can often be 
sketched on paper or on the blackboard. With increasing experience, so the 
mathematician is able to bring to mind a greater number and variety of mental 
pictures, which serve to structure how the novel concept is being perceived and 
interpreted. Topologist, Marie, explains how her supervisor is able to discern a 
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greater range of mathematical phenomena, and thus is able to guide her own 
perception of the mathematical landscape:  
M: For this Estevan has more intuition than me because he knows all the 
different guys on the list and he had many more rules from which to choose 
the deformation that I do not have. I know the list but I have ideas of how to 
use the different pieces of the theory and the different images, but I'm not 
sure if they're true. But I don’t have as much knowledge as Estevan, so I 
have to use him a lot.   
M: Maybe there are some singularities that I wasn’t seeing, because I 
didn’t have them in mind. Maybe there was a bifurcation I was not able to 
imagine. But I'm still not sure how to go from this to this. For Estevan it's not 
a problem. 
 
4.13 The Bridge between worlds: How is meaning translated between domains? 
The quote from Marie demonstrates how, once a suitable reference object is 
obtained, the solution to a problem can be more easily perceived. The referent 
provides the necessary characteristics to motivate certain comparison operations, 
which more easily classify the novel object within a more well-defined semantic 
space. These reference objects thus can be shared between mathematicians, 
providing common reference points by which to orient individual's perspectives. 
The reference domain acts as a bridge between different knowledge domains. Once 
this bridge linking different domains is recognised, so it can be used as an interface 
for transferring meaning between them. A geometer, Brian, explains to me the 
process by which semantic bridges are generated: 
B: I had found some inequalities on multiplicities in commutative algebra, 
that's one thing and at some point I realised that they bore a very close 
formal resemblance with inequalities from the theory of convex sets, convex 
bodies in ℝⁿ. So formally the two things are quite distinct, but as it turned 
out - also this was a stroke of luck because the theory of toric varieties was 
being born, more or less at that time. And I found that through the theory of 
toric varieties you could make a direct bridge. So the question then arose 
258 
 
that, if these inequalities are true for toric varieties, are they true in general 
for any algebraic variety? So this kind of problem you see comes up 
naturally once you have some attitude. Like when you want to understand 
specifically why these inequalities are so similar and intuitively you realise 
that there has to be some connection, and then you try to make it work. 
And that sometimes gives you some very nice connections. Of course you 
can't say that this works always. But that is one way in which you can have 
problems, which at least I find interesting.  
IN: So when you see the analogy between two domains can you use 
the tools you use to describe one object to describe the object in the other 
domain? 
B: No in fact one of the interesting things is that sometimes the tools 
of proof are completely different but you must build a bridge. As I say, one 
of the things I was interested in was to prove isoperimetric inequalities from 
algebraic geometry using this bridge. Of course the way in which one proves 
isomperimetric inequalities is rather different, within the theory of convex 
bodies let us say.  
But in fact what you use in theory - so you prove inequalities in algebraic 
geometry which imply those isoperimetric inequalities - but the two 
methods, in fact, deep down, they have something in common which is 
something about the theory of elliptic operators. So deep down there is 
something in common, but in fact that came after, once you realise that the 
proofs in that field can be connected by a link, then you start saying "well 
there has to be something common to these two proofs" and then if you 
look for it, then in fact you see that its more or less apparent [laughs] in the 
theory of convex bodies.  
 
The bridge acts as a decryption key for translating meaning between different 
domains. When corresponding structures in one domain are discovered or created 
within the receiver domain, so objects from one can be transformed into objects 
within the other. Once a mathematician understands how the decryption key 
functions, then the process of translating between domains becomes second 
nature. Indeed the process of translation becomes naturalised, and falls into the 
realm of the unconscious, intuitive aspects to mathematical work. As the concepts 
evolve, so the conceptual bridges become part of the background infrastructure to 
the field, and they are used without comment. The analogical nature of such 
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semantic bridges are thus obscured, as constructions become formalised; thus 
novel features to the landscape are domesticated, familiarised and forgotten.   
4.14 Affective frames: How is mathematics grounded in the phenomenal world?  
This process of formalisation, familiarisation, and forgetting is common practice in 
natural language. We use metaphors, foreign words, place names, slang, idioms, 
without even being aware of it; in mathematical languages the same is true. 
Novelty becomes banality over time, as concepts are assimilated into a language, 
and as they are used more frequently. The key reference points within the 
landscape become shared references by the community of practice. Thus the 
reference frames through which the mathematical landscape is viewed become 
common to the community.   
This common, invisible, conceptual infrastructure is built upon over time, 
becoming increasingly formalised and abstracted away from its original referents. 
But for some mathematicians, in order to gain an intuition of a concept, they must 
seek reference points outside of conceptual spaces, and ground their 
understanding within their experiences of the physical world. Indeed the physical 
world becomes the source of inspiration for many mathematicians, who use 
physical processes as analogies for operations within abstract spaces. As a 
topologist, Estevan tells me: 
E: Sometimes you just need to put your hands in the mud and make 
computations or drawings and you prove something without such a high 




One differential geometer, Vincent, goes a step further, and argues that all 
mathematical intuition has its grounding in an understanding of the physical world: 
V: I like to use this image which is perhaps a bit shocking to you, but I say 
that you understand a field when you have explained it to your primate. 
That means that your basic intuition of the world is what the primate has 
intuition of space, intuition of progression, of size and things like that. 
Ultimately, when you try to learn a subject you slowly, slowly teach your 
intuition to work in that subject. But to think of some kind of movement in 
some abstract space, but which is similar to something that you understand. 
For example if you learn mechanics, ultimately you understand that in a 
configuration space a movement is like throwing a stone. So any mechanical 
object, however complicated, you could spin tops, you could make a big top 
and put little tops on top of it, and you can make the whole thing turn, and 
so you have a very complicated mechanical system, but in the end in the 
right configuration space the trajectory is just a line, it's just a curve, OK. 
And then that speaks to your intuition of the world because you know that 
when you throw a stone it describes a curve.  
So when you manage to reduce, when you have the mathematical 
language to reduce complicated objects like that to some relatively simple 
intuition, then you can make progress. You can imagine problems, and 
imagine connections and then you become fluent in the field. Even though 
you may not master all the techniques, you become somehow fluent in the 
field, you become able to understand proofs.  
V: Understanding proof is never something you do by formal 
reduction, it's always something you do by explaining to your primate how it 
works. Of course your primate has to be educated. That's what it means to 
become a mathematician. You have painfully, through the years, taught 
your primate to understand some things which are actually written in 
scientific papers. But basically you must understand that when you read the 
word "hyperplane sections" your primate says "Oh yes, I know that, it's like 
that", and when you read the world, I don't know - "raising to the square, or 
raising to some power" your primate says "Oh yes I know that too because 
you have taught me what It means". Or even "approximation", because your 
primate has an idea of the real line and he knows what it means to be near 
or nearer, or not so near and so on.  
  
Vincent argues that mathematicians' intuitions of mathematical spaces are derived 
from an understanding of processes in the physical world. Vincent's "primate" 
refers to the embodied, primitive mind of our early ancestors. Abstract thought, he 
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argues, emerges through adapting cognitive structures specialised for visual 
perception, spatial thinking and planning. For him, constructions, objects and 
spaces in mathematics bear certain resemblances to physical constructions, objects 
and spaces. The act of intuiting becomes a way of relating, analogically, the 
processes occurring in the abstract space to processes which occur in physical 
contexts. The ultimate reference frame for mathematical reality thus becomes the 
body's experience of the physical world.  
This view does not reduce mathematical reality to physical reality, but 
rather it allows us to think about the common organising principles which structure 
both domains of experience. We have seen that analogies lie at the root of human 
experience, serving to link together elements within the mathematical landscape, 
as well as structures in physical and conceptual realities. Analogies serve to 
structure objects by mapping the features of one source, or reference, domain onto 
a receiver domain. The semantic bridges created between reference and receiver 
domains then facilitate further transfers of structure and content between them. 
Through individuals sharing reference frames with a community of language users, 
so a shared conceptual landscape is created and reified.   
The mathematical landscape is perceived as "natural" and objective, outside 
of the realms of human artifice, yet, as we have seen, these conceptual landscapes 
are subject to change. We have witnessed how certain objects, concepts and 
techniques come to play dominant roles as points of reference in the landscape, 
and how certain proofs and semantic bridges have become formal, invisible parts of 
the conceptual infrastructure. Shared reference frames, we saw, serve to orient 
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individual's visions of the mathematical landscape. Such frames organise 
experience, giving structure to the field of view, but, at the same time, they filter 
out certain elements, and distort one's vision of the field.  
The very language that a mathematician uses to describe mathematical 
reality is thus not neutral, but rather it is the product of history, politics and culture 
(Restivo, 1994:212). I argue that, like natural languages, mathematical languages 
possess discourse structures which influence individuals' orientations and 
dispositions to reality. Mathematical languages form fields of force which help 
organise experience, and shape the direction of thought. In the final two sections I 
shall explore this role that language plays in shaping perception. I shall chart the 
social lives that concepts in mathematics experience, following the biographies of 
concepts. Finally I shall demonstrate how political and social forces play a role in 











Section 4.2: Socialising the Landscape 
 
4.20 Overview   
In the following section I shall explore the life histories of mathematical concepts. I 
shall provide examples of how concepts emerge, how they develop, and how they 
are shaped by the social world (through “field effects”). The mathematical 
landscape, we will see, is part of the socio-cultural13 landscape, and subject to the 
structuring principles of habitus. In what follows we will come to understand how 
individual mathematicians negotiate social structures, and exert their own agency.   
4.21 Introduction 
I argue that the mathematical landscape is interwoven with the socio-cultural 
landscape within which it is created. I will use mathematicians' narratives about 
their research histories to chart out the biographies of ideas. We shall see that 
ideas are products of the social contexts within which a mathematician lives. 
Mathematical concepts are given meaning through their assimilation into pre-
existing bodies of knowledge. Ideas become subject to evaluation and classification 
in their quest to be incorporated within a mathematical language.  
For a mathematical proof to be accepted as valid it must, therefore, 
conform to the conventions of a given mathematical genre, and must ultimately be 
accepted or reshaped by a community of practitioners. The perceived validity of a 
                                                          
13 By cultural contexts I am referring to the specific mathematical cultures and traditions of practice 
which emerge within national, regional, or specific institutional contexts. Such traditions are 
transmitted through processes of socialisation and lead to specific styles or schools of thought, as 
well as certain styles for presenting and representing knowledge in mathematics.  
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proof therefore depends upon the contexts in which it is presented. In what follows 
I shall demonstrate how ideas are transformed as they move between contexts. 
Ideas, we shall see, have social lives, forming social relationships with people and 
other ideas, as they become assimilated and accepted by communities of practice.  
4.22 Socialising thought: Understanding the social lives of ideas  
Mathematicians’ social networks14 are integral to the development, dissemination, 
and acceptance of their ideas. Supervisors provide guidance, direction and initial 
problems, which can influence the trajectory of a student's career. Collaborators 
provide a means of extending a researcher's interests, tools and techniques, and 
provide opportunities to proof-read papers and test ideas. Colleagues, likewise, 
provide a source of new ideas, and the latest news from the wider community. 
Mathematicians’ social spheres coordinate their actions, influencing the ideas they 
consume, as well as the knowledge they produce.  
During a mathematician's career certain individuals will have a large impact 
on the subsequent questions that they ask, as well as the research tools they may 
choose to adopt. One topologist, Lawrence, describes how chance encounters with 
two professors shaped his entire research career in mathematics: 
L: I was extremely lucky. I had amazing luck, I had two supervisors from 
Cambridge. One was a big shot called FA... So FA was a rather forbidding 
character, and very, very capable, but rather frightening. And on my first day 
as a graduate student I went to see him saying I want to be your student, 
but also possibly involving AC. He listened politely and he gave me three 
possible topics, and I kind of didn't like any of them. I didn't say it quite so 
                                                          
14 Here a mathematical “social network” is taken to mean the system of relationships an individual 
forms with other individuals or organisations within the mathematical field. The social network of a 
mathematician comprises of relationships with colleagues, collaborators, students, supervisors, 
directors of institutes, members of funding bodies, as well as affiliations with institutions, such as 
universities, awards bodies, publishers, etc.  
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brutally because he was the big professor and I was the first day graduate 
student, let alone first year. Anyway he sensed that I was not enthusiastic. 
And then a miracle happened. He always came to tea, he was very rigorous 
about that, and I sat with him at tea and he said he had just been to a big 
international conference for mathematicians in Nice, in France, and the 
great Russian mathematician Novikov had been forbidden by the Russians to 
come and collect his field's medal and Michenko - a young Russian colleague 
went to give Novikov's lecture for him. And he took notes - AC - and maybe I 
would be interested in reading them and working in that field. And then a 
miracle happened, and I've been working on these problems ever since.  
If I had said yes to one of these three problems in the morning who 
knows what would have happened. But I held out till the afternoon. [The 
problem I chose] was something AC could help me with - it's called Surgery 
theory. So I was very, very fortunate that AC didn't work in surgery theory 
himself - he worked in Homotopy theory - a neighbouring subject. But he 
kind of sensed that I would never be a Homotopy theorist. He used to say 
that I couldn't even pronounce the word correctly - I put the accent on the 
wrong syllable. But he did point me in the right direction, he was very kind 
to me. Maybe because I wasn't really working within his own field. I mean 
his own students didn't manage to get PhDs by and large. At least I managed 
to get my PhD. He was a great man and, much later, I dedicated one of my 
books to him. But sadly 25 years ago, he died in a car accident, but I've 
cherished his memory.  
 
The narrative reveals a number of important sociological processes which are 
involved in the replication of mathematical habitus. The first is the apprentice-
master relationship between student and supervisor. Oftentimes a mathematics 
PhD will have much more close supervision and mentoring in comparison to 
students from other disciplines. The internationalisation of research networks 
reveals itself in AC travelling to Nice for a lecture by Novikov. The role of informal 
conversations and social exchanges at Tea-time and coffee breaks becomes 
apparent, as well as the continued friendships which persist between Lawrence and 
AC, even after he graduates. The fact that AC is not a competitor to Lawrence, 
because he does not work in Surgery Theory, also plays a role in the Lawrence's 
success within the field, as well as his continued friendship with AC. Finally the gift 
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of a dedication to AC in Lawrence's book is a way of reciprocating AC's initial gift of 
the Novikov lecture notes early on in his career.  
The process of becoming socialised within the mathematical community is 
similar in other cultural contexts. Below for example Bertrand gives his own 
personal experiences of becoming enculturated within the French education 
system: 
B: So while I was in the Class Preparatoire I became interested in number 
theory, and then I was a student at the Ecole Polytechnique. And at the 
Ecole Polytechnique I was still interested in number theory. But there it was 
very difficult to study anything. Everything went very fast and you didn't 
have much time to concentrate. Anyway, when I came out I was still 
interested in number theory, especially additive number theory, at that 
time... But I had the good fortune at some point to have lectures by Zeriski. 
And then I became really enthusiastic about what he was doing, and what 
he was talking about. I did not understand anything about what he was 
talking about, but it just looked great. From his personality, from the way he 
spoke about it, as I say I couldn't really understand anything that was going 
on.  
Especially at the Ecole Polytechnique we learned analysis and 
practically no algebra to speak of, only Linear algebra, and that was terrible. 
So I didn't know what a ring was, I didn't know what an ideal was, none of 
that stuff. And so, to me, what Zeriski was talking about was a kind of 
beautiful poetry. But, as I say, I couldn't understand anything. But then I 
started working on this with the help of Pierre Samuel, who was really 
encouraging. And then I had a second stroke of luck, which was meeting 
Hironaka - and he then became my teacher.  
And so then I became interested in singularities, first listening to 
Zeriski, then meeting Hironaka. So it was a great thing at that time because 
you could get a position without, practically, having done anything. [Laughs] 
I mean I entered the CNRS practically straight after the Ecole Polytechnique. 
I didn't have a thesis, I didn’t have anything. I just had some 
recommendations from my teachers at the Ecole Polytechnique, and that 
was that.  
So at the beginning, as I said, I didn't know what a ring was. I 
remember that the first sentence of Zariski's paper was "Let O be a one 
dimensional local ring…" and so every word was new to me [laughs]. So, 
after several months, we worked at it, and finally understood something, 
and gave some talks finally at the seminar of Samuel. So that was the 
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influence of Samuel: to always be very encouraging and open, and so we all 
have a debt to him. I mean we were all nothing to him. He was not at all 
obliged to help us...Yes I have a very fond memory of him.  
 
Mathematics in France is a highly competitive field to enter into. Individuals who 
are academically gifted find that the natural course for them is to continue through 
the top schools, through preparatory schools, and onwards to university, eventually 
becoming researchers or professors. The school a mathematician attends has a 
large bearing on subsequent career moves they can make. However, association 
with well-known figures in the field can serve as a way to step around some 
obstacles. In the above narrative Bertrand tells us how his advisors' 
recommendations allowed him to acquire a job at the CNRS, despite having no 
publications, and little experience in research.  
It is perhaps because of such kindness from members of the community, or 
through the results of fortuitous encounters or events, that many mathematicians 
attribute their success not necessarily to their own skill, but rather to their own 
good luck. Success, they argue, is never an inevitability; it is never just the product 
of genius, rather it is a result of navigating successfully through the social field. In 
order to navigate across the social landscape an individual requires guides. In 
Bertrand's narrative such guides take the form of influential lecturers, such as 
Zariski, advisors and mentors, such as Hironaka and Pierre Samuel, as well as fellow 
students such as Monet. These guides provide access to new ideas, to social 
networks, to employment, as well as to social capital. These influences from the 
social world therefore shape the directions that a mathematician takes during their 
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career, and this has an effect on the concepts they consume and produce as a 
result.   
4.23 Social histories of thought: How the mathematical field is reproduced 
If we turn now to exploring the life-histories of ideas, we see that they are 
inextricably intertwined with the lives of their creators. The origins of ideas are 
often hard to pin down, rather they emerge unexpectedly during the course of 
one's life. Lawrence, recalls his first unexpected encounter with the Geometric Hopf 
invariant, a concept which was to influence his subsequent research in topology: 
L: So that was all very important, but not mathematical. The next day I went 
to a book shop, right there on Mallet Street, which I used to go to as a 
student. And this was a bookshop - I've forgotten the name - but it’s the - it 
was in those days. In the 60s when I was young, the most important 
bookshop for mathematics books in London.  
Now - and there was a book - just came out by - not just by MC - but 
by MC and his supervisor called EJ, who was at that time one of the main 
professors at Oxford. And most of the book - I looked at it and I spent about 
5 minutes looking at it, and most of it, to be honest was slightly dull. But 
there was one page when I realised: this is very interesting. And I've been - 
so this one page - contained something called the Hopf invariant - the 
geometric Hopf Invariant - which I realised was going to be very important 
for me. And so ever since, I came back here, and I asked MC whether we 
could work on this together. And so we did - and so I have this, 
unfortunately, rather long manuscript. Which is now, however many pages 
it is [flicking through].  
 
On first encountering the geometric Hopf invariant Lawrence contacts the author 
and begins a conversation with MC, which eventually leads to a long-term 
collaboration. Lawrence later explains how this concept of the geometric Hopf 
invariant had itself been passed to MC from MC's supervisor J: 
L: I was trying to understand…well to use technical words - in my early work 
I showed how to go from something called the stable map of spaces to 
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quadratic functions. It had been known for a long time that stable maps give 
quadratic functions in algebra, but what he did - in the geometric Hopf 
invariant - was to associate to a stable map a quadratic function in 
geometry. So he had a very concrete construction which goes back to 
something his supervisor had done. His supervisor, professor J, had done 
very good work in the 1950s, and some of it is forgotten. But there was one 
idea there that was crucial for MC and for me. It’s a very simple idea - it's 
called the difference construction.  If you take - I mean I can even say it in 
one sentence - we have two maps of spaces we cannot add or subtract 
them. [But] you can with stable maps.  
I mean that sounds rather stupid, but it has been long known that 
stable maps have better addition and subtraction properties…it’s a simple 
idea, but I didn't know about it to be honest, and I wish I had had the 
gumption to ask myself - but I didn’t. But that's alright, MC did have the 
gumption. But what he didn't know is how to apply it to my - what I call 
"Surgery theory" - that's where I come in. He was doing it for his own 
purposes. And I could see that there were other purposes. So that is very 
good, you always want to do mathematics that grabs somebody else. Of 
course you can try to hammer somebody and say: "I have solved this great 
problem". But he wasn't solving a great problem, he was just developing a 
nice technique which was quite useful for him, and I suspect that I'm one of 
the few people that have read his books. I may be wrong. But it's really an 
acquired taste.  
 
Through collaborating with MC, Lawrence is introduced to this new set of concepts 
which MC had inherited from his supervisor J. Lawrence's contribution to the 
collaboration was to make MC's technique more accessible, and useful, within the 
context of Surgery theory. As Lawrence indicates, few people read MC's books 
because they are perhaps too specialised. But, in order for such ideas to become 
more well-known, they must be written in an accessible format. Below, Lawrence 
continues his narrative, explaining that MC's writing style can be inaccessible 
because of its clipped, condensed, "telegraphic" style: 
L: In fact he (MC) wrote much shorter papers, in telegraphic style, 40 years 
ago, 30 years ago, and the reviewer wrote: "This is a master piece of 
telegraphic mathematics" [Laughs]. So his comments to me, on our project, 
are a bit similar. Actually to be fair to him, earlier this year he has written all 
of 15 pages of text, which I'm struggling at the moment to work out what to 
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do with, because you can't just slot it in. The way he writes you can't just 
take it and put it as a chapter of the book, and off you go…So I'm struggling 
with it a lot, and I may have to invite him to come here, or I'll go there. But I 
mean he's obviously a very good collaborator in the sense that he's right. A 
very bad collaborator in that he doesn't…he's repressed [laughs]. And a 
repressed mathematician is a very tough customer - but they're always 
right… You would like a little bit of explanation, a little bit of the human 
touch - a little bit of almost encouragement. But I'm slightly being unkind. 
 
The style of one's presentation of a proof in mathematics can thus be just as 
important as the content of the proof. For an idea to have some success, to 
influence other mathematician's work, it must be presented in a conventional, 
accessible way. Ideas in mathematics can thus bear similar characteristics to their 
creators - being social or antisocial, introverted or extroverted. In the above 
example, MC's proofs are an acquired taste, requiring specialised knowledge in 
order to be fully understood.  
Other researchers, however, are more easily able to move between 
different social and conceptual contexts: crossing fields and adapting their 
conceptual apparatus to translate meaning between knowledge worlds. Andre, a 
geometer, tells me how he prefers to assimilate tools from many different 
contexts:  
A:  So my PhD was already the kind of stuff like that. I had a very strange 
question, from my advisor, which said that "someone has proved this for 
elliptic curves and can you prove this for Abelian varieties which are 
generalisations of elliptic curves?" And the tools employed by the other 
people were clearly not applicable in the general case...Elliptic curves is a 
very nice subject because it is linked with very abstract theory, but also its 
very concrete with many equations which you can write down explicitly. So 
you can mix them. So I just tried to work on that. Incorporating what I knew 
from other fields, and other points of view. I was beginning in what is called 
Arithmetic geometry, which is already a geometrical way to look at number 
theory, that mixes algebra, geometry, number theory and analysis. 
Everything is there already, so that was my kind of basic training field, for 
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my Master's thesis. And then the question that was asked to me might have 
had some relation with that point of view or not. But I thought of it in this 
point of view, and gradually I understood what happened, and how one 
should prove the results I was interested in. And, ultimately, it appeared 
that what I did was not so unrelated to the case of the elliptic curves. 
A: In fact, after my PhD, I tried to solve another problem in which I 
learned a new set of techniques. Not really learned, but used. Back during 
my PhD I was close to another colleague and we talked about math and he 
used these kinds of techniques of distributions that I referred to. And so we 
discussed this together, just because it was interesting. So I followed very 
closely what he did in his PhD thesis, and it was clear that those tools were 
relevant for what I did at some point, so I absorbed them, and used them. 
And those tools - it is precisely motivated by those tools - that I tried 
recently to develop the geometric theory. And so, in some sense, what I 
have inherited from my PhD times is some kind of point of view, which I try 
to impose on problems that I want to solve.  
 
By moving between fields, and assimilating knowledge and styles from a number of 
contexts Andre has been able to make his ideas much more accessible. As a result 
his papers are more likely to be read, and therefore passed onto a wider 
community of practitioners.  
4.24 From Private thought to public practice: How do ideas become part of 
habitus? 
These issues of accessibility confront the mathematician upon publication, and 
during presentation. When ideas move from the private to the public sphere, so 
their structure needs to change in order to conform to the conventions of a 
community. An algebraic topologist, Jessica, describes her experiences of 
presenting and translating her ideas to a non-specialist audience: 
J: So the problem is, if you want to describe curve here, I needed to describe 
what it means to "Begin like alpha 2". When you draw a picture you say: "Oh 
look, it begins like alpha 2!", but then, when you think about that, it's up to 
isotopy. And if you just say: "Begin like", your alpha 2 can go anywhere in 
the surface, because you can move it. So I can make a code, just like this: 
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you choose an equator and you put a name on every segment between the 
points of the Cantor set. Imagine it is like that, so you have a name for every 
segment, 1234, then you say: "This is like beta". And so this is a picture of 
beta. But then you say beta is like 3, because you go to 3, 1,4 and three; and 
there is only one way to do that. And when you write it this way its rigorous, 
because there's only one way to do that. And then I went to Mexico and 
people read my paper and they said: "We didn't understand what you said 
about the coding". They were like: "What are you talking about?" [Laughs]. 
Yeah because when you write just the results, I try to write it pedagogically, 
but I think I failed. When you write it at the board, taking the time and 
everything, people are like: "OK I understand that". But when you just write 
it with the code they're like: "Wow. What just happened?" We have to do it 
this way because picture is not a proof.  
 
When ideas move from one's private thoughts to a public setting so they must be 
formalised, conventionalised and stylised to suit the audience one is presenting to. 
Ideas thus are transformed to fit the classifications of the genre, and are formalised 
so as to create a familiar context for others to understand them. A common 
conceptual ground is thus created, through ideas being related to a certain history 
and tradition of thought.    
 
 
4.25 Contextualising thought: Understanding the domestication of ideas  
For ideas to be adopted and accepted by a community they must be presented in 
an acceptable manner. Ideas must be fitted into the rest of the field, through 
creating relationships with other concepts and problems in the field. To give order 
to new ideas one must fit them into existing categories, and construct historical 
narratives around them, which legitimise their presence in such categories. Vincent, 
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an algebraic topologist, exemplifies this process, when he traces out the lineage of 
his idea: 
V: Alright - so my thesis was all to do with chain complexes. So these are 
purely algebraic objects, and they have quadratic structure. So one of the 
big subjects in mathematics is quadratic forms…And originally the modern 
version of quadratic forms works with rings and modules and that's fine, 
that's kind of abstract algebra. It has a history going back to Lagrange, in the 
18th century, Silvest in the 19th. Between Gauss in the early 19th - many, 
many famous mathematicians have worked on quadratic forms. That's a 
standard topic of number theory, and also has very important application in 
topology.  
 
Other researchers build upon the ideas of contemporary influential individuals. 
Bertrand, below, describes this process of simplifying, generalising, clarifying and 
formalising the ideas of Hironaka, in order to make them more accessible to other 
members of the field:  
B: You know I think that, as far as I'm concerned, you learn things, you try to 
understand them, and problems sort of jump at you. You suddenly see that 
if things are this way they would be simpler, and it would clarify things, and 
then problems suddenly jump at you. Of course you can choose one of the 
well-known problems, but I don’t think that’s ever the way it works. In fact 
Clochet and I went to Harvard to work with Hironaka and, at that time, we 
were helping in the reduction of his work on singularities. But that was 
Hironaka's problem, Hironaka's ideas.  
But as we worked we tried to simplify, and, in trying to simplify, we 
raised questions and problems. In the end it was very fruitful. We found 
several things which were motivated by the fact that we had to try and 
understand some of the techniques that Hironaka used. We wanted to 
perfect them, to make them more intuitive, and that's how problems arose. 
And then later, well, there is another way, of course, to find problems, 
which is to make analogies, or to understand some operation. For example, 
a little later, I tried to understand what the effect of hyperplane sections 





This process of socialising ideas within the field, of creating relationships to other, 
existing, accepted concepts, is the means by which novel concepts become 
domesticated within the existing field. Novel ideas become adapted and formalised 
so as to fit the contexts in which they are being presented. Through this process of 
contextualisation, they are incorporated and related to the pre-existing habitus. 
Novel ideas are sewn into an historical narrative, related to other authority figures 
within the field, and thus given a place within the existing social and conceptual 
landscape. In the next section we shall explore how a common conception of fields 
within mathematics are created through this process of socialising ideas and 
individuals. We shall see, through creating a system of rules, standards and 












Section 4.3: The Field of Mathematical Production 
 
4.30 Overview   
In this final section I shall discuss the role that authority figures play in shaping 
mathematician's visions of the mathematical landscape. I will explore how authority 
figures help shape discourse and influence the directions of thought in 
mathematics, as well as the means by which points of view and dispositions 
(habitus) are reproduced and inherited by subsequent generations of researchers. 
Through habitus, we shall see, mathematicians come to experience a field of force 
which shapes their tastes, their values and judgements, as well as their visions of 
mathematical reality.   
4.31 Introduction 
I argue that mathematical habitus reproduce the social order, through replicating 
certain values, habits and dispositions within communities of practice. New 
members of the community are assimilated within it through adopting and 
adapting the linguistic, conceptual and social machinery needed to produce the 
mathematical field. Through becoming socialised within mathematical cultures, so 
individuals adopt the discourse structures which give order to their worlds.  
Discourse in mathematics takes the form of talk about truth, beauty, value 
and meaning. Such discourse serves to transmit the rules and conventions of the 
group, shaping how phenomena are evaluated and interpreted by members of the 
community. Such discourse thus serves to structure how individuals perceive and 
relate to the mathematical landscape they encounter, and shapes the community's 
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interests and orientations within the field. In the following we shall see how 
influential individuals shape the field of discourse, and influence the values, 
interests and tastes of other members of the mathematical community.  
4.32 Footprints of the field: Understanding how authority figures shape discourse  
In mathematics, the impact of individual agency on the structure of the language 
becomes evident in the naming conventions for concepts, techniques and objects. 
There are Euler numbers, Lagrangian operators, Wiles' Proof, Conway's Thrackle 
conjecture, etc. The naming conventions provide some indication of the origins of 
certain ideas, and of the individuals involved in generating those ideas. These 
individuals are immortalised in the named features of the mathematical landscape, 
and they serve not only as guide-posts for navigating the field, but also as goal-
posts for the achievements mathematicians should aspire to in their careers. Such 
influence is highlighted in the quote from an algebraic geometer, Claude, below, 
which discusses the influences on his research in Homological algebra: 
IN: How did you become interested in Homological algebra? 
C: It was in the air. Maurice Alessandra came for one year in Paris 
and gave a series of seminars and he was a tremendous person. He was a 
very creative and elegant mind. And a friend of mine, he's in New York now, 
we got very interested in what he was saying and explaining. And that's how 
I began with that. But he was invited by our advisor Pierre Samuel - so there 
is some kind of continuity. But at that time you chose your subject, you 
chose your PhD subject. I mean there's nothing original in that, everybody 
was doing that, with or without great successes.  
  
The trouble is that I changed my research subject. I moved to, not 
completely, but I moved to classical geometry, compact geometry. And also 
that was taught to you - if you wanted to progress you had to extend your 
results, if you've found a reasonable group of results that has been 
recognised by publication in journals, although you didn't solve, in my case, 
the main conjectures, still you made a way through a group of conjectures 
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which have been accepted as important conjectures. You have published in 
decent journals and at some point, in my case, it was 10 years in the same 
subject and it was good enough.  
And I slowly moved, changed collaborators, and moved to classical 
geometry, which at that time was a very active part of mathematics, 
classical projective geometry, which is of course not the case now. Under 
the influence of Grothendiek of course as was my first subject, which was 
clearly under the influence of Grothendiek. So I moved to that, published 
some good papers, one which had, historically, a very impressive success, 
numerous citations, I don’t know how many. Which doesn't impress me that 
much by the way because I was lucky at that.  
 
Above Claude explains the roles played by a number of influential individuals during 
his career. For many mathematicians in algebraic geometry Alexander Grothendiek 
plays a leading role in their narratives, with their intellectual lineages being traced 
back to his foundational works on schemes, etale cohomology, and k-theory. Many 
mathematicians confess to having an intellectual genitor or "hero", who inspires 
their work and career directions, as Nico explains below: 
N: That's true. So I agree with you, I have some mathematical heroes and I 
want to see their notes. So my main mathematical hero is Poincaré and 
what is unusual about him is that even his writing style, in his papers, he 
never returns to what he said, so there are a lot of mistakes, a lot of dead 
ends, even in his published papers. But there are not so many Poincarés. I'm 
sure there are people like Gromov today, I'm sure there are mathematicians 
who have kept their notes and I'm sure there is enough for an army of 
historians and sociologists. I'm 40 now, I'm no Poincaré. I think I'm a decent 
mathematician, but there are plenty of mathematicians like me. It's not like 
I'm going to change the face of mathematics. 
 
Nico uses Poincaré as a point of reference for his own work. Despite his own 
considerable achievements, Nico believes he pales in comparison to Poincaré. 
Living in the shadow of giants thus leads to many mathematicians adopting a 
discourse of modesty when talking about their work and achievements. Their 
heroes, on the other hand, have their reputations and histories embellished and 
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mythologised. Narratives are constructed about famous people, which add to their 
sense of mystique and genius. As algebraic topologist, Evan, explains, famous 
individuals accrue status and fame, as ideas seek to become popularised through 
association:   
E: Most ideas are attributed to people because they are well known as they 
had made the ideas transmissible. But they were not the original authors of 
the ideas. When an idea appears in general it is not understandable. And it 
appears in that context and you have to find it. The use of it comes after. 
The guy who comes up with the idea should be credited with it, but that’s 
not always the case.  
 
By associating certain ideas with certain names and persons of influence, ideas can 
thus themselves become more visible within the field (they can accumulate more 
social capital). Status can be transferred from people to ideas, and thus ideas 
themselves can become influential and widely recognisable. It is perhaps for that 
reason that many mathematicians prefer to work in the shadows of giants, and to 
construct their intellectual lineages in descent of great men and women. Such 
histories of ideas assimilate individuals into wider narratives, and serve to legitimise 
their own ideas, through deferring questions of authority and legitimacy to their 
intellectual forebears. However, such deference to authority figures does lead to a 
certain degree of distortion of the past, and the figures of the past, as differential 
geometer Michael explains: 
M: There is no contest between people. People like Thom are original, his 
ideas are his ideas. Some people say he had not proved things, which is 
quite often true, but quite often he gave the main ideas for the proof. That’s 
what happened in singularity theory.  
Usually the process is that you have a really good mathematician 
exploring an unknown area and they do almost everything that is interesting 
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and what is left is the bones, so to speak. And people call that someone's 
conjecture and it becomes a prize.  But it's maybe not as interesting as the 
interesting things that have been done before. But it’s a matter of taste. 
There are many conjectures like that, which are still unsolved and may be 
considered interesting, but it's not obvious that all of them are.  
 
As Michael points out, great individuals are not infallible. Their work may later be 
scrutinised and found to be flawed, untrue, or incomplete. The contribution of the 
great individual however is not only the result of creating accurate proofs, but 
rather it is through their originality of vision or approach, or through their 
leadership, which distinguishes them. However, when we start to dissociate 
authority and legitimacy from truth, then we begin to see, as Michael points out, 
how there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in significations. Prizes, status and 
position have a lot to do with taste, as much as they have to do with correctness.  
4.33 Visions of truth and beauty: Understanding how discourse shapes perception  
Despite the arbitrary nature of taste, in mathematical discourse there are perceived 
to be certain absolutes about mathematical proofs and structures. Beauty is one of 
these absolutes, and manifests itself in aesthetic discourse. Such discourse 
naturalises certain values and dispositions towards features of the mathematical 
landscape, shaping how we come to perceive and relate to them. Discourse around 
"truth", similarly, is used as a means of legitimising certain ways of viewing the 
mathematical field. Below geometer Carl gives a description of what an ideal or 
"true" mathematician should be:    
C: A true mathematician?  A true mathematician is somebody who pursues 
truth with passion, with no compromise. He is obsessed by truth - what is 
truth? And you understand by how I live that I have no problem with 
compromise, because in life things are based on compromising. But that is a 
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very non-mathematical approach to life. Many true mathematicians - they 
don’t even understand that question. They pursue truth with elegance and 
passion and they don’t believe that the rest has so much value. So this 
obsession with finding the truth takes all their strength. I think that's a 
decent definition of a true mathematician. It’s a test for truth and truth does 
not exist outside of mathematics. Even in physics it is unclear, but in 
mathematics it is a unique community in the world where the definition of 
quality is essentially accepted and shared by all the community. Go visit a 
physicist they are ready for war every day. Mathematicians more or less 
agree - it’s a very special group.  
 
This idealisation of the mathematician is no doubt based upon certain cultural 
tropes, stereotypes and prototypes from the popular mathematical imagination. 
Certain famous individuals such as Leonard Euler, Henri Poincaré, or Isaac Newton, 
become the reference points by which to guide mathematician's perception of 
success within the field. These utopian visions of the "True" mathematician are part 
of the schemas which comprise mathematical habitus. The true mathematician 
becomes part of the imagined field of mathematics, along with the ideals of truth 
and beauty, and a belief in consensus and harmony across the field.  Such images of 
the ideal mathematician structure individuals’ conceptions of the field of 
mathematics by cultivating certain sets of values and judgements. Cultivating a 
certain style of thought, or habitus, influences how an individual relates to 
mathematical reality, but, as Topologist Estevan, below, explains, entertaining 
certain viewpoints or ideologies can narrow one's vision of the field as much as it 
can expand it:  
E: The mainstream is still very much in the Bourbaki style15, which is very 
abstract, not drawing too much. It’s a French tradition and very strong here. 
Most people in this corridor they think like me. We work a lot with 
                                                          
15 Nicolas Bourbaki was a pseudonym adopted by a group of primarily French mathematicians 
operating out of Paris during the 1930’s. Their preoccupation was on creating a set-theoretical 
foundation for all of mathematics.    
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theoretical physicists. People in quantum gravity for example need our 
work. There's been a change in the world, now the concrete people are 
mathematicians and the abstract people are the physicists. It’s the physicists 
who are inventing very complex objects to describe relativity and quantum 
mechanics. Mathematicians we don’t pretend to understand this. We just 
walk along a very small part of this field. It’s a very interesting observation 
that in the middle of the 20th century the Bourbaki viewpoint has led to a 
very important set of results.  
The Bourbakist idea works like this, if you think of some problem you 
can make it very general, very abstract and then it becomes clear and 
simple. It’s a fact that sometimes this approach works. If you find the right 
structure and ignore everything else, if you keep the important structure 
then everything becomes clear and understandable. It's wonderful to see 
this. To transform a problem that was very complicated, once you put in 
some complicated language then it becomes simple. So there was a kind of 
dream that everything could be handled this way. This was the Bourbakist's 
dream. But this is only partially true. There are always people like Thom or 
isolated French mathematicians, Russians, Americans, who were very 
suspicious about that. This approach leads nowhere - just to pure 
abstraction, with no deep result.  
 
One's vision of the mathematical landscape, we see, is never pristine. Rather it is 
influenced by habitus, by the values and dispositions generated by certain 
ideologies or "styles" of thought. The ideals of truth and beauty are likewise the 
product of ideology, taste and fashion. Such value-categories therefore are not 
fixed, and absolute, but rather they are fluid, and change with time. The importance 
of certain proofs and constructions is thus subject to the judgements of the 
community of practitioners, and is therefore influenced by the dominant tastes and 
aesthetic sensibilities of the social group. Through discourse on truth and beauty 
the individual mathematician is influenced in the directions their research takes, 
the questions they ask, as well as ways in which their ideas are presented. As 
topologist Lawrence explains, the directions of the field are constantly changing, as 
tastes and interests evolve over time: 
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L: As I said he was a great man. But that was my, as I said, rather 
unexceptional history. But I was fortunate in that the field has developed 
relatively differently. It used to be very popular in the late 60s, and then in 
the 1970s, just as I got into it, it stopped dead, and so I've kind of been a bit 
like the last of the Mohicans - everybody has moved on to something else 
and I'm still working on surgery theory. But it's alright I can live with the 
shame. In fact when people in more fashionable fields need to know 
something about this theory they come to me. At any rate I have my 
speciality - it's not so narrow. It is somewhat narrow. It's not as fashionable 
as it used to be, but it hasn't completely gone out of fashion either. It’s a 
kind of interesting field and it’s quite difficult for outsiders to get into as 
well. That’s a problem. So I have to spend a lot of time explaining to my 
students what it is and so on, there's quite a lot of background.  
 
4.34 The Value of visionaries: How agency affects the structure of the field  
If we accept that tastes change over time, then we come to understand that the 
ideal of an absolute sense of truth and beauty in mathematics does not exist, but 
rather is a product of the beliefs of the present community. These beliefs, in turn, 
are shaped by influential individuals and groups within the field. Such social entities 
exert their influence through their control over both the means of knowledge 
production, and the distribution of social capital. Through editors controlling what 
is published in journals, or committees allocating prizes; from directors deciding 
where to allocate funds, to the heads of departments choosing who to hire, so 
there are a number of decision-making entities, at local levels, who sum to affect 
the directions of the global field.  
Decision-makers help to shape the tastes of others, by assigning status 
(implicitly or explicitly) to certain problems, questions, or ideas. Such assignments 
focus attention on one part of the field and therefore not on others, and, as a 
result, resources flow to some areas and not to others. By assigning values and 
statuses to problems and ideas, so the field is stratified into different value 
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categories. Through such stratification, a structure is generated by which individuals 
working on certain problems or proofs accrue capital. The importance of problems 
are often justified through defining them as "difficult", but, as Bertrand explains, 
the "difficulty" of problems is itself relative to one's viewpoint:  
B: So there is not much philosophy in that, but still it’s the source of 
problems. You have to choose the right "a implies b" sometimes the 
question is not so interesting and sometimes it becomes like the Poincare 
conjecture - it becomes one of the major questions. If you look at how the 
problem was born it's just "I know that a implies b, but does b imply a".  
So I don't think that there should be a hierarchy of problems, I think 
that the sources of problems are very diverse. But I think for example that 
it’s totally wrong to say that some problems are worth a million dollars16 
and other problems are not worth anything, or maybe 10,000 dollars 
[laughs]. I think it's totally absurd because to me it’s a sign of arrogance. 
Because many problems are solved because someone makes a small shift in 
viewpoint and suddenly a solution appears.   
It's very arrogant to say "this is a very difficult problem". It just 
means that we don’t have the right viewpoint. And if we had not had the 
work of the 19th century mathematicians on elliptic curves, which was really 
I think governed by an aesthetic need to understand those complicated 
elliptic functions from many diverse viewpoints. This occupied many of the 
best mathematicians in the late 19th and early 20th century. If we didn't 
have that, then Fermat's theorem would not have been proved because, 
basically, all the theory that went into it took its roots, after the discovery of 
Gauch, it took its theory from the classical theory of elliptic curves. Of 
course it was made arithmetical and made closer to Galois Theory in many 
ways. But, nevertheless, without this sort of background in elliptic curves 
maybe Fermat's theorem would not have been proved.  
But who can say which theory is going to be useful in solving which 
problem? In 1950 nobody would have, before Gauch, have thought that 
behind Fermat's problem was a difficult problem on elliptic curves so as I say 
I think that we should be more modest, that is what history teaches us. It 
also teaches us that a problem like that which does not look so interesting in 
the end has something fairly deep behind it perhaps, but we don't know 
because Fermat's conjecture has been solved, but the ABC conjecture is still 
not solved. It may be solved by an elegant change in viewpoint. But who 
                                                          
16 Bertrand refers here to the Clay Mathematics Institute’s 7 Millennium Prize problems. These 
problems include the Riemann hypothesis and the Poincare conjecture among others. Successful 
proof of these problems comes with a $1 million prize.  
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knows - someone has claimed to have solved it. Mochizucki has - but 
apparently no one understands.  
  
Bertrand argues that, by creating hierarchies of problems, mathematicians narrow 
down their fields of view, and neglect certain viewpoints. The effect of popularising 
certain ideas over others can also influence the career trajectories of researchers, 
as Alicia explains:  
A: I was a little lucky when it comes to my degree. When I was doing my 
masters there was the proof of Fermat's conjecture. In [19]92. It changed 
everything in this field. Before the proof of Wiles everyone said that it was a 
very bad subject and we cannot prove anything in it - it's too difficult. After 
Wiles there were a lot of new questions, and a lot of money for us to go to 
conferences. Everybody was excited. It was a great time to begin in this 
field. So I'm lucky in that respect. At the time I only tried to learn a little bit 
about Fermat's theorem. So I tried to understand a little part of the theorem 
and to use the theorem to understand some other parts. It was a very nice 
time.  
I was also lucky because since there is this proof of Fermat, the 
community received a lot of money. So in Algebraic geometry we arranged a 
lot of conferences. Beside these we had a semester at the Institut Henri 
Poincaré. So it was a great chance for me because every mathematician in 
the field was there. So I met everyone at this conference. I began to discuss 
with CB. And it was very nice because he is a wonderful person. You know in 
mathematics there are people who create new mathematics, and he is one 
of these people.  
At the beginning he was quite sad. CB is a student of Fontane's - he 
was not "CB" at this time, he hadn't yet got his personality. His title was "the 
student of Fontane". He didn't think at the time that people believed his 
theory.  
At the time I shared an office with him, but I believed his theory. I'm 
not a mathematician like him, I don’t have so many good ideas, but I like to 
make computations. I enjoy computing. I did a lot of computation for CB and 
it was a wonderful collaboration, because he had so many good ideas. But 
he was quite sad because he thought that nobody quite believed his ideas. 
But I believed, and did a lot of computation for him.  
He had a big influence on many people. He created an entire field of 
research. I knew how to compute a mathematical object which is called a 
deformation ring and he knows this theory of Fontane, because he was a 
285 
 
student of Fontane. And if you put everything together you obtain our 
conjecture. This conjecture, now called the CB-AM conjecture, it's in fact the 
first symptom of the P-adic Langland's theory. It’s the first time we see the 
two different worlds are related. It was a numerical aspect of the P-adic 
Langlands programme. It was the first computation which shows that the 
two worlds should be related. So a lot of people are working in this field, 
and he created this…CB is very original. He was one of the first people to 
have the idea for finding a path.  
 
Being part of a dominant discipline gives a researcher access to resources: to 
funding, research positions, statuses and prizes. Being part of a dominant area of 
the field is empowering, through providing individuals with opportunities to travel 
to conferences, to present their work, to build their networks, and to enhance their 
profile and reputation. A famous problem in a popular area can therefore create 
famous problem solvers. The same is true for more visible parts of the field, which 
make individuals who work in such areas more visible. To become visible within 
mathematics thus requires not only that an individual presents "important" ideas, 
but also that they present such ideas within visible fields, in manners fitting to the 
field, and have their work recognised and valued by others within such a field. To be 
valued as a "visionary" is thus dependent on there being a suitable audience to 
recognise one as such.  
4.35 The fields of force: How social status shapes the perceptual field   
Authorities invested with status, influence and social capital shape the 
mathematical field; through the forces generated by capital accumulations, so 
individuals gain the ability to shape perceptions within the field; but such forces 
exerted by capital-rich individuals also have an effect on other individuals who 
comprise the field. Such forces, however, are often invisible, hidden in discourse, 
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and made to appear natural. These forces, as we have seen, can make certain 
viewpoints more visible, they can make ideas more recognisable, or individuals 
more reputable. But equally the forces generated by capital-accumulations can also 
destroy visions, careers, and ideas. Individuals who wield these forces can have a 
lasting influence on the field and the lives of ideas and individuals, as Martin 
explains below: 
M: You must realise that as a student of Thom, I was much frustrated by the 
end of the 70s because you know that in the 70s you had Thom's books and 
you had Zeeman's papers. And so it was very fashionable to do catastrophe 
theory and lots of people were saying absolutely stupid things about the 
subject. And at the end of the 70s Smale had decided to write a paper in the 
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, which was strongly against 
catastrophe theory. For me it was a catastrophe, so to speak, because that's 
what I wanted to do. And in fact, as I had to earn a living for my family, I was 
a coward and stopped.  
I started doing something like catastrophe theory and I only started 
doing catastrophe theory in 2005. I have always taught bifurcations and so 
on and it’s closely related to invariant manifolds so I cannot say I didn’t do it 
at all, but nevertheless I started doing things in that domain in 2005, and 
then what I tried to do was something considered impossible. Because one 
of the reasons why catastrophe theory was considered a failure was that the 
catastrophe theory for dynamical systems is not something as clear as for 
differentiable maps.  
In fact what I started doing was what Thom calls the natural 
stratification of a space of functions. I started doing a stratification for the 
space of dynamical systems. So it's not exactly the space of dynamical 
systems, it’s the product of the space of dynamical systems with the 
manifold on which they are acting. And so in fact it works. So I started to 
carry the things a little further than what was known, in particular I proved 
an extension of the Hopf bifurcation - this is what happens when an 
equilibrium becomes a periodic orbit, and this is rather a brutal process, it 
happens all at once. And you have the same phenomenon, for maps, if you 
have a fixed point, it becomes an invariant circle all at once and it has a 
translation for vector fields. You have a periodic solution that becomes quasi 
periodic, that is a torus. But what I proved was that if you allow more than 
one parameter then you have lots of invariant compact manifolds arising. 
You have spheres, you have all kinds of intersections of quadrics, you have 
tori which have larger dimensions than what you imagine and so on. And all 
this takes some room, meaning that it happens in open regions. It’s a 
strange thing.  
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IN: Did Smale's article make catastrophe theory more unpopular 
amongst the mathematical community? 
M: Yes, of course. It was strikingly effective. The problem is that at 
the time, in Europe, even in the United Kingdom, research was not paid for 
by public funds, based on projects. You did not have to propose a project to 
get money. This concept in mathematics did not exist at all. So if someone in 
Europe wanted to say something absolutely stupid in catastrophe theory it 
didn’t cost one cent to the tax payer. But unfortunately in the United States 
it was already like it is now everywhere, that is it costs a lot to the tax payer. 
That is the reason that Smale felt compelled to say that lots of the funding 
allotted to catastrophe theory was not well placed. He was right, but on the 
other hand, I still remember it because that was when I became a 
mathematician. And it's quite remarkable how it made people from 
different parts of mathematics and even different parts of science 
communicate. For example, people doing meteorology learnt about the 
Hopf bifurcation at the time, because they discussed it with 
mathematicians. And it has become impossible again after Smale's paper, 
and of course the funding for the research in Catastrophe theory went down 
drastically. And in fact I still believed it was a scientific error. Of course there 
were absolutely silly things done under the name of catastrophe theory. But 
there were very deep ideas that needed to be developed and extended. And 
this didn’t completely stop at the time, but only people like Forest Takens in 
the Netherlands or Vladimir Arnold in the Soviet Union were strong, or 
isolated enough, to go on with that. Because in other parts of the world it 
became not only unfashionable but it almost a dirty word to say 
"catastrophe theory". It was really hard for people like me, because I was 
too young to have gone on with it and convince people. But now, I have no 
career and it doesn’t matter.  
 
We see that Smale's article acted as a catalyst which hindered the development of 
an entire field of enquiry within mathematics. Martin's account exemplifies the role 
that the social world plays in influencing knowledge production in mathematics, 
and particularly the agency that famous individuals can exert on the structure of 
the field.  
The social world, we see, penetrates the mathematical landscape, shaping 
its contours, its features and its boundaries. The social world, we see, is a field of 
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force which produces and reproduces the field of production, through the 
generative schemas of habitus.  
In ending we then see that thinking of the notions of truth and beauty as 
absolutes, can no longer be entertained. Rather, such ideals are part of value 
categories constructed within the realm of discourse. Such values are generated 
within a social field, by social entities, for the purpose of reproducing certain visions 
of the world. In the above I have attempted to give a sense of how such visions and 
narratives come to dominate the field of discourse in mathematics. I have 
attempted to show that tastes and ideas evolve as a function of one's social 
context. And finally, through the example of catastrophe theory, I have tried to 

































Chapter 5: Discussion and 
Conclusions 
  
5.0 Overview  
 
Within this thesis I have introduced three different “frames”, which serve to shape 
mathematicians' perceptions of the mathematical field. In the first frame, the 
physical frame (chapter 2), I demonstrated how space is utilised to structure 
routines, and performances of self and ideas within mathematical institutes. In the 
second, conceptual frame (chapter 3), I demonstrated how reference frames are 
created within physical space which serve, analogically, to model abstract 
conceptual spaces. In the third, discourse frame (chapter 4), I demonstrated the 
role that social relations play in shaping perceptions of taste, aesthetics, and 
importance in the field.  
Throughout I have focused on positioning the mathematician within the 
mathematical field. This positioning, I explained, takes place within multiple 
dimensions, as a result of analogous structuring principles operating simultaneously 
across these dimensions. A mathematician's dispositions and perceptions of the 
field, I argued, are products of positioning, and such positioning, in turn, shape how 
mathematics is produced and performed in practice. The mathematical field is thus 
a field of positionings, and a field of relations between positions. This field is 
structured according to the distribution of socially valued capital, and this capital 
serves as a means of differentiating and integrating certain members of the field, 
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that is to say, possession of shared capital resources creates objective relationships 
between individuals, through structuring them within the same neighbourhoods 
within the field.  
Within these neighbourhoods individuals are subjected to similar local 
forces from the field, which shape their dispositions and orientations to 
mathematical phenomena in similar ways. The structured sets of dispositions which 
result are called habitus and, in mathematics, these may consist of shared 
examples, concepts, techniques, histories, and notions of taste specific to a given 
discipline. In practice, individuals each bear their own unique instantiations of 
habitus, which have emerged through their own situated engagements with 
mathematical problems, through experiments and craftwork (Section 3.1). These 
habitus are also subject to change, as a function of the social and physical contexts 
in which a mathematician performs their mathematics. As we saw in Section 2.3, 
instantiations of habitus varied depending on the formalities and visibility of the 
stages of performance.  
5.1 Position, perspective, perception: How does position shape disposition? 
The structure of habitus, because of their variability, multiplicity, mutability, and 
metaphorical nature, make them somewhat under-determined in practice. 
However, it is precisely because of these properties that I utilise the notion of 
habitus. The dispositions which constitute habitus do not solely refer to bodily 
dispositions, manifested in ways of gesturing, speaking, etc. They also refer to 
perceptual dispositions, aesthetic dispositions, mental dispositions, etc. The habitus 
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thus is a way of relating different realms of experience to processes of socialisation 
and domestication.  
Habitus embeds all human experience, all knowledge-production, all 
objectivity, within the realm of the social, and thus mathematical disciplines can be 
analysed as any other system of social relations. Such systems of social relations, 
within the theoretical framework I have used, are referred to as fields. Such fields, 
as Bourdieu characterises them, are contested terrains in which individuals struggle 
for the possession of capital. Capital distorts the field and creates fields of force, 
which influence the decision making powers of other actors in the field. Such forces 
shape habitus, and thus shape the perception of phenomena, as Bourdieu explains 
below:   
[T]he scientific field, like other fields, is a structured field of forces, and also 
a field of struggles to conserve or transform this field of forces. The first part 
of the definition (a field of forces) corresponds to the physicalist stage of 
sociology conceived as a social physics. The agents, isolated scientists, teams 
or laboratories, create, through their relationships, the very space that 
determines them, although it only exists through the agents placed in it, 
who, to use the language of physics, "distort the space in their 
neighbourhood", conferring a certain structure upon it. It is in the 
relationship between the various agents (conceived as "field sources") that 
the field and the relations of force that characterize it are generated (a 
specific symbolic relation of force, given the "nature" of the force capable of 
being exerted in this field - scientific capital, a form of symbolic capital 
which acts in and through communication). More precisely, it is the agents, 
that is to say the isolated scientists, teams or laboratories, defined by the 
volume and structure of the specific capital they possess, that determine the 
structure of the field that determines them, in other words the state of the 
forces that are exerted on scientific production, on the scientist's practice. 
The weight associated with an agent, who undergoes the forces of the field 
at the same time as he helps to structure it, depends on all the other agents, 
all the other points in the space, and the relations among those points, that 




In Bourdieu's notion of field, individuals are weighted according to their relative 
capital accumulations, and such weight determines the extent to which they distort 
the field, and exert a force on other social actors. But such forces can only be felt if 
all the actors involved share certain principles and values, that is to say, that they 
share certain definitions of what constitutes social or symbolic capital. Such 
definitions are generated by habitus, which provide the perceptual lenses through 
which individuals can discern, discriminate, recognise and evaluate socially 
meaningful categories and values. The individual's ability to recognise and 
discriminate, to have a discerning eye, is specific to their given position within the 
field. There are thus many habitus present within the field, which are adopted and 
adapted by the individual according to their place in the field. As Bourdieu explains, 
the ability to recognise, to discriminate certain phenomena, bestows upon the 
individual their sense of place, relative to others within the field: 
Thus the representations of agents vary with their position (and with the 
interest associated with it) and with their habitus, as a system of schemes of 
perception and appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures 
which are acquired through the lasting experience of a social position. 
Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system 
of perception and appreciation of practices. And, in both of these 
dimensions, its operation expresses the social position in which it was 
elaborated. Consequently, habitus produces practices and representations 
which are available for classification, which are objectively differentiated; 
however, they are immediately perceived as such only by those agents who 
possess the code, the classificatory schemes necessary to understand their 
social meaning. Habitus thus implies a "sense of one's place" but also a 
"sense of the place of others." (Bourdieu, 1989:19) 
 
Positions shape dispositions (perceptions) and also the strategies individuals adopt 
in their practice of day to day life. An individual's place within the field thus 
becomes manifested in the food they eat, the sports they enjoy, the places they 
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visit, etc. Social position is symbolised in ways of speaking, acting, consuming 
products; and these symbols of status are made visible and displayed through 
performing them in public places. Through such presentations of self, the individual 
creates the distinctions which symbolise social position, as Bourdieu explains: 
This formula, which might seem abstract and obscure, states the first 
condition for an adequate reading of the analysis of the relation between 
social positions (a relational concept), dispositions (or habitus), and stances 
("position taking"), that is, the "choices" made by the social agents in the 
most diverse domains of practice, food, or sport, music or politics, and so 
on. It is a reminder that comparison is possible only from system to system, 
and that the search for direct equivalence between features seized in 
isolation, whether, appearing at first sight different, they prove to be 
"functionally" or technically equivalent or nominally identical, risks unduly 
identifying structurally different properties or wrongly distinguishing 
structurally identical properties. The very title Distinction serves as a 
reminder that what is commonly called distinction, that is, a certain quality 
of bearing and manners, mostly considered innate is nothing in fact but 
difference, a gap, a distinctive feature, in short, a relational property existing 
only in and through its relation with other properties. (Bourdieu, 1996:10-
11) 
 
In the mathematics institute I demonstrated how individuals position themselves 
within spaces: occupying common spaces, staging encounters, making themselves 
visible or invisible. I observed different presentations of self and ideas in the 
frontstage and backstage, and documented the transformations ideas undergo as 
they move from private to public realms (see section 2.3). As ideas enter public 
stages, so they must conform to certain standards and values; and, through others 
recognising such properties, so ideas may be positioned in relation to existing 
knowledge, and assimilated into the field. Within mathematics, however, this 
process of accepting or validating knowledge is also dependent upon the social 
position of the individual knowledge-producer within the field of production. An 
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individual's reputation and social standing in the community facilitates an idea's 
chances of being accepted, trusted, and made visible. Recognition of ideas 
therefore is as much a product of the idea's merit, as it is the force exerted by the 
social position of its author (See section 4.3).  
Position within social space therefore generates certain perceptions or 
preconceptions about ideas, which invests them with aesthetic qualities, such as 
being "truthful" or "beautiful". The ability to recognise or discern such qualities 
defines one's sense of place within the field, and such place is experienced as being 
"natural", as Bourdieu explains: 
[T]he sense of the position occupied in social space (what Erving Goffman 
calls the "sense of one's place") is the practical mastery of the social 
structure as a whole that reveals itself through the sense of the position 
occupied within that structure. The categories of perception of the social 
world are, as regards their most essential features, the product of the 
internalization, the incorporation, of the objective structures of social space. 
Consequently, they incline agents to accept the social world as it is, to take 
it for granted, rather than to rebel against it, to counterpose to it different, 
even antagonistic, possibles (Bourdieu, 1985:728) 
 
In this thesis I demonstrated how this sense of place manifests itself in the ways in 
which mathematicians talk about their own place within, and contributions to, the 
mathematical field. Many position themselves in relation to the "great 
mathematicians": Euler, Poincaré, Grothendiek, etc. Others characterise themselves 
as "lucky" at having reached their current position, and do not attribute their status 
to their own abilities. Some position themselves in relation to their supervisors, and 
demonstrate the role played by others in shaping their careers and ideas. However 
some individuals position themselves outside of the mainstream, preferring to 
remain invisible, or silent, or powerless, and limit their presentations of self during 
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seminars, or conferences. For such individuals the field can appear alienating, 
disempowering and frustrating.   
5.2 Distinguishing oneself: How is the social field reproduced? 
The senses of self and place within the field therefore affect the presentations of 
self and ideas. Position affects how visible ideas become, how widely they are 
accepted or adopted, or how much recognition they receive. The sense of position 
also shapes the social networks and collaborations an individual establishes, the 
institutions or conferences they attend, the journals they publish in. An individual in 
a certain position is likely to associate with other individuals of similar status, and 
thus publish in similar journals, and receive similar levels of recognition for their 
work (in terms of citation counts for example). As a result of these similarities in 
social position and knowledge-production practices, we can develop a means of 
measuring the degrees of relatedness between individuals in social space: 
The idea of difference is at the basis of the very notion of space, that is, a set 
of distinct and coexisting positions which are exterior to one another and 
which are defined in relation to one another through relations of proximity, 
vicinity, or distance, as well as through order relations, such as above, 
below, and between; certain properties of members of the bourgeoisie or 
petit-bourgeoisie can, for example, be deduced from the fact that they 
occupy an intermediate position between two extreme positions, without it 
being possible objectively to identify them and without their subjectively 
identifying themselves, either with one or the other position. (Bourdieu, 
1996:11) 
 
As Bourdieu writes above, the positions of individuals allows us to deduce the 
behaviours and characteristics they may manifest. Such positions generate patterns 
of behaviour, consumption, and dispositions, which manifest themselves as "styles" 
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of thinking and acting, which are shared by members of a given category (class) of 
individuals, as Bourdieu explains:  
The second opposition, like the first is the source of differences in 
dispositions and, therefore, in "positions", which can differ in their contents 
according to period and society or can appear under an identical form, such 
as the opposition between intellectuals and proprietors which, in post-war 
France and Japan alike, is translated, in politics, into an opposition between 
left and right, and so on. More broadly, the space of social positions is 
retranslated into a space of "position takings" by the mediation of the space 
of dispositions (or habitus); or, in other words, the system of differential 
deviations in agents' properties (or in the properties of constructed classes 
of agents), that is, in their practices and in the goods they possess, 
corresponds to the system of differential deviations which defines the 
different positions in the two major dimensions of social space. Habitus, 
which are the products of the social conditioning associated with the 
corresponding condition, make a systematic set of goods and properties, 
united by an affinity of style, correspond to each class of positions. 
(Bourdieu, 1996:14-15) 
 
These styles of thinking or acting, or "lifestyles", are distinguishing markers for 
members of a given social grouping. Such markers of distinction become part of the 
symbolic machinery used to convey information about position and possession of 
capital, and such signs, when they are performed effectively, establish the 
interactional frames within which knowledge is produced, and ideas presented. 
Perception of distinctions between individuals and phenomena are thus 
mechanisms for dividing up the social field. The perception of distinctions serves 
both to differentiate and integrate phenomena within certain classes, creating 
differences or relationships between aspects of the field, as Bourdieu explains: 
Distinction -in the ordinary sense of the word -is the difference inscribed in 
the very structure of the social space when perceived through categories 
adapted to that structure; and the Weberian Stand, which is often 
contrasted with the Marxist class, is the class constructed by an adequate 
division of social space, when perceived through categories derived from 
the structure of that space. Symbolic capital -another name for distinction -
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is nothing other than capital, in whatever form, when perceived by an agent 
endowed with categories of perception arising from the internalization 
(embodiment) of the structure of its distribution, i.e., when it is known and 
recognized as self-evident. Distinctions, as symbolic transfigurations of de 
facto differences, and, more generally, ranks, orders, grades, and all other 
symbolic hierarchies, are the product of the application of schemes of 
construction that, like (for example) the pairs of adjectives used to utter 
most social judgements, are the product of the internalization of the 
structures to which they are applied; and the most absolute recognition of 
legitimacy is nothing other than the apprehension of the everyday world as 
self-evident that results from the quasi-perfect coincidence of objective 
structures and embodied structures. (Bourdieu, 1985:731) 
 
In relation to mathematics, we explored how mathematicians learn to distinguish 
mathematical phenomena, through mathematical craftwork and problem solving 
(section 3.2); we also explored how mathematicians adopt certain perceptual 
frameworks from supervisors, and through being socialised within the field (section 
4.1); and finally we explored how aesthetic discourse within mathematics orients 
the individual to certain key texts, exemplars, and role models within the field 
(section 4.3). Through using these frameworks, exemplars, and role-models as 
reference frames, mathematicians are then able to orient themselves within the 
field, and establish stances, or points of view, on the mathematical field itself. Such 
points of view produce sets of positions and possibilities individuals can take within 
the field, and these shape the choices available to individuals in the future. Knowing 
one's place in the field thus gives the individual a knowledge of the field's static 
elements (its present condition), as well as its dynamics (its future directions): 
To have knowledge of the structure is to acquire the means of 
understanding the state of the positions and position-takings, but also the 
probable evolution, the future, of those positions and position-takings. In 
short…analysis of the structure, the statics, and analysis of change, the 




By understanding one's position relative to others, and understanding the 
possibilities for position-taking, so an individual comes to understand the structure 
of the field, as well as their own abilities to effect change within that structure. Built 
into this notion of point of view, or disposition, is therefore a notion of agency, or 
the ability to alter one's position within social space. In mathematics this agency 
manifests itself in the problems mathematicians choose to address, the positions 
they apply for, or the collaborations they form. These choices emerged through an 
understanding of their position within the field, and a perception of the possibilities 
for action based upon their positionings.     
5.3 Constructing a social topology: How can we represent social fields? 
One's position is determined through reference to other positions held by other 
individuals, and these collections of positions constitute a space of relations 
between positions. This space of relative positions is what Bourdieu refers to as a 
topological space. The role of the sociologist is that of constructing such social 
topologies, through defining the relationships between individuals' positions within 
social space. It is for this reason that Bourdieu refers to sociology as "social 
topology" - that is to say, the study of social topologies: 
Sociology, in its objectivist moment, is a social topology, an analysis situs as 
they called this new branch of mathematics in Leibniz's time, an analysis of 
relative positions and of the objective relations between these positions. 
(Bourdieu, 1989:16) 
Bourdieu asks us to think of these topologies, or social spaces, as geographic spaces 
(topographical spaces), which bear properties of position, distance and orientation. 
Individuals closer together in this social space will, therefore, share similar features 
and be integrated within the same classes: 
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At this point of the discussion, we can compare social space to a geographic 
space within which regions are divided up. But this space is constructed in 
such a way that the closer the agents, groups or institutions which are 
situated within this space, the more common properties they have; and the 
more distant, the fewer. (Bourdieu, 1989:16) 
 
Within these classes individuals share similar dispositions and viewpoints from 
which to view the field:   
On the basis of knowledge of the space of positions, one can separate out 
classes, in the logical sense of the word, i.e., sets of agents who occupy 
similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected 
to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions 
and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting 
similar stances. (Bourdieu, 1985:725) 
 
These dispositions serve to constitute the group within the class, and act as 
distinction operators, by which other individuals in the field identify themselves and 
others as belonging to certain positions in social space: 
One of the functions of the notion of habitus is to account for style unity, 
which unites both the practice and goods of a singular agent or a class of 
agents. Habitus are these generative and unifying principles which 
retranslate the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position into a 
unitary life-style, that is, a unitary set of persons, goods, practices. Like the 
positions of which they are the product, habitus are differentiated, but they 
are also differentiating. Being distinct and distinguished, they are also 
distinction operators, implementing different principles of differentiation or 
using differently, the common principles of differentiation. (Bourdieu, 
1996:15)  
 
Through situating individuals within these topological spaces Bourdieu argues that 
we can understand how individuals are shaped by, and how they shape, the social 
fields within which they are situated. Representing social space as a topological 
space, which bears certain properties of distance and differentiability, allows us to 
better situate individuals within the field, and make predictions about the choices 
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they will make, and the beliefs they will hold, as a function of their positions within 
such spaces.  
One of the roles of the sociologist is thus to develop social topologies for the 
social systems we encounter. We do this through understanding the positionings of 
individuals within social spaces, and then objectifying these positions within 
topological representations of social space. To undertake such a process of 
positioning individuals within the field, we must understand the space of positions 
which are specific to a given field. Such a process of positioning the individual 
involves contextualising them within different frames of experience, from the local 
level of an individual's department, to the wider discipline within which they are 
entangled:   
This work of objectification of the subject of objectivation must be carried 
out at three levels: one first has to objectify the position of the subject of 
objectivation in the overall social space, his or her original position and 
trajectory, his or her membership of and commitment to social and religious 
groups ; then one has to objectivate the position he or she occupies within 
the field of specialists, each discipline having its own traditions and national 
particularities, its obligatory problematics, its habits of thought, its shared 
beliefs and self-evidences, its rituals and consecrations, its constraints as 
regards publication of findings, its specific forms of censorship, not to 
mention the whole set of presuppositions inscribed in the collective history 
of the speciality (the academic unconscious); thirdly, one has to objectivate 
everything that is linked to membership of the scholastic universe, paying 
particular attention to the illusion of the absence, of the pure, absolute, 
"disinterested" point of view. The sociology of intellectuals brings to light 
the particular form of interest which is the interest in disinterestedness. 
(Bourdieu, 2004:94) 
 
Through this process of positioning, or "objectivating", the individual we are better 
able to understand how a particular point of view, or set of dispositions, is 
generated. We can understand how such perspectives are produced as products of 
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socialisation and conditioning within certain habitus, and also determine the extent 
to which these perspectives are shared between members of a class. As Bourdieu 
explains below, when the sociologist attempts to position the individual, they are 
attempting to reconstruct the socialisation process by which the individual was 
themselves constituted within a social space. The sociologist thus aims to 
reconstruct the perspectival frame, by which the individual construes the world, by 
attempting to locate the enframing mechanisms within certain positions within the 
social topology: 
A point of view is first of all a view taken from a particular point 
(Gesichtspunkt), a particular position in space and, in the sense in which I 
shall mean it here, in the social space: to objectivate the subject of 
objectivation, the (objectivating) point of view, is to break with the illusion 
of the absolute point of view, which is characteristic of every point of view; 
it is therefore also a perspective view (Schau): all perceptions, visions, 
beliefs, expectations, hopes, etc., are socially structured and socially 
conditioned and they object a law which defines the principle of their 
variation, the law of the correspondence between positions and position-
takings. Individual A's perception is to individual B's perception as A's 
position is to B's position, with the habitus making the connection between 
the space of positions and the space of points of view. (Bourdieu, 2004: 95) 
 
This role of positioning the individual and creating a space of relationships between 
individuals, in the form of a social topology, thus provides the sociologist with a 
means of understanding how position within social space shapes dispositions and 
perceptions. Understanding positionings within the field, likewise, allow us to see 
how individuals within the same mathematical discipline come to share similar 
reference frames and objects, similar tools and languages, as well as similar abilities 
to perceive the mathematical landscape. Such similarities are the products of 
socialisation within the specific local contexts of a social space, which generate 
similar habitus, and styles for thinking and acting.  
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5.4 Representing social topologies: How useful is the concept of social topology? 
Within this thesis I have merely provided the background necessary to understand 
Bourdieu's notion of social topology, and have not fully constructed a topological 
representation of the mathematical disciplines I have studied. I have begun the 
process of situating mathematical production and perception within three different 
realms of experience: physical, conceptual and discourse spaces. I use these spaces 
as frameworks by which to position the reader within the mathematical field, and 
to give the reader a sense of the complexities involved in producing and perceiving 
mathematics. What I have not done is to demonstrate how the sociologist goes 
about the process of positioning individuals in the field, and building topological 
representations of mathematical fields. In this final section I will describe how this 
process of objectivation (Goffman's "framing") can proceed, as well as the possible 
representations which may result:
 
Figure 29 Dividing the field according to varieties of capital and creating frames for 
positioning individuals within the field. 
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 To begin to transform a field of production into a social topology we first 
need to divide the field into different social frames, which are relevant to 
determining the position of the individual.  
 These frames correspond to the different varieties of capital that are 
relevant to the positioning of the individual in the field. The distribution of 
capital, after all, is what constitutes the field of production in the first place.  
 Once we have determined the relevant grades of capital, be they economic, 
symbolic, political, etc., we can begin to view the field as a whole, and locate 
different groups or classes co-existing within the field.  
 We now need to understand the general contours of the social space. To do 
this we must understand how different forms of capital are distributed 
within the field. In relation to mathematics this could be through studying 
bibliometric data, studying impact, or through looking at funding levels 
according to discipline. 
 Our next task is to understand the sites of capital accumulation and 
knowledge-production. To do this we must locate the various departments 
or institutes within which mathematics is produced. We must ask how these 
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institutions are connected and perhaps measure productivity and reputation 
as a function of output (of publications, PhD students, prizes won, etc.).  
 Once these macro level interactions and distributions of capital have been 
defined it is possible to explore the finer scale interactions, at the level of 
institutes, or individuals’ social network. 
 Using such maps it is then possible to identify key individuals within a social 
network. These individuals can act as nodes for transferring information 
within or between networks, or can be influential individuals who shape the 
Figure 30: Visualising different classes which emerge as a result of shared capital 
accumulations, as represented on a topological space 
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opinions or ideas of others. Such individuals are given certain weights which 
change the topology or shape of the network itself.  
Figure 31 Graph representation of an individual's social network. Large nodes 
represent influential individuals with large capital accumulations, arrows 
determine flow of capital or direction of influence. 
 After building these social network topologies it is possible to position 
individuals within specific reference frames: within nations, within 
institutions, within local communities, etc. Micro scale, social spaces of 
individuals can then be constructed, which chart out the individual's 
biography - for example education or career trajectories.  
 An individual's history of ideas and the influences on such ideas can be 
charted, through asking the individual to describe their research histories, 
and the origins of their ideas.   
 The individual’s performances within different institutional frameworks can 
be documented through shadowing individuals over extended periods, and 
understanding how they present themselves and ideas within different 
spatial contexts. The motivations, expectations, perceptions of individuals 
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can be studied, in order to understand how an individual positions 
themselves within the field, and how such a field is perceived by them.  
 Finally the life-cycles of individual ideas can be explored, from conception to 
publication, through following the material remains of concepts in 
notebooks, and at blackboards. At this level we will explore decision making 
processes - of how to present an argument, where to publish the paper, 
etc.; as well as the changes ideas undergo, as they are communicated within 
different contexts and to different individuals.   
 Through a process of framing, at different scales of magnification, we can 
thus build up a clear sense of an individual's position, orientations and 
dispositions within a field. We can then explore how such orientations affect 
the knowledge produced, and how and where such knowledge is presented. 
By means of this system of framing, or "objectivating", the individual and 
their ideas, we can build up a social topology, and a sense of how the 
individual's ideas change as a function of their position and movement 
within social space.   
This task of constructing social topologies is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, my future work will involve developing these concepts further and 
building tools by which social spaces and habitus can be represented 
mathematically. However, I hope that the above outline gives a sense of how such 
social topologies may be built, through following Bourdieu’s procedures on framing 
and positioning. The justifications for creating such social topologies may not seem 
entirely clear from the above descriptions, however I believe that being able to 
situate individuals within social space can provide analytical tools by which to: 
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1.  Study the effects of unequal distributions of capital on social groups.  
2. Understand social mobility as a function of social topology  
3. Model different effects of capital accumulations.  
4. Compare the topologies of different social systems.  
5. Understand how positioning effects dispositions and world view.  
6. Predict behaviour of individuals within certain framings.  
This process of defining social spaces in terms of topological spaces, however, lies in 
my future work. What I have presented in this thesis is a foundation for 
understanding how such an analysis can proceed. This foundation is based primarily 
on Bourdieu’s theoretical framework of capital, field, habitus and practice. I have 
used such terminology to define how individuals position themselves, and how they 
are positioned within, mathematical fields. Such positionings, I have explained, 
shape individuals’ dispositions towards mathematical phenomena, which in turn 
affect how they perceive mathematical spaces and produce knowledge in the 
mathematical field.   
 The forces of fields and habitus, I have explained, affect dispositions and 
behaviour on multiple dimensions of experience. I have demonstrated the effects at 
the levels of physical, conceptual and discourse spaces, and have showed how 
similar ordering principles exist within each of these different spatial dimensions. 
My argument was that habitus act as bridges between worlds, and that the 
schemes of habitus structure different dimensions of experience in similar ways, 
through the processes of analogical relation and metaphorical projection. I 
explained that individuals are socialised within habitus according to their positions 
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within social fields, and that these positions then serve to shape dispositions 
towards the world.  
5.5 Contribution to Knowledge  
Although such a Bourdieu-inspired analysis has been undertaken within the history 
of mathematics (by Goldstein 2007, Ehrhardt 2010, 2016 and Brian 1994), within 
the sociology of mathematics such an analysis still retains some novelty. In my 
discussion of the tensions between competition and friendship I do present nuance 
to the traditional view of the field as a purely competitive field, or battlefield. 
Rather than the field being conflictual I suggest there are other strategies that can 
be adopted, based upon reciprocity or altruism. Within these modalities the notion 
of distinction and differentiation becomes less important, and the ideal of 
integration comes more to the fore.  
 My observations on craftwork extend existing work conducted by Barany 
(2011) and Greifenhagen (2012). I provide greater detail on the physical processes 
involved in organising and producing mathematics, and demonstrate the selecting, 
sorting, relating and differentiating processes that ideas undergo as they move 
from informal to formal stages of presentation. Relating knowledge-production 
practices to physical processes I believe presents the embodied, affective aspects to 






5.6 Future Directions  
One aspect of my future work will involve studying mathematical genealogies, and 
exploring the mechanisms by which knowledge is transmitted and transformed as it 
is inherited. To understand inheritance and kinship networks I intend on extending 
my studies outside of institutional contexts, to explore mathematics education 
within university mathematics’ departments. My aim will be to document the 
socialisation process by following mathematicians’ careers from undergraduate to 
post-graduate levels. To examine the effects of different cultural traditions on 
mathematical practice and knowledge production I will attempt to gain access to 
departments in China, Japan or Russia and compare them with education at 
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